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ABSTRACT
DEMOCRATIC COUNTERINSURGENTS: HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PREVAIL
IN IRREGULAR WARFARE
William Roland Patterson
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz

This dissertation answers the question o f whether or not democracies can win
counterinsurgency conflicts. This is done first through an analysis o f the arguments made
by those who claim that democracies are uniquely incapable o f doing so due to various
limitations imposed by public opinion as well as the arguments o f those who argue that
democracies can win such conflicts given the correct strategy. Secondly, the question is
investigated through an examination o f three case studies: Malaysia, Vietnam, and Iraq.
This analysis demonstrates that the arguments against the ability o f democracies to win
counterinsurgencies is not as strong as many scholars currently believe. Secondly, this
research demonstrates that a population-based, culturally-informed, counterinsurgency
strategy provides a plausible avenue o f victory for democratic states faced with
insurgencies. Though such a strategy cannot guarantee success, the more closely it is
followed the more likely success will be.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

THE PUZZLE
We are in a critical part o f history when it comes to counterinsurgency warfare.
One war, Iraq, is over for the United States and another, Afghanistan, is winding down.
Some major goals were accomplished in each place. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein was
overthrown, tried and executed and his brutal Baathist regime was dismantled.
Furthermore, elections were held which led to the establishment o f a government that
represents a majority o f the Iraqi people. Similarly, in Afghanistan the Taliban were
overrun and removed from power and the current government was established by
democratic means. Progress has been made on establishing and training Afghan security
forces and police and some progress has been made in regards to economic development.
Neither o f these conflicts, however, can be considered an untarnished victory for
the U.S. Violence has been on the rise in Iraq since the U.S. withdrawal and sectarian
tensions continue to prevent political reconciliation and stability. In Afghanistan the
Taliban continue to threaten the stability and security o f the country and al Qaeda
remains a threat. After more than a decade o f effort, more than a trillion dollars spent,
thousands o f lives lost and tens o f thousands o f severe injuries, the costs o f these conflicts
have been great. In the wake o f such costs many have come to the conclusion that
succeeding at counterinsurgency is not possible, especially for democracies that must be
responsive to the will o f the people. Such conflicts are said to be too lengthy to maintain
public approval and they are simply too costly in terms o f treasure and lives. Some have
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concluded from this that no such efforts should ever be attempted again and that
democracies, especially the U.S., should focus their military efforts on conventional
threats.
It is not at all clear, however, that this is the correct conclusion to draw. It is too
hasty to claim that counterinsurgency is impossible without a close look at the totality o f
the theoretical and empirical evidence. Furthermore, democracies may not have the
convenience o f simply proclaiming a disdain for counterinsurgency and pledging to avoid
them. It is rare that such conflicts are desired. They are entered into because they are
seen as vital to the national security. Failing to prepare for counterinsurgency will only
make victory less likely the next time one is unavoidable. It is therefore imperative to
draw proper conclusions about the viability o f success in counterinsurgency from the
vantage point o f democratic regimes. The analysis presented here is intended to further
clarify the issues at stake and bring us to more firmly grounded conclusions upon which
democratic governments can base important defense and military decisions.
The fact that large powerful countries have frequently lost in counterinsurgency
warfare against much weaker opponents during the past century is puzzling from the
perspective o f realist international relations theory. Since power is the predominant
factor in realist theory, the larger power should almost always win. While other factors
may be significant at the margins and result in an occasional upset, the vast majority of
wars will, according to realism, be settled by power differentials. As Ivan Arreguin-Toft
explains, “As far back as Thucydides’ description o f the wars between Athens and
Sparta, the link between power and conflict outcomes has been the root principle o f
realist international relations theory. More power means winning wars, and less power
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means losing them.” 1 The facts suggest, however, that within the past fifty years strong
states, even when vastly more powerful than their opponents, have been losing small
wars at a much greater rate than in the past. Calculations by Arreguin-Toft indicate that
from 1950 - 1999 the more powerful actor won such wars only 48.8% o f the time; less
than half! The rate of success by powerful actors in earlier fifty year increments were
much higher (1800-49, 88.2%; 1850-99, 79.5%; 1900-49, 65.1%).2
Democratic states are considered especially ineffective at counterinsurgency
warfare. Jason Lyall, for example, notes that “To date, a near consensus exists among
scholars, policymakers, and journalists around the belief that democracies are uniquely
deficient when fighting counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns.”3 Several arguments have
been advanced to explain the deficiencies demonstrated by democratic regimes in this
regard. Efrain Inbar lists several o f them in the introduction to his book, Democracies
and Small Wars:
By their nature, democracies clearly have greater constraints than autocratic
regimes on their freedom o f action as they have to meet constitutional, legal and
moral criteria in their use o f force, and particularly so regarding the management
o f small wars. There are limits on the ruthlessness to which democracies can
recur in subduing their enemies. The relatively slower decision-making
processes, due to a less centralized system than in autocracies reduces the amount
o f flexibility required for waging small wars. Democratic political processes,
including engaging in war, also require a certain amount o f transparency, which is
invariably at the expense o f the military operational needs for secrecy.
Unquestionably, democracies pay a certain price in combat effectiveness for
maintaining their values.4

1 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory o f Asymmetric Conflict,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.
2 Arreguin-Toft, 4.
3 Jason Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing
Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration,” International Organization 64
(W inter 2010): 167.
4 Efraim Inbar, Introduction to Democracies and Small Wars, ed. Efraim Inbar, (London:
Frank Cass, 2003), viii - ix.
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Despite the strong case that has been made by a variety o f scholars using an array
o f arguments to demonstrate that democracies are particularly unsuited to
counterinsurgency, there is an opposing literature which is consolidated around an
effective counterinsurgency strategy applicable by democratic governments. It has long
been a tenet o f counterinsurgency doctrine that the local population is the key to winning
such conflicts. In his 1964 masterpiece, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and
Practice, for example, David Galula argued that the First Law o f counterinsurgency is
that: “The Support o f the Population is as Necessary for the Counterinsurgent as for the
Insurgent.”5 In fact, he argues that support from the population is the key determinant o f
power in counterinsurgency conflicts. “In conventional warfare,” he argues,
strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the
number o f divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In
revolutionary warfare [insurgencies], strength must be assessed by the extent o f
support from the population as measured in terms o f political organization at the
grass roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position o f strength when his power
is embodied in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the
population.6
If this is true, power must be measured differently than it is in conventional warfare. A
belligerent with more tanks but less support from the population may in fact be less
“powerful” than its ostensibly weaker opponent.
This population-centered notion o f counterinsurgency has found support among
other key theorists, including David Kilcullen,7 and has culminated in the U.S. Army and

5 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT:
Praeger Security International, 1964, 2004), 52.
6 Galula, p. 55.
7 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst o f a Big
One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual under the direction o f Gen. David
Petraeus.8 The strategy involves three primary components: providing security to the
population, understanding the needs o f the population through close interaction with them
and a nuanced grasp of the culture, and developing legitimacy for the government
through improved governance, institutions, and development projects. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, a strategy called “clear, hold, build” was eventually implemented which
essentially followed this approach and improved the situation on the ground in both
places.
There is a wide divergence in the literature pertaining to counterinsurgency. On
the one hand, there is agreement among one group o f experts (mostly academics) that
democracies are uniquely incapable o f carrying out counterinsurgency warfare while, on
the other hand, there is another group, composed of both military practitioners and some
academics, which argues that democracies can be successful given that they follow the
appropriate strategy. Determining which one o f these competing camps in the literature
is correct, or, whether or not they both contain elements o f the truth, is extremely
important to future force structure and national security issues for many democratic
regimes, but particularly for the United States.
A demonstrated failure o f democracies’ efforts in counterinsurgency, along with a
robust theoretical explanation detailing why they are inherently handicapped in such
wars, has major policy implications. It may cause democratic governments, believing
that it is impossible for them to win counterinsurgencies, to prematurely give in to
insurgent demands or not to respond to them at all. It could lead democracies to focus

8 The United States Army and United States Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field
Manual, FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, (Kissimmee, FL: Signalman Publishing, 2009).
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military resources, spending and planning towards more conventional forms o f warfare,
despite the fact that counterinsurgency warfare is much more likely to occur. The belief
that democracies can’t win counterinsurgency may result in a self-fulfilling prophecy
whereby democratic regimes faced with an insurgency may be resigned to failure at the
outset and therefore not devote the appropriate resources or implement the correct
strategy necessary to prevail. If it is demonstrated, on the other hand, that democracies
can win counterinsurgency efforts, and that there exists a fairly strong consensus around
the necessary strategy for doing so, such regimes can prepare their militaries for such
contingencies and confidently resist insurgent elements when they present themselves.
This is not to say, however, that winning such conflicts will be easy.
This dissertation will untangle this puzzle by examining the arguments on both
sides o f the divide in order to determine which group presents the more plausible case.
This will be done first by a conceptual analysis o f the arguments and secondly by an
examination o f three case studies: Malaysia, Vietnam, and Iraq. Through these analyses I
will demonstrate that the argument against the ability o f democracies to perform in
counterinsurgencies is not as strong as many scholars currently believe. Secondly, this
research will demonstrate that a population-based, culturally-informed,
counterinsurgency strategy, the one advocated by most experts in the field, provides a
plausible avenue o f victory for democratic states faced with insurgencies. Though such a
strategy cannot, o f course, guarantee success, and all such conflicts are likely to be
extremely difficult and costly, the more closely it is followed the more likely success will
be.

7
ORGANIZATION
The first chapter will grapple with and attempt to define a variety o f relevant
terms and concepts. Definitions o f both insurgency and counterinsurgency will be
provided. What it means to “win” a war, which can be a highly complex and sometimes
subjective determination, will be explored. Similarly, the concepts o f “culture” and
“legitimacy” will be examined.
This chapter will also analyze the arguments o f those who believe that
democracies are uniquely disadvantaged in counterinsurgencies. The reasons for this
supposed weakness will be presented and critically examined in terms o f the strength of
their logic and the weight o f the supporting empirical evidence. Following this analysis,
a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy will be presented and its plausibility for
democratic governments will be considered.
The next three chapters will consist o f case studies. Since much o f the rationale
behind the idea that democracies are uniquely handicapped in counterinsurgencies comes
from empirical evidence rather than solely through mere theoretical analysis, an empirical
examination in the form o f case studies will be useful in demonstrating the plausibility o f
the counterinsurgency strategy proposed here. A purely theoretical refutation o f the idea
that democracies are inept at counterinsurgencies would not carry the same weight as one
confirmed by case study analysis. One o f the case studies (Malaysia) will be that o f a
democracy actually winning a counterinsurgency and how it was done. Two others
(Vietnam and Iraq) will show that the lack o f success experienced was not due to the
democratic nature o f the counterinsurgent but rather to faulty strategy. While
counterfactuals are most often impossible to prove, a strong case can be made
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demonstrating with a high degree o f plausibility that these conflicts could have been
prosecuted more successfully had they more closely followed the counterinsurgency
strategy proposed here, or one similar to it.
These three case studies will provide a broad analysis o f relatively contemporary
conflicts that can still offer highly relevant lessons for today. The Malaysian case study
will serve as an example o f a democracy (Great Britain) successfully countering an
insurgency. It will also serve to illustrate a conflict in which the strategy most closely
aligned to that laid out in the counterinsurgency literature was followed. It’s final virtue
is that it is a non-U.S. case and will therefore distinguish it from the other two.
The second case study, that o f Vietnam, is an example o f a powerful democracy
being defeated by a relatively weaker insurgency. Despite massive expenditure, a huge
loss o f life, and an effort that spanned over a decade, one o f the most powerful countries
on the planet could not defeat an insurgent movement in an undeveloped country. The
study will explore the reasons for the defeat and provide an opportunity to judge whether
or not it serves as evidence that democracies are inherently incapable o f
counterinsurgency, or instead demonstrates only that democratic countries are likely to
fail if they diverge from the optimal strategy propounded by counterinsurgency experts.
Since the strategy and tactics utilized in Vietnam were not monolithic, this case study
draws out the significant differences between the two primary strategies utilized.
Under the leadership o f Gen. William Westmoreland, a conventional seek-anddestroy strategy was implemented with the intention o f eliminating the enemy through
force. While counterinsurgency was recognized as an aspect o f the war, Westmoreland
thought o f it as secondary and left those tasks to the South Vietnamese government and
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military. In 1968, Westmoreland was replaced with Gen. Creighton Abrams. Though
Abrams continued to seek out the enemy and was by no means opposed to the use o f
force, he implemented a strategy that was much more in-line with a population-centered
counterinsurgency strategy. The results obtained under the two strategies were
remarkably different and the use o f such within-case comparison is instructive when
judging success in counterinsurgency. It strongly supports the contention that a
conventional military strategy is not likely to be successful against a committed
insurgent. It also demonstrates, however, that such failure does not mean that
democracies can’t win against such foes. Rather, the success obtained following the
implementation o f a strategy more in-line with counterinsurgency principles indicates
that winning is possible.
Finally, the case o f Iraq will provide a more ambiguous case study in terms o f
victory or defeat. Some o f the goals set out by the United States in its efforts to support
the constituted government of Iraq against insurgent forces were certainly met, others,
however, were not. In some cases, the level o f success remains unclear. This case study
will provide a particularly good model forjudging the success o f the proposed
counterinsurgency strategy versus a more traditional military approach and whether or
not the difference has any broad implications for democratic countries engaged in
counterinsurgency. There was a clear evolution over time from a conventional approach
to an approach more consistent with the counterinsurgency principles put forward here
and by experts in the field. Like Vietnam, the within-case differences between a
conventional period and a counterinsurgency period are key to obtaining a more nuanced
understanding of success and failure in Iraq. This case demonstrates that the more
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rigorously counterinsurgency principles were adhered to, the higher the level o f success
that was achieved.
The concluding chapter will analyze the lessons arrived at from the conceptual
analysis conducted in chapter two and through the three case studies. It will recapitulate
the evidence that democracies are not inherently incapable o f conducting successful
counterinsurgencies but that in order to achieve success an appropriate strategy must be
adopted, carried out, and sufficiently resourced. Though winning counterinsurgencies
can indeed be done by democracies, it will be expensive and require a great deal of
commitment, and most importantly, the right strategy. Democracies can win
counterinsurgencies, but only if they institute a strategy that is consistent with democratic
capabilities and limitations.
The two major findings o f this dissertation are that 1) democracies can win
counterinsurgencies, and 2) they are most likely to do so by following a populationcentered strategy. It provides a more nuanced picture o f past conflicts that are often
pointed to as evidence o f failure. Rather than just look at the case o f Vietnam or Iraq and
chalk them up as defeats, the analysis presented here differentiates between different
periods o f those conflicts and the various strategies implemented. Counterinsurgency
cannot be considered a failure in an instance in which counterinsurgency strategy was not
implemented, or was implemented too late. This was the case in both Vietnam and Iraq.
A conventional approach was tried at the beginning o f both wars. Only after it became
clear that the conventional approach was failing were population-centered
counterinsurgency strategies implemented. The major turnarounds in both conflicts that
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followed the switch in strategy is powerful evidence that democracies can be successful
counterinsurgents provided that they take the right approach.
This serves as a significant contribution to the literature concerning the ability of
democracies to win counterinsurgencies. Coming in the wake o f disappointing results in
the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq, it is important that the proper lessons from
history be learned. A blunt analysis may lead democratic decision-makers to give up on
the concept o f counterinsurgency and merely to hope that such conflicts will not arise
again while focusing military resources on preparing for fights they can win,
conventional ones. When examined with the proper nuance, however, these defeats
shouldn’t be viewed as defeats for counterinsurgency, but instead as evidence that a
conventional strategy is unlikely to be a productive one in such conflicts. In order for a
democracy to win a counterinsurgency, a counterinsurgency strategy is called for.
Furthermore, not any type o f counterinsurgency strategy will do. Those academics are
right who claim that a strategy reliant upon brutality is not likely to be sustainable for a
democratic regime, as the case o f the French in Algeria demonstrates. But there is
another path. A counterinsurgency strategy based on protecting the people and winning
them over through competent and legitimate governance while simultaneously separating
them from the insurgents provides the optimal chance o f success.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ARGUMENTS

The complexity and ambiguity o f the subject o f counterinsurgency is perhaps
represented by the number o f terms that refer to it. These conflicts have been called
small wars, revolutionary wars, low intensity conflicts, and counterinsurgencies. Though
each o f these terms has its own subtleties, some o f them being broader while others are
more narrow, for the most part they are interchangeable. For the purposes o f this
dissertation the term counterinsurgency, or COIN, will be used throughout, with the
exception o f direct quotations from other authors who use one o f the different terms.
FM 3-24, the Army and Marine Corps’ field manual for counterinsurgency,
following joint doctrine, defines insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the
overthrow o f a constituted government through the use o f subversion and armed conflict
(JP 1-02). Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military
struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy o f an established government,
occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.” 1
Counterinsurgency is the effort by the challenged political authority to thwart the
insurgency while maintaining its own legitimacy. This effort can entail military,
political, developmental, economic, diplomatic and law enforcement elements, among
others. Though counterinsurgency is often seen as a military activity, in reality a
successful counterinsurgency is likely to require a competent application o f the full
spectrum o f governmental capabilities.

'The United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1-1.
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Both insurgencies and counterinsurgencies often involve outside actors.
Insurgents often seek external assistance for sanctuary, renewed manpower, supplies, and
moral support. In fact, both Jeffrey Record2 and a study conducted by RAND3 find that
such external support is one of the most crucial factors in whether or not an insurgency is
likely to succeed. The counterinsurgent government also often has external support.
Democratic states are often the supporting actors for weak allies facing insurgencies.
This was the case in both Vietnam and Iraq, for example. As will be shown later, there is
some reason to believe that it is the fact that democratic regimes are often conducting
counterinsurgency operations in foreign (some would say occupied) countries that
explains their unusual record o f defeat rather than the nature o f their regime.
This chapter will critically examine a variety o f reasons that have led scholars to
believe that democracies are uniquely inept at fighting counterinsurgencies, along with
identifying some o f the weaknesses in those arguments. It will also dissect key concepts,
such as legitimacy and what winning means when it comes to counterinsurgency, for
which a proper understanding is necessary before moving on. The first argument that
leads many scholars to doubt the ability o f democratic regimes to successfully fight in
counterinsurgencies is that they lack the necessary resolve to do so. The basis o f this
argument, and its possible flaws, are discussed in the following section.

Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (Washington, D.C.: Potomac
Books, 2009).
3 Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica: RAND,
2010 ).
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LACK OF RESOLVE
The lack o f resolve which democracies supposedly exhibit in the face o f
counterinsurgency is one o f the most prominent arguments advanced in explanation o f
their presumed ineptitude at winning such conflicts. The root o f this argument stems
from Andrew Mack’s seminal 1975 article, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The
Politics o f Asymmetric Warfare” published in the journal World Politics. In this article
Mack focused on the perceived level o f importance placed on the outcome by each
participant in an asymmetric conflict. His main argument boils down to this one
statement: “for the insurgents the war is ‘total,’ while for the external power it is
necessarily ‘limited.’”4 The weaker power, the insurgent group, has everything at stake
and is using all means at its disposal. The stronger power, however, not having as much
at stake and presuming victory to come easily in any case, does not bring its full force to
bear at the outset and, having less to lose, is more apt to withdraw from the conflict when
the costs start to become too steep.
This disparity o f wills applies most particularly when the counterinsurgent is an
external occupying force that cannot be threatened with invasion o f its home territory by
the insurgent. It is the stronger resolve o f insurgent forces that has allowed them to be
successful. Subsequent to an analysis o f insurgent victories, Mack concludes that, “In
every case, success for the insurgents arose not from a military victory on the ground—
though military successes may have been a contributory cause— but rather from the
progressive attrition o f their opponents’ political capability to wage war. In such

4 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics o f Asymmetric
Conflict,” World Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 181.
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asymmetric conflicts, insurgents may gain political victory from a situation o f military
stalemate or even defeat.”5
The divergence in will-power is also likely to be prominent when a large
developed state, what Mack calls a metropolitan state, is involved in the occupation o f a
smaller state. The insurgent forces o f the smaller state are facing annihilation while a
defeat for the metropolitan state will presumably be less existentially drastic. If it is
perceived that low stakes are involved for the metropolitan state, high costs become less
sustainable. Mack argues that if such a war
escalates dramatically, as it did in Algeria and Vietnam, it makes a definite impact
on the economic and political resources which might otherwise have been
allocated to, say, public welfare projects. Tax increases may be necessary to
cover the costs o f the war, a draft system may have to be introduced, and inflation
will be an almost certain by-product. Such costs are seen as part o f the ‘necessary
price’ when the security o f the nation is directly threatened. When this is not the
case, the basis for consensus disappears. In a limited war, it is not clear to those
groups whose interests are adversely affected why such sacrifices are necessary.6
It may be argued here that democratic regimes are most likely to be adversely
affected by such concerns. Since democratic governments must be more responsive to
public opinion than autocracies, democracies should therefore be less capable o f
preventing unpopularity from having a major impact on their resolve and fighting ability.
While Mack acknowledges this possibility, he does not claim that his theory applies only,
or even more to, democracies. In fact, he points out that “politics, under any political
system involves conflict over the allocation o f resources. In closed or centrist policies,
these conflicts will by and large be confined to the ruling elite— but not necessarily so.”7
Mack discusses internal conflict among the ruling elite in Portugal over the costs incurred

5 Mack, 177 (emphasis in original).
6 Mack, 185-186.
7 Mack, 189.
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by their colonial possessions as demonstrating that the principle applies to nondemocratic regimes as well as democratic ones. In fact, there is little a priori reason to
judge democracies more vulnerable to this problem than autocracies.
It could in fact be argued that democracies are less susceptible to this problem, at
least in certain cases. This is so because in democratic regimes discontent can be
demonstrated via open debates, popular demonstrations, and elections. These activities
certainly present a risk to the ruling party or parties that cannot be ignored. The risks to
an autarkic government, however, may be even greater. The leaders of autocracies, when
challenged by public discontent, may not face a simple loss at the next election but may
risk being deposed through a coup d ’etat due to military opposition. Public unrest on a
large scale is also a major threat as the normal means o f dealing with such problems,
military force, will be diverted in fighting the insurgency. This is especially the case in
autocracies that rely upon military strength to impose their rule. A divergence o f that
strength to a foreign counterinsurgency effort while increasing opposition at home may
leave them highly vulnerable to regime change not through an electoral process but
through the use o f force. Such tenuously balanced autocracies may feel even more
pressure to abandon a foreign counterinsurgency effort than would a democracy.
Whether or not a democratic regime is more or less vulnerable to the pressures outlined
by Mack is not a determination that can be made merely by considering regime type
alone, other variables may be equally, or even more, important.
Leaving regime type aside, it is not clear that Mack’s argument is as completely
successful at explaining the defeat o f metropolitan powers by smaller insurgents as he
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would like to think. Jeffrey Record, for example, complains that Mack’s case selection
biases the outcome o f his study.
It is perhaps no coincidence that Mack’s analysis makes no reference to examples
o f metropolitan-govemment military and political defeats o f foreign insurgencies
such as Great Britain’s defeat o f the Indian Mutiny (1857), the Boers in South
Africa (1899-1902), and Malayan Races Liberation Army in Malaya (1948-60);
Spain’s defeat o f the R if rebellion in Spanish Morocco (1921-26); and the U.S.
defeat o f the Aguinaldo rebellion in the Philippines (1899-1901) and the Sandino
insurrection in Nicaragua (1926-33). These and other cases suggest that factors
other than political will are at work. Even the strongest will, if hitched to a bad
strategy or denied minimum material resources, can be defeated.8
Arreguin-Toft also criticizes M ack’s thesis on three grounds. He first points out
that even when survival is not at stake for the strong actors, they may act as if it were in
order to protect other major interests, such as their dominant position in the international
system. He argues that this is especially likely when the strong actor believes that defeat
could have a domino effect which would impose additional costs in other areas o f foreign
policy.9 Secondly, he argues that Mack’s thesis presumes a certain passage o f time
before the costs to metropolitan power begin to accumulate. “Mack’s argument,” he
says, “assumes rather than explains a weak actor’s capacity to avoid defeat and impose
costs on its stronger adversary. This leaves us wondering why some asymmetric conflicts
are over quickly yet others drag on.” 10 Arreguin-Toft’s third critique o f Mack is that his
thesis leaves the increased rate o f defeat for metropolitan powers unexplained. If Mack
has identified the most important explanatory variable for the defeat o f strong powers in
asymmetric conflict why did it not apply equally in the past as in the present?

8 Record, 9.
9 Arreguin-Toft, 14.
10 Arreguin-Toft, 14.
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Mack’s case may be strengthened, however, at least as applied to democracies,
when buttressed by the issue o f casualty aversion. In the wake o f America’s defeat in
Vietnam, the United States’ inability to stomach a large number o f casualties became a
plausible explanation. This hypothesis led John E. Mueller to conduct a quantitative
comparison o f American public opinion o f the Korean and Vietnam Wars and the level o f
casualties sustained in them. He famously came to-the conclusion that popular support
for war could be seen “as a function o f the logarithm o f the total number o f American
casualties that had been suffered at the time o f the poll... .In each war, support is
projected to have started at much the same level and then every time American casualties
increased by a factor o f 10 (i.e., from 100 to 1,000 or from 10,000 to 100,000) support

for the war dropped by about 15 percentage points.”' 1
These findings quickly consolidated into a consensus that the United States in
particular, and democracies in general, suffered from a weak stomach and any war efforts
that they might engage in were subject to being undermined by weakening public support
as casualties mounted. This phenomenon became known as the Vietnam Syndrome.
Many hoped that this aversion had been overcome in the United States by the quick
success in the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman,
however, point out that:
Contrary to the predictions o f those who saw Desert Storm as putting the Vietnam
experience to rest, the relatively low U.S. death total in Desert Storm only raised
public expectations o f bloodless foreign policy and fed perceptions among policy
makers that the public had softened in this regard. The further erosion o f already
fragile U.S. public support that followed the October 1993 deaths o f 18

11 John E. Mueller, “Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam,” The
American Political Science Review 65, no. 2, (June 1971): 366 (emphasis in original).
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servicemen in Mogadishu evinced the strong pull that U.S. casualties can exert on
policy.12
These conclusions fit handily with Mack’s contention that democracies can’t hang
tough long enough to win asymmetric conflicts such as insurgencies. Recent research,
however, has drawn a more nuanced picture o f casualty aversion in democracies, and
particularly the United States. The work o f several researchers indicate that there are
multiple factors involved in how democratic publics react to war casualties. This
literature is put in context below.
Richard Eisenberg, in his article “Victory Has Many Friends,” which examines
American public opinion between the years 1981 and 2005, finds that the aims o f the
conflict matter when it comes to acceptability o f casualties. If the goals o f a conflict are
considered to be significant and worthwhile, support is likely to remain high despite
casualties. This finding is not a positive one, however, for democratic counterinsurgents,
especially when the counterinsurgency is carried out abroad. He finds that intervention in
civil wars or peacekeeping activities in their aftermaths receive less initial support than
do more conventional conflicts. He argues that, “it seems likely that one reason for the
public’s reticence is the estimate that intervention in civil wars offers uncertain prospects
for success. Civil wars are particularly intractable because o f their zero-sum nature, and
reconciliation o f competing factions requires a political rather than a military victory.” 13
Since counterinsurgencies are often similar in nature, it is likely that they will also have
lower initial levels o f support than do conventional conflicts.

12 Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics o f Coercion: American Foreign
Policy and the Limits o f Military Might (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
135.
13 Richard C. Eisenberg, “Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use o f
Military Force, 1981-2005,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 175.
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This initial pessimism may be outweighed, however, if military operations are
seen as being successful. Eisenberg’s second important finding is that

. .the public’s

support is conditioned by the outcome o f the military intervention rather than by the
number o f casualties that are actually suffered.” 14 Indeed he found that success can
overcome high levels o f casualties and a war can remain popular despite them.15 This
may also bode ill for democratic counterinsurgents since it is precisely in such conflicts
that military progress may be most difficult to measure. Counterinsurgencies may be
able to overcome initial public skepticism if they are perceptibly successful but may
suffer even further erosion if not.
Another important factor in determining public opinion was multilateral support.
Though this variable was weaker than either policy objectives or the cost-benefit analysis
produced by perceptions o f success or failure, multilateral cooperation did increase public
support for conflict. Eisenberg surmises that this is due to the perception o f burden
sharing.16 Moral solidarity may also be an important element. How this factor will affect
public opinion about counterinsurgencies will o f course be case-dependent, as some
counterinsurgencies are highly multilateral while others are less so.
Research conducted by Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler on
U.S. public opinion concerning casualties in Iraq corroborates Eisenberg’s first two
findings.17 They demonstrate that two key variables directing U.S. public opinion in this
case were perceptions o f the wars rightness or wrongness (consistent with Eisenberg’s

14 Eisenberg, 175.
15 Eisenberg, 147.
16 Eisenberg, 175.
17 Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, “Casualty Sensitivity and the
War in Iraq,” International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter, 2005/2006).
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findings on war aims) and the likelihood o f success. They also find that these two factors
are interrelated and effect each other but that success is the stronger o f the two variables.
Success is such an important variable, they argue, that it trumps the raw number
o f combat deaths. In contradistinction to Mueller, they contend that public support for
the war did not vary with casualty numbers but instead was determined by the public’s
moral view o f the war along with perceived levels o f success during the w ar’s various
phases. This research leads them to conclude that “ .. .the public does not measure
success in terms o f body bags. On the contrary, the public claimed to focus on whether
the coalition was in fact winning over the hearts and minds o f the Iraqi people, as
measured by Iraqi willingness to cooperate with coalition forces.” 18 These findings have
important implications for counterinsurgency campaigns in that it demonstrates the
public’s understanding o f the key importance o f gaining the support o f the population.
Achieving such support is a major plank o f the counterinsurgency strategy outlined
below, as being the most likely to lead to success for democratic regimes.
Scott Sigmund Gartner remains unconvinced by the argument presented by Gelpi,
Feaver and Reifler. He agrees that public opinion is the result o f engaging in cost-benefit
analyses o f war, but rejects their conclusion that casualties don’t matter. The results o f
his statistical analysis indicate that they definitely do matter, though casualty aversion is
context dependent. He argues that his data indicate that the impact o f recent casualties on
public opinion interacts with overall casualty trends. This interaction strongly influences

18 Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 45.
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public opinion and he finds that the probability o f victory cannot substitute as an
explanatory variable for public opinion.19
The research o f D. Scott Bennett and Allan Stam may demonstrate the effects o f
eroding public support in the face of mounting casualties and the other costs o f conflict.
They find that while democratic initiators o f conflict start with a greater overall chance o f
winning than do autocracies, that advantage declines over time. Their results can be
summarized as finding that as long as a conflict continues, “ ...democratic initiators
become less likely to continue fighting, less likely to win, and much more likely to accept
a draw.”20 Specifically, they find that democratic initiators have a 32% chance o f
continuing to fight during the first year but only a 22% chance by the fifth year. The
probability o f a democracy winning a war is 49% in the first year but only 6% by the
fifth.21 Furthermore, they find that autocracies do not experience the same sharp decline
■J'S

in the likelihood o f winning.
The totality o f this research, Andrew Mack’s combined with the casualty aversion
literature, would seem to indicate a strong handicap for a democratic regime’s ability to
win a counterinsurgency. Democracies are likely to be less committed to the outcome of
the conflict, be less willing to sustain casualties, and experience a drop-off in their
chances o f winning a conflict over time which may be particularly harmful in

19 Scott Sigmund Gartner, “The Multiple Effects o f Casualties on Public Support for War:
An Experimental Approach,” The American Political Science Review 102, no. 1,
(February 2008): 104-105.
20 D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, “The Declining Advantages o f Democracy: A
Combined Model o f War Outcomes and Duration,” in “Opening up the Black Box of
War: Politics and the Conduct o f War,” ed. Scott Sigmund Gartner, special issue, The
Journal o f Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (June 1998): 361.
21 Bennett and Stam, 361.
22 Bennet and Stam, 363.
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counterinsurgency efforts. Other research, however, may serve to weaken this
pessimistic outlook for democracies, at least to some extent.
One important finding stems from a RAND study entitled How Insurgencies End.
The study finds that the median length of an insurgency lasts ten years, though some can
last considerably longer.23 This is seemingly bad news for democratic counterinsurgents
since they may experience a declining willingness to fight over time. The study also
finds, however, that longer insurgencies are not disproportionately won by the insurgent
side. The study reports that

. .the average length o f insurgent-won conflicts does not

exceed the average length o f time o f government-won conflicts. Therefore, it is safer to
conclude that insurgents do not necessarily win as long as they manage to ‘hold out. ”’24
This is true because insurgencies themselves often lose the support o f the public as the
conflict runs on. The study notes three possible reasons for this: 1) the insurgents lose
their message over time and re-focus on issues that are extraneous to those o f the original
insurgency, 2) the use o f indiscriminate tactics such as terrorism, and 3) government
success at undermining the key demands o f the insurgency through social, political and
economic changes.25
Real examples also serve to undermine the notion that democratic governments
cannot determinedly fight counterinsurgency over a long period o f time. The three case
studies examined in later chapters all demonstrate a considerable willingness by
democratic counterinsurgents to continue fighting over long periods o f time. The most
clear example is that o f the Malaysian Emergency. Often called The Long, Long War,

Connable and Libicki, 27.
24 Connable and Libicki, 29.
25 Connable and Libicki, 30-31.
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the British fought insurgent forces from 1948 - 1960. In this case, Britain’s willingness
to continue the fight led to eventual success.
In another example o f long-term commitment to counterinsurgency by a
democratic regime, the United States was engaged in Vietnam from 1950 - 1975 with a
considerable engagement o f combat troops from 1965 - 1973. Though the United States
o f course lost that war, and public opinion likely played a large role in that loss, it is not
clear that the application o f a more appropriate strategy would not have led to a better
outcome (as I argue in chapter five). And despite the outcome it demonstrates American
willingness to suffer a large number o f combat deaths (over 50,000) for a long period of
time.
The Iraq War provides another example o f a democratic country displaying
significant commitment to a counterinsurgency effort. The United States committed
combat troops to the conflict from March 2003 to December 2011 and withdrew combat
forces at the behest o f the newly constituted government there. The outcome was a
mixed one but did result in several key achievements. Its ultimate success or failure will
take more time to judge, but what cannot be doubted is that the United States contributed
substantial combat troops to a counterinsurgency effort for a sustained period o f time
while suffering increasing casualty rates.
Other research further militates against the notion that democracies are inept at
counterinsurgencies. Jason Lyall, for example, argues that it is not their political system
that has led to the unusual number o f losses tallied up by democratic counterinsurgents
but rather the types o f counterinsurgencies that they find themselves engaged in. He
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points out that democracies are more likely to be engaged in foreign counterinsurgencies
and argues that this is the key dependent variable. Democracy itself is spurious.
According to Lyall’s analysis, democratic regimes face far less chance o f internal
war. Therefore, the wars that they do get involved in are foreign wars, which are
inherently more difficult to win than are internal ones. Since autocracies are more likely
to fight internal insurgencies and democracies more likely to fight more challenging
foreign insurgencies, democracies lose more often than autocracies. He also points out
that foreign counterinsurgency efforts are easier to withdraw from. For states battling
internal insurgent forces, withdrawal is not likely to be an option at all. This may serve
as an alternative explanation for why democratic regimes withdraw sooner than
autocratic regimes on average. It’s not because they suffer from weaker resolve but
rather that they enjoy more options.
In a separate study, Lyall, along with co-author Isaiah Wilson III, find yet another
variable that may have been confused with democracy. In the Winter 2009 issue o f the
journal International Organization they convincingly argue that mechanization is a better
explanatory variable than is democratic regime type (though they do not claim that
regime type is totally irrelevant) through both statistical analysis and comparative case
studies o f mechanized versus infantry units in Iraq. It is the mechanized nature o f
democratic militaries, rather than the democratic nature o f their regimes, that best
explains their tendency to be less effective at counterinsurgency.
Democracies are usually richer and more powerful than are autocracies, which is
one o f the most puzzling aspects o f their failure to be more successful at counter-

26 Lyall, 173.
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insurgency warfare. Lyall and Wilson argue that it is this very wealth which undermines
their efficacy at counterinsurgency warfare. This is so because they use that wealth to
developed highly mechanized war machines that are ineffective in counterinsurgency
conflicts. As they put it,
Scholars and practitioners largely agree that successful COIN efforts hinge not
on the physical destruction o f insurgent organizations but rather on the
incumbent’s ability to win over local populations. Mechanized militaries thus
already begin at a disadvantage since their battle mission may be secondary, and
even counterproductive, to the determinants o f success. Instead the key to success
lies in the efficient collection o f reliable information on population characteristics,
including its grievances, cleavages, power structures, views o f the
counterinsurgent, and the nature of the insurgents themselves. Acquiring this
information in turn requires a high rate o f interaction between counterinsurgent
and population so that the requisite skills— including language and cultural
awareness— are obtained and connections forged.27
These problems are further exacerbated by the facts that mechanized militaries
tend to be less troop intensive, are incapable o f traversing certain types o f terrain, and
usually pass through insurgent areas more quickly, thereby increasing the total area
covered but decreasing the longevity o f that coverage.

Furthermore, mechanized

militaries may become more culturally and bureaucratically directed towards
conventional warfare and view counterinsurgency as secondary, therefore devoting fewer
resources to it and reducing their likelihood o f success in such conflicts.29 Democracies,
due to their generally greater role in the international structure, may view conventional
warfare as a greater threat than do less prominent states, thereby reinforcing the need for
heavy mechanization and a continued focus on conventional war. Autocracies, on the

27 Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes
in Counterinsurgency War,” International Organization 63 (Winter 2009): 76.
28 Lyall and Wilson, 77.
29 Lyall and Wilson, 78.
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other hand, which tend to have less mechanized militaries, may view internal insurgency
as a primary threat and focus their military planning accordingly.
Despite the abundance o f literature purporting to demonstrate that democratic
states can’t hang tough long enough to win a prolonged counterinsurgency effort, because
they aren’t playing for the same high stakes and because they are uniquely sensitive to
battlefield casualties, other research indicates that democracy is a spurious variable and it
is other factors— the types o f wars that democracies fight and the types o f armies that
they have— which truly explain the vulnerability o f democracies in counterinsurgencies.
At first sight, this doesn’t appear to be a very helpful finding for powerful democracies
such as the United States. Whether democracy itself is the problem or not, they still face
major handicaps if they are to fight counterinsurgencies overseas with highly mechanized
militaries. After a second look, however, it may indeed be a positive discovery that other
factors are at work in democratic deficiencies in COIN rather than being solely a matter
o f regime type.
If democracy is truly the main problem, then there may not be much that such
regimes could do to ameliorate their problems with COIN, other than become nondemocratic which is not a very tempting option. The problems o f operating in a foreign
environment and with a sub-optimal military force, however, are amenable to correction,
to at least some degree. The deployment o f a cultural knowledge capability, such as
Human Terrain Teams (discussed in the Iraq case study), and an increased focus on
working with the host government may help alleviate the problem o f operating in a
foreign territory. The use of more ground troops engaged in a population-centered,
COIN oriented, mission rather than a highly mechanized more conventional mission
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might reduce the problems noted by Lyall and Wilson. This research, then, though
initially foreboding, may offer democracies some reason for optimism when faced with
the prospects o f having to conduct COIN operations. There remains, however, another
very strong body o f research that seems to demonstrate the inability o f democracies to
conduct COIN. This research focuses on strategy and is discussed in the following
section.

STRATEGIC LIMITATIONS
Arreguin-Toft argues that the key explanatory variable for the defeat o f the
stronger powers in asymmetric conflict is a strategic one. He says that “the best predictor
o f asymmetric conflict outcomes is strategic interaction. According to this thesis, the
interaction o f the strategies actors use during a conflict predicts the outcome o f that
conflict better than competing explanations.”30
There are, he argues, two primary approaches to strategy in such conflicts, direct
and indirect, and that these two approaches apply to both the offense and the defense. A
direct approach for the offense would be a conventional attack and for the defense a
conventional defensive posture. The indirect approaches for the offense include
barbarism (which Arreguin-Toft focuses on) and other non-traditional approaches such as
“hearts and minds.” The corresponding indirect strategy for the defense would be
guerrilla warfare. According to Arreguin-Toft’s research, “when actors employ similar
strategic approaches (direct-direct or indirect-indirect) relative power explains the
outcome: strong actors will win quickly and decisively. When actors employ opposite

30 Arreguin-Toft, 18.
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strategic approaches (direct-indirect or indirect-direct), weak actors are much more likely
to win, even when everything we think we know about power says they shouldn 7.”31
Arreguin-Toft supports this hypothesis through analysis o f five case studies: the
Murid W ar (1830 - 1859), the South African War (1899 - 1902), the Italo-Ethiopian War
(1935 - 1940), the Vietnam War (1965 - 1973), and the Afghan Civil War (1979 - 1989).
He finds that when the strong power in these conflicts met insurgency with barbarism (an
indirect offensive strategy vs. an indirect defensive strategy) that power was successful.
When they met insurgency with conventional force, they most often were not. An
interesting aspect o f these analyses is that in every case the indirect strategy used by the
stronger power was barbarism, though Arreguin-Toft notes that there are other
possibilities.
This fact is important because according to Gil Merom’s research, democratic
regimes have a particular challenge in using barbarism as a strategy. He explains the
greater frequency o f strong powers losing small wars by reference to regime type. Most
o f the counterinsurgencies carried out during the last five or six decades have been by
democracies. He uses the examples o f France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the
United States in Vietnam. Democratic governments often experience societal pressures
to conform to the normative rules o f war, therefore ruling out, or at least making much
more difficult, the concerted use o f barbarism as a strategy. Democracies face a dilemma
in which they must balance the normative expectations o f society against the pragmatic
necessities o f warfare, or as Merom puts it, “for democracies, the process that dooms the
prospects o f political victory in protracted small wars involves an almost impossible

31 Arreguin-Toft, 18.
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trade-off between expedient and moral dicta that arise from an intricate interplay between
forces in the battlefield and at home.”32 In essence, domestic pressures forestall
democracies from using the indirect strategy o f barbarism against the indirect strategy o f
guerilla warfare.
When put together, Arreguin-Toft’s and Merom’s explanations for how strong
(and democratic) powers lose small wars is extremely powerful. The country that is
today most involved in counterinsurgency warfare, the United States, is both democratic
and vastly more powerful than the actors it has fought in its two most recent conflicts,
those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The research, however, leaves little hope for ultimate
victory in these conflicts. If an indirect strategy is necessary to defeat the indirect
strategy o f the insurgents, if that indirect strategy is barbarism, and if barbarism is not a
socially or morally acceptable strategy for democratic states to pursue, then defeat for the
United States in these conflicts seems inevitable. The same would also apply to future
such conflicts involving the United States or other powerful democratic states.
Though the prospects for strong democracies prevailing in counterinsurgency
efforts appears to be grim, I will demonstrate here that the inability o f democratic states
to rely upon barbarism as a strategy does not imply their inevitable defeat. In fact,
Arreguin-Toft leaves the door open to another possibility in his brief mention that
barbarism is not the only indirect offensive strategy available (although he analyzes no
others in his case studies). Since democracies are precluded from engaging in prolonged
barbarism, and rightfully so, an alternative form o f indirect strategy must be adopted in

32 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures o f
France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 24.
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order for them to win such conflicts. That strategy is a culturally sensitive populationcentric one.
Rather than utilize barbarism as a tool, therefore, powerful democratic states
should look to winning the population to their side when engaged in counterinsurgency—
the exact opposite o f barbarism is called for. The only way that this can be done is by
establishing a government that is at least minimally effective and seen as legitimate by
the people. Meeting the population’s needs in terms o f livelihood, justice, and basic
development are key to building trust and establishing a functional relationship between
the counterinsurgent force and the population. This, in turn, can only be accomplished
with a thorough understanding o f the population in question and its culture. A
population-focused strategy will get nowhere without such an understanding. In order for
democracies to successfully counter insurgencies they must apply an indirect strategy
consisting o f a culturally nuanced effort to win the support o f the population. This
strategy is more fully outlined in a subsequent chapter. Before discussing how to win a
counterinsurgency, however, it is necessary to take a brief look at what it means to win
one.

WHAT COUNTS AS WINNING?
Determining who won or lost a conflict may seem like a very easy thing to do.
The winning side was victorious in a greater number o f key battlefield engagements,
forcing the losing side to acquiesce to their demands. But not all conflicts end as clearly
as when the Japanese signed a treaty o f unconditional surrender on the deck o f the U.S.S.
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Missouri.33 In fact, such a conclusive outcome is the exception in modem conflicts.
Even in cases in which such seemingly final terms are reached, this may only signal the
movement from one type of conflict, conventional, to another type, insurgency. This was
certainly the case with the Iraq War in which George W. Bush triumphantly announced
the end o f major combat operations aboard an American aircraft carrier only for the
conflict to quickly morph into an even more deadly insurgency. In contemporary combat
situations, the difference between winning and losing is often ambiguous and subject to
individual judgment. Such judgments can result in differing conclusions based upon two
major factors— differences in the definition o f victory and differences in cognitive biases.
Both are considered below.
Robert Mandel, in his important book The Meaning o f Military Victory, argues
that there are two primary ways in which to define or measure victory, each o f which
faces conceptual problems. These two measurements o f victory are 1) reaching a desired
end state and, 2) attaining a positive cost-benefit ratio over time.34 The first o f these is
the most traditional and common. As Mandel describes it, “This approach views victory
as a relationship between war aims and war outcomes, with successful outcomes o f
fighting necessitating satisfactory attainment o f one’s own war aims and, preferably,
frustration o f one’s opponents’ war aims.”35 This type o f measurement is problematic,
however, in that it is possible to achieve the initial war aims while still not being able to
claim victory, at least not in an unqualified sense. The U.S. operations in both

33 The surrender wasn’t quite unconditional as it protected the Emperor from prosecution
as a war criminal and secured the maintenance o f his status as at least a figurehead in the
new government.
34 Robert Mandel, The Meaning o f Military Victory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006),
5-7.
35 Mandel, 5.
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Afghanistan and Iraq are examples o f this. Although in both cases the initial war aims
were achieved fairly rapidly with conventional forces, the insurgencies that subsequently
developed erased, or at least seriously eroded, any claim to victory that the U.S. might be
able to make in either place.
In any given conflict there are likely to be multiple war aims, some o f which may
eventually be achieved and others not. In such cases, victory is unclear. Perhaps the
various aims can be ranked according to importance and victory can be judged on
achieving those at the top o f the list, but in other cases aims might be equally ranked or
ranked differently by different persons or organizations. Furthermore, war aims often
shift during the course o f a conflict. It’s possible, and in fact has often happened, that
initial war aims may have been unrealistic or irrelevant. Mandel’s point on this issue is
worth quoting at length:
Beyond ambiguity and fluctuation, measuring victory in terms o f achieving war
aims raises questions about their appropriateness. What if national security
policymakers identify a wrong-headed end state, making its accomplishment
meaningless or irrelevant to attaining their actual underlying desires in the
aftermath o f war? Historical cases abound where the identified war aims o f
victors have appeared, with the benefit o f hindsight, to be misguided. For
example, in the aftermath o f the 1991 G ulf War, the United States appeared to
satisfy many o f its strategic objectives, as immediately after a decisive military
victory the United States enjoyed a huge boost in international prestige, Saddam
Hussein was punished, and other tyrannical despots watched all this with horror;
however, these may not have been the right objectives, as they did not include
regime change. Given the turmoil that quickly emerged within Iraq, regime
change perhaps could have prevented the need for another war twelve years later.
In such cases, should victory be judged by what the victor said it wanted to
«
•
• •
•
achieve, or by what the victor should have said it wanted to achieve?
O f course it’s also possible to argue that the war aims were properly limited, that
the victory was complete, and that the decision to engage in the second Iraq War was

36 Mandel, 6.

34

wrong-headed in itself. War aims are likely to vary by person and organization and
through time. What is judged in the immediate aftermath o f a conflict to be a great
victory may be seen in hindsight as Pyrrhic due to improper war aims. These problems
don’t make the achievement o f war aims completely irrelevant to judgments o f victory—
but they do muddy the waters.
Because o f the problems with the fixed war aims criterion, others attempt to
measure victory on a cost-benefit analysis. Did fighting the war lead to greater benefits
than costs? If so, according to this view, the war was at least a partial victory. Mandel,
however, points out that this approach also has its problems. First, cost/benefit can be
measured in various ways. Should it be measured by whether the postwar benefits
exceed the costs o f fighting, whether the state is better off having fought the war than
they would have been if they had not fought it, whether the states gains and losses are
greater or lesser than the adversary’s, whether the state’s military gains match the
political objectives, or a combination o f these?37 A variety o f measuring sticks are
available, making it sometimes possible to judge the same conflict a success using one o f
them but a failure using another. When judging one’s own level o f success, therefore, it
might turn out that one is more likely to choose the measuring stick most amenable to an
outcome o f victory. This is especially true since, as Mandel says, “ ...in judging victory
there appear to be few if any objective criteria for ranking their importance or choosing
some over others.”38
Even if the proper measuring stick is agreed upon, carrying on with the
measurement may itself be problematic and a matter o f judgment rather than an

37 Mandel, 7-8.
38 Mandel, 8.
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objectively identifiable fact. The levels o f cost and benefit may not be readily apparent in
any given case, either because solid metrics do not exist, people weigh the costs and
benefits differently, or for some other reason. As with the fixed end state measurement,
the ambiguity of the cost/benefit analysis o f victory does not make it useless, it only
means that it is not infallible or objectively settled in every case. Though an approximate
or disputed measurement o f victory may not be perfect, it is often better than having no
criteria at all. Mandel, however, argues that we can do better through a more
thoroughgoing analysis.
He argues that it is first necessary to break conflicts down into two phases: warwinning and peace-winning. It is possible to win the war and lose the peace, as has been
demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq. War winning “ .. .occurs when a state attempts to
bring a war to a successful military conclusion, affecting the mode of battle in terms o f
how one fights and whether one continues or ceases to fight.”39 Peace-winning, on the
other hand, “ .. .occurs when a state attempts to reap the payoffs o f war, affecting the
mode o f postcombat activities in terms of how one manages the transition afterward and
whether one stays in or leaves the area where the fighting occurred. Clearly involved in
this second phase is the extent to which triumph in battle can yield durable postwar
stability.”40 To truly achieve victory, winning in both stages is necessary. Doing so is
called “strategic victory.”41
Any true measurement o f victory must go beyond mere battlefield success to
viewing the final outcomes o f both the military and post-military aspects o f the conflict.

39 Mandel, 13.
40 Mandel, 13.
41 Mandel, 13.
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Military victory opens a path for meeting the political ends over which conflict is waged,
but if those political ends are not ultimately achieved the military successes will be for
naught. Mandel argues that six key metrics can guide us in our judgments o f whether or
not strategic victory has been achieved: information control, military deterrence, political
self-determination, economic reconstruction, social justice, and diplomatic respect.
Mandel points out that complete success in each element is not necessary. In
different conflicts some o f the elements may be more important than others. Still,
however, some progress in each is likely to be necessary for a lasting strategic victory.
Ignoring any one o f these elements may detrimentally impact, or nullify, the success
achieved in others. Mandel warns that, “Although a temptation may exist to scrap
individual elements in cases where the costs o f achieving them all seem too high or strain
domestic credibility and support, the dangers o f leaving some unaddressed— and
suffering cascading postwar problems as a result— outweigh these concerns.”42 A
successful war and post-war strategy will take each o f these elements into account and
can ill afford to completely ignore any o f them.
Achieving military victory and addressing the necessary post-war elements may
not in themselves, however, be sufficient for claiming victory. In their book Failing to
Win: Perceptions o f Victory and Defeat in International Politics Dominic Johnson and
Dominic Tierney differentiate between score-keeping and match-fixing for assessing
victory in international conflicts. Score-keeping occurs when judgments about victory
are made in accordance with actual facts on the ground and metrics such as those
presented by Mandel. As they put it, “According to this approach, observers decide the

42 Mandel, 16.
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winners and losers on the basis o f a scorecard listing material gains and losses. When
people score-keep, their views about who won and who lost directly reflect the material
outcome o f the war or crisis.”43 There may be various ways to keep score, as Mandel
points out, but whatever the metrics used, at least under this approach there is an
objective measurement undergirding the judgment arrived at.
The match-fixing approach is quite different, though often applied. When matchfixing obtains it is not just objective metrics that come into play but more subjective
perceptions as well. Specifically, Johnson and Tierney argue that mind-sets, salient
events, and social pressures often play a role in judgments o f victory and defeat and can
in fact lead to conclusions opposite o f those that would be arrived at by using scorekeeping alone.44 These may be seen as subjectively created distortions o f the actual
win/loss metrics.
People’s mind-sets can be affected by historical events, biases o f various types,
cultural beliefs, and expectations. This last can be particularly important in terms of
asymmetric warfare. Powerful democracies, due to their military, developmental and
economic superiority, are often expected to win easily over less powerful insurgent
adversaries. Anything less than out-right victory may, therefore, come to be looked upon
as a defeat. Furthermore, minor setbacks may be given significance beyond what the
actual occurrences would imply. Mind-sets can also affect perceptions o f outcomes due
to cognitive dissonance. This is especially the case with metrics selection. If one side is
unexpectedly winning or losing, cognitive dissonance may lead to the acceptance o f

43 Dominic D.P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions o f Victory
and Defeat in International Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006),
24.
44 Johnson and Tierney, 38.
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metrics that are inappropriate or marginal for arriving at a realistic judgment but which
will seem to support the prior expectations. Prior expectations then can lead to either
unreasonable pessimism when things don’t go perfectly or may cause one to switch
metrics in order to continue believing in prior expectations. In either case, the actual
events will be misinterpreted.
Salient events may also distort win/loss perceptions. These are events that evoke
an emotional or visceral response and alter psychological perceptions o f a conflict but
which have minor real and tangible effects. Johnson and Tierney point to the Tet
Offensive as one example. Though in terms o f normal battle metrics, the United States
won that particular encounter, the images shown on television made it seem like a loss.
This perception was never fully overcome and had serious implications for the future o f
the war. Another example provided by the authors is that of the Cuban missile crisis.
They argue that “the fact that Soviet ships physically turned away from a U.S. naval
blockade o f Cuba created the image that Moscow had backed down and thereby lost the
crisis, even though the USSR made tangible gains in the final settlement.”45
Finally, social pressures can alter or distort perceptions o f victory and defeat.
These pressures are usually manifested in manipulation by the media, leaders, elites, or
the society at large. These pressures come from self-interested individuals or groups that
attempt to ‘spin’ events in their favor or to conform to their positions. Politicians,
pundits, special interest groups, and other individuals or groups can knowingly or
unknowingly engage in this type o f manipulation.

45 Johnson and Tierney, 63.
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Johnson and Tierney’s research is well summated in the final paragraph o f their
book. They write,

..success on the battlefield does not guarantee victory. Human

nature commonly elevates the influence o f mind-sets, salient events, and social pressures
over and above the outcome on the ground. Without more attention to the way victory is
determined by perception as well as by reality, nations may sacrifice copious amounts o f
blood and treasure, only to find themselves failing to win.”46
These match-fixing factors may be more powerful in counterinsurgency efforts
since they are inherently more difficult to judge through objective score-keeping means.
The complexity o f counterinsurgencies and the often difficult-to-quantify metrics of
population support, legitimacy building, etc., can result in a resort to match-fixing.
Johnson and Tierney argue that democracies may be slightly insulated from match-fixing,
however, due to freer sources o f information. Manipulation o f information is more
difficult in democracies, making score-keeping easier. The downside for democracies,
however, is that when they match-fix they tend to do it against themselves.47 Open media
can lead to greater self-criticism, political competition means that there are always parties
or individuals interested in undermining perceptions o f the ruling party, and democracies
may have greater expectations o f quick and easy victories.
When engaged in counterinsurgencies, democratic regimes should strive to
maintain an objective score-keeping approach to judging their success or failure along the
lines provided by Mandel’s six metrics. Democratic leaders should clearly articulate
these metrics while also acknowledging their complexity. Expectations o f difficulty and
possible set-backs should be communicated early on while still maintaining optimism if

46 Johnson and Tierney, 298.
47 Johnson and Tierney, 85.
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warranted. Expectation management and the identification o f appropriate metrics and
their priority are key to setting the stage for eventual victory. These expectations and
priorities may shift during the course o f the conflict but they should do so due to events
on the ground rather than misperceptions or match-fixing. O f course misperceptions can
never be completely overcome, either in conventional or counterinsurgency warfare, but
a concerted effort must be maintained for the decision-makers to utilize appropriate
metrics and to communicate honestly with the public. In order to accomplish these goals,
and win in counterinsurgencies, democracies must formulate and execute an appropriate
strategy which takes into account those appropriate metrics. Such a strategy, drawn from
the experience o f experts over several decades o f counterinsurgency war-fighting, is
outlined in the following chapter.
Before moving on to that chapter, however, and delineating a population-centric
theory o f counterinsurgency that democracies can win, it is first necessary to make a
short conceptual and philosophical detour. The notion o f legitimacy is crucial to the
counterinsurgency approach taken here and therefore important to get a good conceptual
grasp o f before moving on. In fact, the U.S. military’s field manual, FM 3-24, goes so far
as to make it the basis o f judgment for victory in COIN conflicts: “The primary objective
o f any COIN operation is to foster development o f effective governance by a legitimate
government....Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government’s
legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency.”48
Identifying just what legitimacy is would then seem to be a necessary step in
developing any type o f successful COIN strategy. Yet it is not a simple notion and it is

48 United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1-113 and 1-14.
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all too easy to disregard culture and to blithely apply Western notions o f legitimacy to
settings in which they may not be relevant and without regard to the population’s own
ideas o f legitimacy. Such disregard would certainly turn out to be counterproductive
since it is exactly the population’s acceptance o f the government’s legitimacy that is
sought. It is altogether appropriate, therefore, to spend some time dissecting this issue
before moving on.

LEGITIMACY49
There are many factors that may reinforce, or erode, the legitimacy o f a particular
government. Some argue that legality is the key ingredient o f legitimacy. If the
government or ruler has attained power through the appropriate legal means, then their
governorship is legitimate. Others argue that consent from the governed is political
legitimacy’s most important element. If, and only if, a leader’s rule is consented to by
the governed is that rule legitimate. Others argue that a government is legitimate only in
so far as it is just. To these thinkers, the government’s conformance to principles o f
justice is the most important criterion o f its legitimacy. Still others believe that all that is
necessary for legitimacy is power. If a government has the power to enforce its will, then
it is legitimate. Each one of these elements certainly plays an important role in building
and sustaining the legitimacy o f a government or particular leader. But none o f them
fully illuminates the concept o f legitimacy and none are correct in all circumstances, at
least not in isolation from each other or other possible considerations. In order to better

49 This analysis is a slightly modified version o f a section from an article I first published
as: William R. Patterson “To Fight or Not to Fight? The Ethics o f Military Desertion,”
International Journal o f Applied Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2004).
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understand the role that they do play in a government’s legitimacy, we will examine each
individually.
It cannot be doubted that legality is an important element o f legitimacy. A leader
who has attained his position through legal means is much more likely to be considered
legitimate than one who has not. On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive o f legality
having much importance unless the government already holds a certain degree of
legitimacy. Jean-Marc Coicaud notes that “belief in legality presupposes the legitimacy
o f the legal order that lays down the law.”50 This is essential to keep in mind in the case
o f a foreign counterinsurgency effort in which the legal structure may have been
composed, or even imposed, externally.
Furthermore, legal processes themselves are often flawed. If the legal system is
itself unjust, it will hardly lend legitimacy to a leader or government that has gained
power through it. Raimond Gaita argues that “our sense o f the authority and dignity o f
the law, by virtue o f which we consent without servility to its jurisdiction over us,
depends on our seeing it as answerable to a conception o f justice that transcends and
guides its practices and proscriptions.”51 Chinese leaders, for example, may come to
power legally, but their legitimacy may be still be drawn into question.
Another problem with the argument that legality is o f primary importance to
legitimacy is that it may be in conflict with another element that is often considered
significant to legitimacy, that o f consent. There are many instances, after all, when a
government may legally be in power but still not rule with the consent o f the people.

50 Jean-Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study o f Political
Right and Political Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 39.
51 Raimond Gaita, A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice,
(New York: Routledge, 2000), 76.
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Joseph Stalin and Deng Xiaoping may have become leaders in their respective countries
lawfully, but whether or not they maintained the full consent o f their citizens is dubious.
Some, like Coicaud, argue that consent is absolutely essential to the legitimacy of
a government.
Political institutions require active participation from the members o f the
community. This contribution o f cooperation pries individuals out o f their
immediate zones o f interest and can go as far as the sacrifice o f their lives,
especially in time o f war. This possibility o f a radical limitation upon individual
freedom, which lies at the heart o f political life, engenders a need for consent in
order to establish the right to govern.52
While popular election may be important to a governor’s legitimacy in democratic
societies, it is easy to imagine a society whose citizens would be unimpressed by the
outcome o f an election, e.g., one which chooses its leaders by single combat to the
death .53 Philosopher D.Z. Philips points out that,
If we think o f various political traditions o f sovereignty explicit consent plays no
part in them. For example, consider sovereignty by inheritance. Where is the
explicit consent by the people in that? People will recognize that someone is the
legitimate heir to the throne, but would be very puzzled if asked what role their
consent played in any o f it. But, at various times in history, sovereignty has not
been by inheritance, but by conquest. It would, o f course, be absurd to suggest
that consent played any part in that.54
Some writers (not including Phillips) have claimed that, far from having anything
to do with legality or consent, legitimacy is merely generated by raw power. Those rulers
are legitimate who have the power to seize the reins o f government and maintain them.
As long as they have the power to rule, they are legitimate. Genghis Khan was not the
legitimate ruler o f the Mongols because o f having gone through some legal process or

52 Coicaud, 12.
53 D.Z. Philips, Introducing Philosophy: The Challenge o f Scepticism, (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1996).
54 Philips, 120.
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election. Rather, his was rule was legitimate because it was backed by power— or so it
has been claimed.
Problems arise, however, when the attempt is made to equate legitimacy with
power. It is difficult to picture how a ruler could force his people to recognize him as
legitimate. The best that could be done would be to force them to recognize that he is
powerful. As Peter Winch puts it, “legitimacy.. .is something which cannot itself be
simply imposed by the exercise o f power. Legitimacy is something that needs to be
acknowledged and this ‘acknowledgement’ is an exercise o f will on the part o f the
acknowledger, something, like love, which if it is not freely given is not what it claims to
be at all, but something else.”55
The exercise o f power can force people to obey the ruler, but it cannot morally
obligate them to do so. “Whether we obey the sovereign out o f prudence or necessity,
this is not the same as a sense o f political obligation.”56 A leader or government may rely
on brute force to pass and enforce laws, but without legitimacy those laws will have no
moral weight. In order for people to consider it their moral duty to obey the laws and
commandments o f the government, the government must first believe those laws to be
backed by justice and not merely power.
“Legitimacy,” Simone Weil tells us, “is not a primitive notion. It is derived from
justice.”57 If there is one element that is central to the idea o f legitimacy, it is justice. All
o f its other elements rest on this one notion. Law will be ignored if not seen to be just;
elections or hereditary lines o f monarchy will only be valid in societies that deem them to

55 Peter Winch, “Authority and Rationality,” The Human World 8, no. 19 (1972); 15.
56 Philips, 118.
57 Simone Weil, “The Legitimacy o f the Provisional Government,” Philosophical
Investigations 10, no. 2 (April 1987): 94.
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be a just means o f acquiring positions o f leadership. Power used unjustly may create fear
and obedience; never legitimacy.
A main ingredient in the sense o f justice is the belief that the ruling government
or leader is acting for the benefit o f the citizenship. “Power that is exercised for strictly
personal ends cannot be legitimate,” Coicaud argues. “Indeed as soon as public office is
privatized— that is to say, as soon as it serves exclusively private interests— the right to
govern is called into question.”58 Leaders solely concerned for their own welfare,
whatever the cost to the people, are plunderers; they are leaders in name only.
We should not be fooled, however, into believing that armed with the discovery
that justice is an important element of legitimacy, we now have a steadfast and exact
measurement by which to determine the legitimacy o f individual governments or rulers.
For the concept o f justice itself varies across cultures, space, and time. Though Genghis
Khan may not seem to us to have been a just leader, his people had a very different
conception o f justice than we do. To the Mongols, cruelty may have been justified
insofar as it strengthened their own society and protected their own people from outside
attack. And consider the case o f Vietnam; was that a just or an unjust war? While many
have extremely strong points o f view on that question, others will hold to the opposite
view with equal tenacity. Though today war is supposedly governed by the abstract laws
o fju s adbellum (the justice o f war) and ju s in bello (justice in war), these rules are rarely
applied in practice without controversy.
So, despite having found an important indicator o f legitimacy, that o f justice, this
indicator is imperfect and will not alone clear up all o f our disagreements regarding the

58 Coicaud, 32.
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notion o f legitimacy. Because the concept o f justice is a blurry one, however, does not
make it useless. Consider this discussion that Ludwig Wittgenstein has with an
imaginary interlocutor:
W: If I tell someone ‘Stand roughly here’ - may not this explanation work
perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too?
I: But isn’t it an inexact explanation?
W: Yes; why shouldn’t we call i t ‘inexact’? Only let us understand what
‘inexact’ means. For it does not mean ‘unusable.’59
Consider also his discussion about games. “One might say that the concept o f
‘game’ is a concept with blurred edges. - ‘But is a blurred concept a concept at all?’ - Is
an indistinct photograph a picture o f a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to
replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn’t the indistinct one often exactly what
we need?”60 While the concepts o f ‘justice’ and ‘legitimacy’ may, like that o f ‘games,’
be quite blurry, they are not useless. These concepts serve to give us points o f reference
about our political obligations and help us ground our moral decisions regarding them.
Though the limits that justice imposes on legitimacy are indistinct, they are still
limits. Winch explains that “limits are recognized to the exercise o f legitimate state
power: limits the extent o f which is itself a subject for political disagreement and
discussion and undergoes historical change.”61 All o f this is not to say that the concepts
o f justice and legitimacy are completely amorphous and that their meaning must be
decided by each individual for himself. These concepts are usually bound up in cultural
practices and traditions operating at a particular place and time.

59 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1958), sec. 88.
60 Wittgenstein, sec. 71.
61 Winch, 18.
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A problem can arise for counterinsurgents, particularly those engaged in foreignbased counterinsurgency efforts, when their own views o f legitimacy are different, or
even counter to those in the host nation. When there is a significant difference between
the two, FM 3-24 advises that

. .the most important attitude remains that o f the HN

[host nation] population. In the end, its members determine the ultimate victor.”62 While
it’s true that the host nation population’s acceptance o f its government is crucial, it’s also
true that perspectives held of that government’s legitimacy by the assisting nation’s
population cannot be ignored. An assisting nation’s population may not be willing to
support the sacrifices o f a counterinsurgency operation if the government being propped
up in the host nation is seen as barbaric or completely illegitimate. In order to obtain
acquiescence in the host nation and continued support by the assisting nation, some type
o f consensus about legitimacy needs to be reached. The local population must consider
their government legitimate, and the assisting nation’s population must at least view that
government as acceptable, even if not one that they themselves would want to live under.
This can be a delicate, but vital, balancing act.
The next chapter outlines a counterinsurgency strategy that is drawn from the
academic literature and from FM 3-24. It is amenable to use by democratic regimes and
emphasizes the population as the center o f gravity. The use o f this strategy side-steps
Merom’s objections since brutality is strictly avoided and is replaced by legitimacy
building efforts. Though it certainly doesn’t guarantee victory— countering an
insurgency is difficult under any strategy— it does offer what is likely to be the best
opportunity for success.

62 United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1-118.
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CHAPTER 3
A POPULATION-CENTRIC COIN STRATEGY

This chapter will serve to outline a counterinsurgency strategy that builds off o f
the work o f earlier theorists as well as that which has developed in the wake o f the
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq by both academicians and practitioners. It offers a
plausible framework for democracies to succeed in future counterinsurgency conflicts.
The strategy outlined here will assume a certain type o f insurgency, that is an insurgency
in a foreign country in which the host government is being assisted by, or occupied by, a
democratic country. This assumption is made because most counterinsurgency efforts
carried out by democratic governments in recent decades have been o f this sort and it is
the most likely form o f insurgency to challenge democratic regimes in the future.
There are essentially two viable strategies for being successful at
counterinsurgency. The first is to engage in extreme brutality. Under this strategy, force
is applied without regard to civilian casualties or human rights. Torture is used to extract
intelligence during interrogations. And there are few, if any, restrictions on the type of
weapons used. This type o f strategy places emphasis on destroying the insurgency by
any means necessary and pays comparatively little attention to the welfare o f the
population.
Gil Merom does a good job at explaining why this strategy will not work for
democratic regimes. He argues that democratic states which attempt to apply brutal
tactics during a COIN conflict will run into three dilemmas. “The first dilemma is how to
reconcile the humanitarian values o f a portion o f the educated class with the brutal
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requirements o f counterinsurgency warfare. The second dilemma is how to find a
domestically acceptable trade-off between brutality and sacrifice. The third dilemma is
how to preserve support for the war without undermining the democratic order.” 1
Merom is certainly right that these problems are sure to confront any democratic
regime that attempts a strategy o f brutality in the conduct o f COIN. Information is too
freely available in today’s media-saturated world and concepts o f international justice
and human rights are too developed not to result in a backlash to brutal tactics once made
public. Where Merom goes wrong, however, is in concluding that COIN is therefore
impossible, or at least excessively difficult, for democratic regimes to achieve success.
Rejecting a strategy o f brutality does not mean rejecting COIN, it only entails rejecting
that form o f COIN. A strong literature has developed during the post-World War II era,
in fact, which delineates a completely opposite strategy which, if properly employed,
may offer a plausible strategy for democratic regimes involved in COIN.
As discussed in the introductory chapter, one o f the earliest, and still one o f the
most pre-eminent, authors o f this new COIN strategy was David Galula. His strategy is
most cohesively laid out in his book Counterinsurgency Warfare. One o f the primary
findings in his work, confirmed in much o f the literature that followed it, is that the
support o f the population is the “center o f gravity” in such conflicts. He argues that,
In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other
tangible criteria, such as the number o f divisions, the position they hold, the
industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare [COIN], strength must be
assessed by the extent o f support from the population as measured in terms o f
political organization at the grass roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position
o f strength when his power is embodied in a political organization issuing from,
and firmly supported by, the population.2

1 Merom, 2 3 0 -2 3 1 .
2 Galula, 55.
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Galula brings to bear several powerful arguments that demonstrate the importance
o f the population in COIN. First, even more than most conflicts, COIN is at its core a
political conflict. The victory sought in such a conflict is a political one. Such a victory
depends upon the support— or at least the acquiescence— o f the population. As he puts it,
“ .. .the exercise o f political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement o f the
population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.”3 In the absence o f brutality, which has
already been ruled out for democratic counterinsurgents, a political regime established
without the explicit, or at least implicit, acceptance o f the population is not likely to
persist for long.
A second reason that Galula points to for identifying the population as the center
o f gravity is that the population is essential to the insurgency. The population provides
recruits, supplies, and places to hide. He writes, “What makes it possible for guerrillas to
survive and to expand? The complicity o f the population. This is the key to guerrilla
warfare, indeed to the insurgency, and it has been expressed in the formula o f the fish
swimming in water [by Mao Tse Tung].”4 By denying this necessary support o f the
population to the insurgency, it can be defeated.
Support from the population is also essential to a successful counterinsurgent in
order to gather intelligence. The strength o f an insurgency lies in its anonymity, in its
ability to engage in an attack and then to slink away and avoid any counterattack. In
order to identify insurgents and locate their secret safe havens, counterinsurgents must
rely upon information from the population, for it is they who will know who the

3 Galula, 4.
4 Galula, 33.
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insurgents are and where they base themselves. Just as police departments rely upon
information provided by a cooperative population in order to solve crimes (hence the
growing ubiquity and success o f community policing initiatives), counterinsurgents must
rely upon the population to root out insurgencies.
Contemporary counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen agrees with the
assessment that the population is the key to winning COIN engagements. “In
counterinsurgency the population is the prize,” he says, “and protecting and controlling it
is the key activity.”5 Elsewhere he writes, “The center o f gravity o f an insurgent
movement— the source o f power from which it derives its morale, its physical strength,
its freedom of action, and its will to act— is its connectivity with the local population in a
given area. Insurgents tend to ride and manipulate a social wave o f grievances, often
legitimate ones, and they draw their fighting power from their connection to a mass
base.”6 Since the population is the center o f gravity for any COIN operation, and because
the insurgency rests so heavily upon the support o f the population, the best way to attack
an insurgency is through the population. Kilcullen again,
Because the insurgent network needs the population to act in certain ways in order
to survive, we can asphyxiate the network by cutting the insurgents off from the
people. And they cannot simply ‘go quiet’ to avoid that threat. They must either
emerge into the open, where we can destroy them using superior numbers and
firepower, or stay quiet, accept permanent marginalization from their former
population base, and suffocate. This puts the insurgents on the horns o f a lethal
dilemma.7
The centrality o f the population to COIN warfare has become official U.S. Army
and Marine Corps doctrine with the publication o f FM 3-24. The manual states that,

5 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 73.
6 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 7 - 8 .
7 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, p. 10.
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“Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side
aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate.”8 Furthermore,
“Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge o f their own affairs
and consenting to the government’s rule.”9
It is safe to say that the paramount importance o f winning over the population is
one o f the fundamental tenets o f contemporary democratic counterinsurgency theory as
well as in United States military doctrine. This has been most succinctly encapsulated in
the phrase “winning hearts and minds.” This realization entails a complete rejection of
the brutalitarian strategy and the adoption o f a much more population-centric one. Such a
strategy will be one that is sensitive to the population’s notions o f legitimacy and which
will take a whole-of-govemment approach to ensure that such legitimacy is maintained.
It should not be mistakenly believed, however, that this approach is a completely non
military one. The military still plays an essential role in this strategy as keeping the
population secure from insurgent violence is one o f the key necessities o f winning and
maintaining their support. Furthermore, the military is necessary in order to accomplish
the targeted eradication o f irreconcilable elements o f the insurgent movement. Military
action remains crucial to this COIN strategy, but the military is to be used in a moderated
and targeted manner which compliments, rather than contradicts, the political strategy.
The difference between strategy and tactics should be firmly kept in mind in this
section. What follows is a broad strategy which will be manifested or enacted differently
in any particular conflict. There is no cookie-cutter approach that will be successfulin all
COIN circumstances, rather each situation will differ according to geographic, cultural,

8 United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1-3.
9 United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1-4.
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political, military, or other factors. Rather than an attempt to constrain COIN efforts into
specific measures or tactics, what is provided here should be seen as strategic guidelines
which are themselves flexible.
A population-centric COIN strategy, which keeps in mind the elements of
strategic victory described by Robert Mandel, has several key aspects10:
1. Direct Action against the Insurgent.
A. Secure the population from insurgent attacks.
B. Ensure sufficient troop strength to protect targeted populations and
destroy or expel insurgent forces.
C. Emplace troops in population centers.
D. Produce intelligence to identify insurgents and differentiate them
from the larger population.
E. Prevent insurgent groups from reforming following initial defeat.
F. Undermine or destroy insurgent political organizations.
G. Develop host nation military capability.
2. Indirect Action against the Insurgent
A. Build host-nation legitimacy by demonstrating political, economic,
social and developmental competence.
B. Undermine insurgent grievances through effective political action.
C. Hold elections and develop functional and independent political
institutions as soon as practical.
D. Develop close partnership between host and assisting nations.
3. Interaction with Population
A. Develop substantial and deep cultural awareness and understanding.
B. Address political, economic, developmental and social grievances o f
the population.
C. Develop cooperation between the population and counterinsurgent
forces in order to improve intelligence.
D. Avoid brutal tactics that will alienate the population.
E. Deny insurgent forces access to and support from the population.
Having provided a broad outline o f a potentially successful COIN strategy, a
deeper examination o f each element o f that strategy is provided in the rest o f this chapter.
First, however, a few general principles need to be emphasized. One is that a successful
COIN strategy must be a whole-of-govemment approach, meaning that all elements of

10 The strategy described here is primarily drawn from the work o f David Galula and
David Kilcullen along with FM 3-24.
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state power and resources— military, political, economic, and social— must be brought to
bear. Additionally, there must be unity o f effort. Military and political personnel cannot
work at cross purposes but must act cooperatively and in unison.
Political efforts can easily be undermined by military efforts and vice versa. It is
essential that such counterproductive actions are avoided through close integration
between civilian and military leaders and the imposition o f a clear chain o f command and
responsibility. Finally, leaders who initiate a COIN effort must recognize the difficulties
that will likely be faced and prepare their publics for a sustained and costly effort.
Attempts to downplay the long-term nature o f counterinsurgency efforts or their
potentially substantial costs is likely to backfire. Not only is the support o f the host
nation’s population vital, but so is the support o f the assisting nation’s people.

DIRECT ACTION AGAINST THE INSURGENT
Despite the political nature o f a successful COIN strategy, military force remains
a vital aspect o f it. Counterinsurgency is, after all, a form o f warfare. Though
counterinsurgencies cannot be won without careful attention to their political aspects,
which are at the core o f such conflicts, neither can they be won without the appropriate
application o f force. Kilcullen reminds us that, “All successful counterinsurgents have
been willing and able to kill the enemy, often with great ruthlessness.” 11 Such use o f
violence cannot be indiscriminate, as Kilcullen also notes that these counterinsurgents
have all “clearly distinguished that enemy from the population in which it hides, have
applied violence as precisely and carefully as possible, have acted scrupulously within

11 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 7.
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the law, and have emphasized measures to protect and win over the population,”

but

violence must be used nonetheless.
Galula argues that incapacitating the insurgent through the use o f force is the first,
but only preparatory, stage o f a successful COIN strategy. “The destruction o f the
guerrilla forces in the selected area is, obviously, highly desirable, and this is what the
counterinsurgent must strive for,” he says. “One thing should be clear, however: This
operation is not an end in itself, for guerrillas, like the heads o f the legendary hydra, have
the special ability to grow again if not all destroyed at the same time. The real purpose o f
the first operation, then, is to prepare the stage for the further development o f the
counterinsurgent action,” 13 which includes a whole-of-govemment approach.
The use o f force is a necessary first step because nothing further can be achieved
if the population is not relatively secure from insurgent violence. Security is required for
political, economic and social development and the use o f force is necessary to ensure
security. Without security, all other efforts will be futile. A newly built school, for
example, will remain empty if insurgents are able to credibly threaten the population with
retaliatory violence if they send their children there, as happened frequently in
Afghanistan. In such a case the counterinsurgent has only managed to waste money in
building the structure and, even worse, allowed the insurgents an opportunity to
demonstrate their own strength and the government’s weakness. Hence, non-military
related counterinsurgency efforts may turn out to be counterproductive if the necessary
security is not available to support them. According to FM 3-24, “The cornerstone o f any

12 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 7.
13 Galula, 75.
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COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure
environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads.” 14
Even if other COIN goals could be achieved without first establishing security,
the legitimacy o f the government surely could not be. One o f the primary roles o f
government, after all, is to establish and maintain security. Any government unable to do
so is likely to be viewed by its citizens as weak, ineffectual and incapable o f carrying out
one o f its chief functions. Security is a defining role o f government and without the
ability to provide it no other success is likely to endow that government with legitimacy
in the eyes o f the people.
Just how much troop presence is necessary to provide security in COIN warfare
has been a contentiously argued issue. Various scholars and practitioners have developed
troop-to-insurgent ratios which they argue are absolutely essential for victory. These
ratios are proposed as minimal force requirements without which victory will be highly
unlikely at best. Unfortunately, these levels are often so high as to be often unattainable.
RAND researcher James T. Quinlivan authored an influential study in 1995 in
which he tied appropriate troop levels to population numbers. He argued that COIN
operations, which he refers to as stability operations, are particularly troop intensive. He
writes that,
a ‘hearts and minds’ counterinsurgency campaign places the focus on the people,
the military consequences o f which are requirements for population control
measures and local security o f the population. The static forces that protect the
population from insurgents and cut o ff any support the population might provide
to them is essential to the campaign. Consequently, in any stability operation it is
almost certain that the force devoted to establishing order will be both larger in

14 United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1-131.
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numerical terms than the forces dedicated to field combat and more aligned to
political aspects o f a ‘hearts and minds’ concept o f operations.15
Through an analysis o f historical cases Quinlivan argues that there has been a
range o f troop levels depending upon the type o f conflict but that 20 security forces per
1,000 population is likely to be optimal in most situations. In any large country this can
quickly become an impossibly large force to maintain over time. Quinlivan points out
about Iraq, for example, that its population o f approximately 25 million would have
required a constant presence o f 500,000 American troops to meet this ratio. In order to
sustain that over time would require a force structure o f 2.5 million troops.16 Such troop
levels are clearly unsustainable.
An analysis conducted by the Center for Army Analysis and described by Steven
M. Goode agrees that the troop levels should be tied to the size o f the population. It
further argues that the necessary ratio is dependent upon the intensity o f the insurgency
and the number o f host nation forces available. It is also dependent upon the
effectiveness o f the troops available for deployment. Though the ratio is variable, this
analysis found that the average security force ratio should be 2.8 security forces per one
thousand population in peacetime situations. More troops will obviously be required,
however, in situations o f intense violence, making this number merely a starting point.
On the other hand, troop levels can be reduced if more local forces are available.

15 James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters 25
(Winter 1995): 2.
16 James T. Quinlivan, “Burden o f Victory: The Painful Arithmetic o f Stability
Operations,” RAND Review 27, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 29.
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Goode stresses the importance o f local forces, arguing that “the higher the
proportion of local security forces the better.” 17 Though these forces may be less well
trained or professional than would be foreign troops, they have several key advantages.
They have a substantially better understanding o f the area and usually o f the language
and the culture. They are also likely to be more quickly and fully accepted by the local
population, a key goal o f population-centric COIN. Goode also points out that local
forces are likely to be more committed since it is their own country that they are fighting
for. Furthermore, they will have to live with the consequences o f defeat while foreign
forces will simply go home. One further advantage is that local forces can remain
deployed to the same area for a much longer time than can foreign troops who typically
serve a rotation o f one year or less. This allows for the development o f more long-term
relationships and trust.18
In a book published by RAND, researchers Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki
warn that not too much should be based on ratios determined by historical case studies. It
is unsound to extrapolate from an assessment o f historical cases to any given particular
case, at best they can provide guidance, but not rules.19 Determining appropriate force
levels will require on-the-ground determinations, especially after operations have begun.
“During operations, policymakers will have to depend on the plain-word assessments o f
their trusted field commanders in order to conduct force planning and to shape

17 Steven M. Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency,”
Parameters 39 (Winter 2009-10): 55.
18 Goode, 55.
19 Connable and Libicki, 138-139.
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insurgency endings. If they do not trust their commanders to give them accurate
assessments, it is their responsibility to replace them with more-competent officers.”20
FM 3-24 stresses the importance o f using the appropriate level o f force. In some
operations, overwhelming force will be necessary. In others, too much force may be
counterproductive. “An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if
collateral damage leads to the recruitment o f fifty more insurgents.”21 For this reason, the
level o f force applied is highly important. Research by Jason Lyall et. al. has found that
this is especially the case for a foreign counterinsurgent force. They find that inadvertent
harm caused by a foreign, or otherwise out-group, counterinsurgent is more likely to be
viewed negatively than a similar degree o f harm caused by an in-group insurgent attack.
In other words, they find an asymmetric reaction to harm based upon the status o f the
responsible combatant. Their findings indicate that:
Viewed through the lens o f intergroup bias, individuals are more likely to punish
out-groups for transgressions, simply confirming biases about the out-group’s
disposition. Harm inflicted by the in-group, however, carries a different meaning:
victimized individuals, and the community at large, may be more forgiving, since
such acts are justified by appeal to extenuating circumstances that forced the in
group’s hand.22
This means that it is especially important for a foreign counterinsurgent to avoid
unnecessary harm to the population, for which it is likely to be disproportionately
blamed. A positive finding in the same research, however, indicates that some o f the
harm caused by unintentional harm can be partly alleviated. They find that culturally
appropriate mitigation efforts, at least in Afghanistan where the research was conducted,

20 Connable and Libicki, 140.
21 United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1-142.
22 Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai, “Explaining Support for Combatants
during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan,” American Political Science
Review, 107, no. 4, (November 2013): 681.
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cause a movement o f support away from the insurgent force.23 In tandem, this research
suggests that foreign counterinsurgents should be particularly careful about inflicting
unintentional harm to civilians, but that if it occurs, culturally appropriate displays o f
contrition and restitution should be attempted.
Jeffrey Record points to a tendency o f the U.S. military to risk inadvertent harm
to civilians through an over-reliance upon its technological advantage and heavy fire
power, especially as this keeps soldiers out o f harms way and reduces casualties.
“Needless to say, perhaps, a devotion to firepower, while highly desirable in itself, cannot
help but encourage the U.S. armed forces to rely on it even when other modes o f military
behavior would be more suitable. In irregular conflicts in particular, heavy and
sometimes seemingly indiscriminate, certainly disproportionate, resorting to firepower
solutions readily becomes self-defeating.”24 Ironically, the unavailability o f troops may
increase the tendency to use too much firepower. Insufficient troop levels produces
limited options and the use o f technological solutions, such as drone strikes, may be the
only available course o f action, thereby resulting in excessive causalities and
undermining the goal o f winning the population.
The research o f Jason Lyle and Isaiah Wilson III also points to the negative
repercussions of an over-reliance on mechanical warfare in counterinsurgency operations.
Mechanized forces tend to draw the counterinsurgent away from the population and can
therefore be detrimental to COIN operations. They argue that,
As the number o f machines in a given military increase, the number o f personnel
devoted to their operation and maintenance must necessarily rise. Modem
militaries therefore possess comparatively few infantrymen, reducing the rate o f

23 Lyall, Blair, and Kosuke, 693.
24 Record, 105-106.
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interaction simply because fewer soldiers are available for such tasks. The fact
that mechanized forces are ill-suited for certain types o f terrain and are tied to
available roads only magnifies these problems. Rather than exercising control,
mechanized forces are actually providing only ‘presence’ since their greatest
asset, mobility, allows them to cover more ground without having to embed in a
particular location. This asset is nonetheless a liability: with fewer soldiers,
mechanized forces must sacrifice depth for breadth.25
Though mechanization can provide an advantage to counterinsurgents if used
sparingly and with specific purpose, it cannot replace infantry soldiers and police officers
on the ground. Over-reliance on mechanization can lead to excessive force, loss o f
connection with the population, and a failure to collect vital intelligence. Consistent and
pervasive foot patrols in populated areas are the only way to prevent such pitfalls.
Whenever possible, troops should be emplaced with the population. This ensures
persistent, rather than intermittent, security. It also provides greater access to intelligence
and a closer working relationship with the people. Patrolling through a village (or town
or city, the example o f a village will be used throughout for the sake o f convenience),
even if it is as frequent as once or twice a day, does not provide security to that village.
As soon as the counterinsurgent forces leave, the insurgent forces return. Even worse,
insurgents might carry out reprisals against those known to have cooperated with the
counterinsurgents while they were there. This deters future cooperation and can severely
undermine the counterinsurgenf s ability to gain the people’s trust. Kilcullen writes:
Effective counterinsurgency provides human security to the population, where
they live, 24 hours a day. This, not destroying the enemy, is the central task. It
demands the continuous presence o f security forces that protect population
centers; local alliances and partnerships with community leaders; creation o f selfdefending populations through community-based security measures such as local
and neighborhood watch and guard forces; and operation o f small-unit ground
forces in tandem with local security forces, developing pervasive situational
awareness, quick response times, and unpredictable operating patterns that keep

25 Lyall and Wilson III, 77.
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the enemy off balance.26
Living with the people is key to the development o f intelligence, which is vital for
taking direct action against insurgents. Without reliable intelligence the insurgents
cannot be identified or differentiated from the rest o f the population. FM 3-24 recognizes
this point. “Counterinsurgency,” it says, “is an intelligence-driven endeavor.”27 In order
to avoid reliance on indiscriminate firepower, intelligence must be available to more
precisely target the application o f lethal force. Identifying the insurgents from the people
requires a robust and effective intelligence capability. As Kilcullen puts it, “In
counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is often nearly impossible.”28
Information is initially most likely to come from those segments o f the population
that are natural allies o f the government or the counterinsurgent force, “those who would
have least to win and most to lose through the insurgent’s victory.”29 These people must
be identified early and recruited to assist in intelligence operations. As counterinsurgent
forces spread into new areas, they will consistently need to identify these people and
partner with them. The amount o f intelligence coming into counterinsurgent forces is a
useful measurement o f population cooperation, and therefore o f success. In fact, the level
o f acquired intelligence is most often a better measurement o f success than body count in
COIN operations.
Once insurgents have been initially defeated in a given area, it is crucial to
prevent their future resurgence. If after a village has been secured troops are moved to
another area and there has been no long-standing relationship and security apparatus

26 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 266.
77
United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 3-1.
28 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 31.
29 Galula, 84.
♦

*

63

developed, it is possible for the insurgents to move right back in, thereby undermining all
previous progress. Either a small contingent o f counterinsurgency forces or host-nation
security personnel must remain, or the village must be capable o f its own self-defense.
At the first sign o f resurgence, the area should be inundated once again with
counterinsurgent forces. The loss o f a previously secured area will make it more difficult
to recover that area since trust will have been lost. It may also serve to undermine the
counterinsurgent forces with other localities as they will have reason to doubt their long
term commitment.
At the same time that insurgents themselves are being targeted and destroyed,
their political arm, if they have one, must be undermined. Insurgent forces often develop
a political wing that is meant to appear as separate from the insurgency yet which pursues
the same goals in the legitimate political sphere. A good example o f this was in Northern
Ireland where Sinn Fein acted as the political wing o f the IRA (Irish Republican Army)
which engaged in violent insurrection. Direct military action against these political
actors is likely to be counterproductive as it may demonstrate a lack o f commitment to
the political process. Rather, a more indirect effort should be undertaken to expose the
political wing’s association with the military wing o f the insurgency and to delegitimize
it through information operations. In addition, criminal prosecutions should be pursued
where evidence o f connection to insurgents is available. This will obviously require
effective intelligence and law enforcement capabilities. Additionally, the financial
resources o f these political groups should be monitored in order to detect connections
with insurgents or with foreign supporters. When detected, these finances should be
frozen, arrests made, and the political party disbanded.
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None o f these efforts will have a long-term impact unless the capabilities o f host
nation forces are being simultaneously developed so that they can gradually take over
counterinsurgent responsibilities. Foreign counterinsurgents will eventually have to
return home and if host nation forces are not capable o f maintaining order upon their
departure insurgents may re-emerge. Avoiding this outcome requires the development o f
effective police and military forces. FM 3-24 notes that:
The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself. In the end,
the host nation has to win on its ow n... .HN governments have the final
responsibility to solve their own problems. Eventually all foreign armies are seen
as interlopers or occupiers; the sooner the main effort can transition to HN
institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the better.30

INDIRECT ACTION AGAINST THE INSURGENT
Taking indirect action against the insurgent entails activities that are generally
considered non-military, but which the military has often had to do anyway. These
activities involve building political legitimacy for the host government while denying it
to the insurgents, undermining insurgent grievances, and developing a strong relationship
between the host and supporting nations.
The most important first step in indirectly taking action against the insurgent is to
build the political legitimacy o f the host nation. An insurgency counts on the
beleaguered government suffering from a lack o f legitimacy and cannot long survive
against a government that enjoys strong popular support. In order to display legitimacy
the host government must demonstrate its ability to effectively govern the country. This
is most visibly done, aside from providing security through direct action against the

30 United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1-147.
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insurgents, by presiding over political, economic and social development. If the country
is moving forward in these areas in a way that tangibly benefits a large proportion o f the
population, the legitimacy o f the government will be enhanced. A brief discussion o f
what these three forms o f development entail follows below.
Political development involves the creation o f viable political processes and
institutions that are seen as legitimate by the governed populace. Political institutions
that are seen as representative, effective, largely uncorrupted, and competent are essential
to long-term legitimacy. Regimes that are seen as unrepresentative o f the population,
perhaps due to foreign influence, will not be long regarded as legitimate political actors
on their behalf. Similarly for regimes that are considered overly corrupt, ineffectual or
incompetent. Such regimes will have difficulty maintaining the allegiance o f the
population in the face o f insurgent counter-claims to power. Especially if the insurgents
do seem to be representative, competent and uncorrupted.
Economic development is essential to counterinsurgency. Economic misery can
lead ordinarily peaceful citizens to violence, especially young males. Even if they have
no ideological grievances against the government, unemployed young men are vulnerable
to economic incentives from insurgent groups and may engage in violence simply for
pay. If such men are gainfully employed, on the other hand, they will often be less
susceptible to manipulation by insurgent groups and more focused on providing for their
families. They will be less likely to jeopardize their stable employment and will also
likely feel less aggrieved and alienated from the government.
Social development is often the most difficult. It encompasses a wide range o f
issues such as education, women’s rights, the development o f civic groups,
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secularization, and anything else o f a social nature. Such development can often be
highly controversial. Women’s rights, for example, is a highly contentious issue in
Afghanistan. Forcing these issues prematurely, or too strongly, may lead to a backlash
against the government and aid the insurgency. Not dealing with them at all, however,
may prevent long-term stability as social development is essential to establishment and
maintenance o f such stability. How social development is handled must be considered on
a case-by-case basis and take into account cultural and historical factors.
Legitimacy is equally crucial for supporting nations as it is for the host nation
itself. If not seen to be fighting for a legitimate cause, the populations o f supporting
nations may demand that their sons and daughters cease fighting for an unworthy cause
and return home. Chaplain Charles F. Kriete is quoted as saying, “ [War] requires for its
successful pursuit the mobilization o f a moral consensus o f the legitimacy o f both the
objectives o f violence and the means by which these objectives are pursued...”31
Without that legitimacy popular support will falter and the insurgency is likely to outlast
their commitment to the fight. This will leave the host nation to battle the insurgency on
its own, probably with much less likelihood o f success.
Unfortunately, though vitally important, this is perhaps the hardest aspect for an
assisting nation to impact. As T.X. Hammes puts it, “It is much more difficult for an
outside power to force the host country to make the necessary political changes....an
outside power cannot establish the legitimacy o f the host government. The host nation
may simply refuse to make changes the outside power sees as necessary for success.”32

31 Charles F. Kriete, quoted in Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis o f
the Vietnam War (New York: Random House, 1982), 34.
32 T.X. Hammes, “The Future o f Counterinsurgency,” Orbis 56 (Fall 2012): 571.
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Despite these difficulties, the assisting nation must attempt to advise and support the host
government’s efforts at winning and maintaining political legitimacy using whatever
leverage or influence it has. Failure to do so may handicap the entire counterinsurgency
effort.
The second aspect o f indirect action against the insurgent involves undermining
their grievances. If the insurgent’s grievances are legitimate ones, ameliorating them, at
least to some degree, will likely be necessary— and just. Rectifying the underlying
causes o f insurgent activity will pull the rug out from beneath them and leave the
insurgents without a legitimate rallying cry. Dealing with such issues is also necessary
for long-term stability since even if the current insurgency is defeated without doing so,
remaining grievances may spawn further resistance in the future. Undermining legitimate
grievances will both undercut the raison d ’etre o f the current insurgency and prevent the
development o f any future ones.
As the Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual puts it, “Skillful
counterinsurgents can deal a significant blow to an insurgency by appropriating its cause.
Insurgents often exploit multiple causes, however, making counterinsurgents’ challenges
more difficult. In the end, any successful COIN operation must address the legitimate
grievances insurgents use to generate popular support. These may be different in each
local area, in which case a complex set o f solutions will be needed.” 33 Accomplishing
this goal typically requires the political, economic and social development mentioned
above.

33 United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1-51.
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Rather than pushing legitimate grievances, however, insurgents may indeed have
illegitimate, or contested, grievances. If so, they will likely have less success in bringing
the population to their side. Even illegitimate grievances, however, may be powerful if
they are expressed through potent propaganda or misinformation campaigns.
Additionally, grievances seen as illegitimate by the government and the majority o f the
population may still draw support from smaller, but powerful, constituencies. Rather
than concede to illegitimate grievances, these should be undermined in the political arena
through a counter-campaign o f information operations. The illegitimacy o f the
insurgent’s arguments, claims, and demands should be made apparent through messaging
and other government efforts.
Care must be taken, however, in judging the legitimacy o f an insurgency’s
grievances. The government itself is o f course likely to be biased against accepting any
grievance as legitimate. If grievances, both legitimate and illegitimate, are to be
undermined or rectified, they must first be honestly and objectively identified.
Though highly significant, undermining grievances will not be easy. If it were,
the grievances would have already been dealt with and the insurgency would never have
developed in the first place. The grievances which the insurgents use as a rallying cry are
likely to be longstanding and difficult to resolve. The grievances at issue may also, in
some cases, go to the heart o f the ruling regime’s power and threaten that regime’s very
existence, something that they are not likely to accept. Galula warns that, “To deprive
the insurgent o f a good cause amounts to solving the country’s basic problems. If this is
possible, well and good, but we know .. .that a good cause for the insurgent is one that his
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opponent cannot adopt without losing his power in the process. And there are problems
that, although providing a good cause to an insurgent, are not susceptible o f solution.”34
If the insurgent’s grievances have any hope o f resolution, they must be accurately
identified and properly dealt with, taking into account the views o f the population. One
o f the best ways in which to ensure representative political institutions that properly
identify and deal with the legitimate grievances o f the population is to allow the people to
choose their own government through free and fair elections. Therefore, such elections
should be held as soon as practical, at least for local leaders, if they are not part o f the
current system. Several conditions may stand in the way o f doing so: the lack of
effective electoral institutions (established and fair election laws, polling places, etc.), a
population unfamiliar with electoral politics, insecurity at polling places, and the
possibility o f strong electoral gains by the insurgency’s political wing (if there is one).
Overcoming these obstacles to elections should be a primary goal o f the overall
counterinsurgency strategy from the beginning. Fortunately, completely resolving
legitimate grievances may not be necessary. Even a demonstrated interest in those
grievances and concerted effort, as well as some progress towards resolving them, may
be enough.
The final piece o f indirect action against the insurgent is the maintenance o f a
strong relationship between the host and supporting nations. A major goal o f the
insurgency will likely be to create discord between the two, thereby dividing and
weakening the counterinsurgency effort. Insurgents may attempt to do this in numerous
ways, for example by presenting the host government as a puppet o f the supporting

34 Galula, 46.
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nation, by infiltrating one or the other o f the governments and initiating attacks from
within thereby generating distrust (as is currently being done very successfully in
Afghanistan), or by other means. A strong relationship between all o f the nations
involved in a counterinsurgency effort is vital for ultimate victory and attempts to sunder
that unity must be overcome.
Strategic and tactical partnership between the host and supporting nations, as well
as compromise over any issues o f political discord, are necessary in order to prevent the
fraying o f the relationship over time. Shared sacrifice will also forge stronger bonds.
Neither partner, therefore, should be allowed to carry a heavier burden than the other if it
can be prevented. The host and supporting nations must be in the fight together.

INTERACTION WITH THE POPULATION
Not only must the host and supporting governments be in the fight together, but
they must ultimately get the population on their side as well, or at least a sizeable and
active proportion o f it. It is worth quoting Galula at length on this issue:
What is the crux o f the problem for the counterinsurgent? It is not how to clean
an area. We have seen that he can always concentrate enough forces to do it, even
if he has to take some risk in order to achieve the necessary concentration. The
problem is, how to keep an area clean so that the counterinsurgent forces will be
free to operate elsewhere. This can be achieved only with the support o f the
population. If it is relatively easy to disperse and to expel the insurgent forces
from a given area by purely military action, if it is possible to destroy the
insurgent political organizations by intensive police action, it is impossible to
prevent the return o f the guerrilla units and the rebuilding o f the political cells
unless the population cooperates. The population, therefore, becomes the
objective for the counterinsurgent as it was for his enemy. Its tacit support, its
submission to law and order, its consensus— taken for granted in normal times—
have been undermined by the insurgent’s activity. And the truth is that the
insurgent, with his organization at the grass roots, is tactically the strongest o f
opponents where it counts, at the population level. This is where the fight has to
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be conducted, in spite o f the counterinsurgent’s ideological handicap and in spite
o f the head start gained by the insurgent in organizing the population.35
No successes against the insurgent forces will be permanent if the insurgency has
the population’s support and is able to continually regenerate. In order to win over the
population the counterinsurgent must 1) develop a profound understanding o f the culture
and perspectives o f the people, 2) show interest and progress towards addressing
political, economic, and social grievances, 3) develop cooperative partnerships between
the people and the counterinsurgents that benefits both, 4) deny counterinsurgents free
access to the population, and 5) avoid brutal tactics.
FM 3-24 argues that, “Successful conduct o f COIN operations depends on
thoroughly understanding the society and culture within which they are being
conducted.”36 Understanding the culture is indeed one o f the most crucial steps in a
counterinsurgency, but what exactly is culture? It is one o f those intangible concepts that
people claim to know when they see it, but often can’t articulate. In fact, even experts in
the fields o f sociology, anthropology, and political science, often disagree about just what
precisely culture is. While I won’t attempt to provide a definitive solution to the problem
here, it is necessary to provide a working definition that, though not completely
exhaustive, gets us going in the right direction and is conclusive enough for our present
requirements.
For the purposes o f this dissertation, culture will refer to the shared patterns of
beliefs and behaviors o f a given people, along with the manifestations o f those beliefs
and behaviors. This can include language, religion, various rites and rituals, political

35 Galula, 52.
36 United States Army and United States Marine Corps, 1-124.

72

structures, economic activities, political hierarchies and lineages, gender relations, tribal
interactions, the production o f symbolic artifacts, and many other things. Culture is a
vast area o f study and is often extremely difficult for soldiers, especially foreign soldiers
from supporting nations, to grasp. Cultural differences and insensitivities, however, can
generate distrust and destroy the counterinsurgent’s relationship with the population— a
crucial mistake.
Without cultural understanding, underlying grievances will be more difficult to
identify, understand, and ameliorate. It will also be more difficult to create lasting
relationships o f trust between the host and supporting governments as well as between
those governments and the local population. Such trust is important in order to deny
support, succor, and replenishment o f troops to the insurgents, and to obtain intelligence
against insurgent activities. It is also necessary for political, economic, and social
development, as no such development can occur without an engaged populace.
The counterinsurgent must not only win the population over to its side, however,
it must also prevent the insurgents from interacting with them. If the insurgents are free
to mingle with the larger population they will be able to spread their messages and
propaganda, obtain supplies and intelligence, and recruit new fighters. If insurgents are
not able to win over the population with their cause they can use violence to intimidate
them into cooperation, or at least acquiescence. It is therefore imperative that
counterinsurgents protect the population by keeping the insurgency away from them.
This will also prevent resupply, recruitment, the acquisition o f intelligence, and the
ability to spread propaganda. The insurgent must be denied access to the population if at
all possible.
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Even if ail o f this is done, the population can be quickly lost if the
counterinsurgent force engages in tactics seen as brutal and illegitimate, especially if the
civilian population becomes victim to such tactics, either inadvertently or otherwise.
Much good will, built up over months or even years, can be lost by one atrocity or heavyhanded attack. A villager who loses an innocent son or daughter to an indiscriminate or
brutal attack will not soon be won over to the counterinsurgent’s side.
It has been the purpose o f this section to outline a general strategy that lends the
greatest probability o f success to democratic counterinsurgents. The strategy involves
three key pieces: direct action against the insurgent, indirect action against the insurgent,
and interaction with the population. Under each o f these three elements are several
important factors. While it’s possible to win a counterinsurgency without fulfilling every
part o f the strategy, the closer the counterinsurgent comes to doing so the more likely will
victory become.
It must be cautioned, however, that this a general strategic outline rather than a
step-by-step tactical guide. Each insurgency is different and there is no one-size-fits-all
approach to them— only general strategic guidelines that can be identified as best
practices. As counterinsurgency expert Harold Johnson put it,
One must keep in mind that while the modus operandi o f most insurgencies is the
same, the actual applications may be quite dissimilar. The variable is not simply
geographical configuration and climate but is, more importantly, the people, their
degree o f development, their existing form o f government, their religions, and—
most important— their attitude toward their government. Just as the insurgent
considers each o f the conditions just mentioned, exploiting those that best suit
him, the counterinsurgent must improve those that are satisfactory while
combating the insurgents’ efforts where conditions are being exploited. This is
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rarely a combat operation, but is more often a battle for the hearts and minds o f
the people.37
In COIN, the details matter. The counterinsurgent strategist must adjust to local
conditions and apply tactics accordingly.
An examination o f the theoretical literature has weakened the case that
democracies cannot succeed in counterinsurgency warfare. We have seen that, at least
conceptually, an alternative to brutality exists which offers democracies a plausible path
to victory— the population-centric strategy. The next step is to examine the issue
empirically using historical case studies. In the following three sections, I explore how
closely the above strategy was followed in three separate conflicts: Malaysia, Vietnam
and Iraq. I measure the strategy proposed above against the actual strategy carried out in
those three conflicts. If the strategy is a promising one, we should predict that those
conflicts in which the counterinsurgent forces most closely followed it will have achieved
the most success. Additionally, within particular conflicts if strategies or tactics differed
across time or space, those instances in which this strategy was most closely followed
should also have brought greater levels o f success.

37 Harold K. Johnson, foreword to The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya
and Vietnam, by Richard L. Clutterbuck (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), x.
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CHAPTER 4
MALAYSIA

Malaysia has become synonymous with success in much o f the counterinsurgency
literature, and for good reason. It was a ground-breaking counterinsurgency campaign in
which a democratic country used a new strategy and innovative tactics to defeat an
insurgency in a foreign land. Though the exact replication o f the particular tactics used in
Malaysia is not to be recommended for other conflicts, since the facts on the ground are
likely to be quite different, much of the strategy is similar to what I have outlined above
and is applicable elsewhere. This chapter will demonstrate two things. First, that
democracies can in fact win foreign counterinsurgency fights; second, that the strategy I
have outlined in chapter three can be effective. Though not exactly the strategy used in
Malaysia, much o f it was followed. This chapter will first outline the history and
characteristics o f the Malayan Emergency, as it is frequently called, and then examine the
conflict through the framework o f the counterinsurgency strategy described in chapter
three.

HISTORY
Britain’s involvement in Malaysia stretches back to the 16th century, when it
began extensive trading activities. Singapore, Penang and the coastal areas o f Malacca
became British colonies in the early 1800s and the British provided administrative
assistance to Malaysia’s ruling sultans. Though Britain did not technically rule them,
decisions made by the sultans were done so in consultation and agreement with the
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British.1 Commercial interests, especially in the tin and rubber industries, were the
primary benefit to the British. Chinese and Indian labor was imported to the country to
help meet the needs o f those two industries, thereby resulting in their coming to
constitute large minority populations in the country.
These industries were completely disrupted during the Japanese occupation in
World War II and animosities between the Malays and Chinese also developed during
that period. The Chinese saw the Malays as traitors for tolerating the Japanese presence
while the Malays were encouraged by the Japanese to view the Chinese as disruptive
immigrants.2 It was the Chinese segment o f the Malaysian population that put up the
most resistance to the Japanese occupation, led by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).
The MCP was formed in 1930 and its largest constituency was derived from the
Chinese minority, which made up 38% o f the overall population.3 During the war, the
MCP sided with the British since the British were allied with Russia and opposed to the
invading Japanese army which was the most immediate threat. Before losing Singapore,
the British managed to train 200 communist guerrillas, who went on to set up training
camps and form a resistance force called the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army
(MPAJA).4 This organization boasted 7000 men who were divided into eight regiments.
This force also enlisted the support o f the Chinese population in Malaysia more broadly.
According to Richard Clutterbuck, who served in the conflict, the arrangement was
beneficial to both parties, but each realized that after the immediate aim o f defeating the

1 Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and
Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 20.
2 Clutterbuck, 21.
3 Clutterbuck, 13.
4 Clutterbuck, 15.
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Japanese was attained, their interests would diverge sharply. He writes, “the guerrillas
had no more qualms about cooperating with the British than Mao Tse-tung had about
working with the Kuomintang. The Malayan Communists made sure that they took more
from the British than they gave.”5 As for the British, they made the judgment that it was
in their immediate interest to ally with whoever could assist them in defeating their main
enemies, and to worry about the aftermath later. That aftermath would prove to be very
difficult indeed.
The country was returned to British control in August 1945 after Japanese
occupation during the war. The population o f Malaysia at that time was about 5 million
people. No ethnic group made up a majority but the Malays (indigenous people, to be
distinguished from Malaysians, who can be from any ethnic group with Malaysian
citizenship) were close with a 49 percent plurality. Ethnic Chinese were the next largest
group, with 38%, and the third largest group were Indians, which made up about 12% of
the population.6
Though the MCP wished for Malaysian autonomy rather than a return o f British
rule, they recognized that they were much better off under the British than they had been
under the Japanese. They further recognized their own current inability to govern as well
as their inability to directly challenge the British militarily. The MCP therefore agreed to
disband their guerrilla forces and turn in weapons provided to them by the British during
the conflict. They had also, however, managed to stockpile many other weapons that
they had acquired during the war, especially in the immediate aftermath o f Britain’s
initial defeat when they were forced to abandon weapons and supplies. The MCP kept

5 Clutterbuck, 16.
6 Clutterbuck, 19.
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these supplies in hidden locations in the jungles for future use against the British if
necessary. They also established organizations ostensibly formed to support former
members o f the MPAJA, but which in reality kept members o f that force available for
future call-up against the British.
Rather than openly defy the British through force o f arms, the MCP first sought to
undermine their power through economic sabotage and by undermining the British ability
to rule. As Clutterbuck describes the strategy,
.. .the revolutionaries first attempt to disrupt the economy so that the daily life o f
the people goes from bad to worse. Confidence in the government deteriorates,
and in the interests o f national unity the government is persuaded to allow leftwing parties (including Communists, or Communists under another name) to join
a coalition; the Communists soon have control o f key departments. This is all
quite legal and overt. At the same time, the Party is intensifying its undercover
activities to infiltrate a network o f selected and trained Communists into positions
where they can influence people and events at every level.7
The MCP maintained this strategy o f subversion and sabotage in 1948 when,
under the leadership of its new Secretary-General Chen Ping, they came to the conclusion
that it would not be sufficient to obtain their ends. They formed The Malayan Peoples’
Anti-British Army (which later came to be called the Malayan Races Liberation Army)
and initiated a violent insurgent resistance to the British governance o f Malaysia.8 The
MCP hoped that terrorism and instability might force the British out, leaving them as the
only organized political party in the country as no other indigenously Malaysian parties
had yet formed.9
Chen Ping’s strategy included four stages:

7 Clutterbuck, 25.
8 Edgar O ’Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-60 (London: Faber
and Faber, 1966), 14-15.
9 O ’Ballance, 78.
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1) Guerrilla attacks in the interior to force British landowners from their isolated
estates and to chase law enforcement and other government officials from small
towns and villages and into more urban centers
2) Develop insurgent bases in those areas left unprotected by the British in stage
one and use these areas for expanding their own forces
3) Further territorial expansion into small towns and villages
4) Conventional massed attacks against British forces wherever they were
concentrated10
The insurgency, and Britain’s countervailing efforts, officially began with the
murder o f three European estate holders on June 16th, 1948. In response, police were
given expanded search and detention powers and the military was brought in to support
their efforts. The MCP was declared an unlawful society on July 23rd.11 The ensuing low
intensity warfare would not be officially ended until July 1960 with the total defeat o f the
MCP.
Clutterbuck usefully divides the conflict into three distinct phases: the defensive
(1945-51), the offensive (1952-55), and victory (1955-60). In the first phase, the British
were still coming to grips with the fact that an insurgency was indeed growing and were
attempting to deal with it through relatively normal law enforcement measures. By the
second, offensive, stage, they instituted the Briggs Plan and were aggressively attacking
the insurgents both militarily and politically. During the final phase the British had
seized the clear upper hand and were finishing off the last stragglers o f the insurgent
forces and were forming new political institutions for Malaysian independence.
The foundational element o f the British strategy in Malaysia was the Briggs Plan.
Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs had been appointed to the position o f Director o f

10 O ’Ballance, 78.
11 O ’Ballance, 82.
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Operations in Malaya in 1950. He was responsible to the High Commissioner for the
overall management o f the conflict. He was also in charge o f coordinating civilian, law
enforcement and military personnel and forces.12
O ’Ballance writes:
After seeing the situation for himself and weighing up the various ‘pros’ and
‘cons,’ he formulated what came to be known as the ‘Briggs Plan.’ Its object was
to start a logical clearing o f the country from south and north, to isolate the
MRLA from the people who supported it and to force the insurgent fighters into
the open. The main features o f the plan were close civil administration, police
and military co-ordination at all levels, and the resettlement o f Chinese squatters.
The army was to clear the areas initially and then hand them over to the police.
There also to be some re-groupment of mine and rubber estate labour.13
The plan was instituted on June 1st, 1950 and established a Federal War Council,
which operated at the national level, and several War Executive Committees which
functioned at the state, district, and lower levels. These institutions were comprised o f
important governmental and military officials, as well as local people o f prominence or
special expertise, and were responsible for making policy recommendations and
decisions. These committees brought close cooperation between police, military and
civilian decision-makers and allowed for more coherent policy choices.14 Further details
o f the plan will be discussed in subsequent sections o f this chapter.
The plan quickly bore fruit as the British reaction swung from defense (preventing
a coup d'etat and attempting to maintain control over as many villages as possible) to an
offensive initiative against the insurgents. “By the spring o f 1952, the government
campaign had swung over to the offensive, and the whole character o f the war had

12 O ’Ballance, 106.
13 O ’Ballance, 107.
14 O ’Ballance, 107.
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changed.” 15 Relocated Chinese squatters could be more easily defended and more
resources could be used to seek out insurgents. Clutterbuck estimates that in 1951 the
guerrilla forces stood at about 8,000 fighters. Over the next six years they suffered
approximately 9,000 casualties while only recruiting 3,000 replacements. By 1957 they
had an estimated fighting strength o f only 2,000.16 By 1960 the remaining guerrillas had
either given up, surrendered or been killed or captured and the Emergency was officially
ended.
The following sections will examine the conflict using the rubric o f the strategic
outline presented in the previous chapter.

DIRECT ACTION AGAINST THE INSURGENT
Direct action against the insurgent consists o f seven elements, as outlined in the
previous chapter: 1) secure the population from insurgent attacks; 2) ensure sufficient
troop strength to protect targeted populations and destroy or expel insurgent forces; 3)
emplace troops in population centers; 4) produce intelligence to identify insurgents and
differentiate them from the larger population; 5) prevent insurgent groups from reforming
following initial defeat; 6) undermine or destroy insurgent political organizations; 7)
build up host military forces. This section will examine how each o f these aspects was
carried out (or not) in Malaysia.
One o f the first steps in a successful counterinsurgency operation is to protect the
populace from insurgent violence. Failure to do so both undermines faith in the
government and may lead the population to support the insurgency out o f fear.

15 Clutterbuck, 86.
16 Clutterbuck, 87.
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Noel Barber describes the MCP’s tactics o f intimidation in his book The War o f the
Running Dogs:
The objective was simple - to brand innocent, frightened people with the
trademark o f terror. It did not matter whether the attacks were large or small like wildfire the news sped along the Asian grapevine that if ordinary men and
women wanted to stay alive they must do only one thing: obey. The alternative
was death - and only if one were lucky would the killing be swift. That was why
in the Johore village o f Layang Layang, a silent crowd watched a Malay
policeman fighting desperately for his life against three Chinese CTs. No one
stirred to help. No one dared later to name the murderers.17
With this tactic the Communists were able, at least temporarily, to prevent the
population from siding with the government. Assistance, especially in regards to
intelligence and information, was not forthcoming. Since the population is the key to
winning in insurgency warfare, allowing such a situation to continue would have been
fatal to the British. They therefore took several steps to remediate it.
One o f these steps was to develop a Special Constabulary. These men were
armed and placed at guard posts. They received training over time as it became possible.
Within the first three months o f the war, 24,000 Malays had been recruited for these
positions. Creating this indigenous force freed up military and police personnel to be
used offensively against the insurgents rather than entirely being tied down with the
!o

defense o f villages and urban centers.
O ’Ballance describes a division o f labor that was set up among the various law
enforcement and military forces.
The uniformed branch o f the Federation Police was chiefly responsible for
maintaining law and order in the towns, protecting the people, enforcing
Emergency regulations and checking identities. The Special Constables were to

17 Noel Barber, The War o f the Running Dogs: How Malaya Defeated the Communist
Guerrillas 1948-1960 (London: Cassell, 1971), 51.
18 O ’Ballance, 83.
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be employed on static duties whenever possible until the proposed Home Guard
detachments were raised and trained. The police formed a number o f jungle
squads that went out into the jungle and forests to obtain information, and they
also had to deal with groups o f recalcitrant Chinese squatters. While the police
dominated the populated areas, the army was to be the striking force against the
MRLA. Army formation and unit headquarters were to be in the towns and large
villages with the sub-units lying out in the jungle, ready to pounce whenever they
received information o f the whereabouts o f MRLA detachments. The task o f the
army was to search out, to harass and to kill insurgent fighters.19
In addition to efficiently utilizing and assigning available manpower, the British
also effectively organized defense through the development o f “New Villages.” This was
perhaps the most noteworthy initiative o f the Briggs Plan and o f the entire
counterinsurgency effort. Chinese squatters, who had set up households on untitled land,
were frequent targets o f insurgent intimidation and were utilized by the insurgents for
food, supplies, and information. They further provided insurgents the opportunity to
integrate into their communities where they usually remained indistinguishable to the
authorities from non-combatants.
With this plan these settlers were removed from their dwellings and resettled in
New Villages which were protected by barbed wire and Special Constables until they
could form their own Home Guard units. They were also strategically located to provide
the greatest level o f defense.

When combined with the registration o f all inhabitants

and the provision o f identity cards to them, these New Villages served to better protect
the villagers from insurgent harassment and to prevent insurgents from gaining access to
these communities. Karl Hack argues that it was this resettlement, and the consequent
ability o f the British to effectively control the population that was most important to

19 O ’Ballance, 108.
20 O ’Ballance, 109.
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eventual success.21
This initiative was resource and time-consuming but by 1952 more than 400,000
squatters and been moved to approximately 400 New Villages. The people were offered
title to the lands that they were given in these villages (which was considered o f great
value to most of these previously landless people since they could pass it down through
the family) as well as schools and medical clinics. Government officials were assigned to
help with the relocations and the initial administration o f the villages to allow the
transitions to proceed more smoothly.
As these villages became settled more and more authority was turned over to the
inhabitants themselves, including for security. According to Barber, “One o f Templer’s
first thoughts was that the more the Chinese (some o f whom tended to sit on the fence)
were given responsibility, the more they would integrate into the community. What
better way than to arm Chinese Home Guards in the struggle against Communism?”23
This had the dual effect o f giving members o f the Home Guard a larger stake in their
communities and in the success o f the government while freeing up official forces to take
the fight to the insurgents.
These New Villages not only offered protection to the villagers but also allowed
for sufficient forces to seek and destroy the enemy. This was done very successfully.
“The degree o f success o f the Security Forces against the insurgents was such that in
September 1953, General Templer was able to declare his first ‘White Area.’ This meant
an area in which all Emergency restrictions were lifted, and in which the inhabitants were

21 Karl Hack, “Iron Claws on Malaya: The Historiography o f the Malayan Emergency,”
Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (March 1999): 118.
22 O ’Ballance, 110.
23 Barber, 181.
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free to go about their business normally, without curfew, food or other restrictions, such
as police searches and checks.”24
This was accomplished without massive numbers o f troops. In 1948, at the
beginning o f the struggle, the government had 10 infantry battalions (2 British, 5 Gurkha,
and 3 Malay, each battalion had 700 men) and 9,000 police officers25 This made the
actual combat forces available to the government roughly equal to the number o f
guerrillas in the field.26 The number o f battalions had doubled to 20 by 1951, but
guerrilla recruitment had also increased. By 1951 the police force was large enough and
capable enough to handle static guard duty so that more military forces could be freed
from this task to engage in offensive operations. The police also formed their own
offensive jungle squads and a force o f 3,000 police officers manned forts in deep parts o f
the jungle inhabited by aborigines.27
Though not overwhelmingly superior in number, troop levels were sufficient to
defeat the insurgents because there was an efficient division o f labor and the most
vulnerable populations were protected in the New Villages where they eventually
developed their own Home Guard units and were able to protect themselves. Clutterbuck
argues that by 1952 the government’s effective fighting capacity was probably at a 2-to-l
ratio over the insurgents but never approached the larger ratios often deemed necessary
by some counterinsurgent experts.28 In addition to British forces there was a continual

24 O ’Ballance, 141.
25 Clutterbuck, 42.
26 Clutterbuck, 43.
27 Clutterbuck, 43.
28 Clutterbuck, 43.
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effort to train up local Malaysian forces and to increasingly rely upon them for
operations, thereby preparing them for eventual British withdrawal.
As the population felt more secure and as the insurgents were increasingly driven
deeper into the jungle, intelligence became easier to obtain. In addition to the increased
willingness o f people to come forward with information because they felt safer doing it,
two other reasons propelled the gathering o f intelligence and the ability to separate the
insurgents from the regular population— a rewards system and a national registration
system. Rewards for information leading to the arrest o f wanted insurgents were quite
high, often enough for someone to set up a new business and begin a new life. Former
communist insurgents were also eligible to collect these rewards, but at half the normal
rate.29 In combination with periodic amnesties, this incentive was enough to generate a
substantial number o f surrenders leading to valuable information.30 Robert Thompson,
an important military leader during the counterinsurgency effort in Malaysia, noted that
“there is nothing like establishing prospects whereby an individual can go from terrorist
to capitalist in two easy moves.”31 The effectiveness o f these rewards in obtaining
intelligence that led to the capture o f important guerrilla fighters and leaders is widely
recognized.32
The national identity card was crucial in differentiating between insurgents and
ordinary people. Barber calls the initiative a “masterstroke” as it served as a census and
enabled the government to determine when someone was out o f place. “It also meant that
security forces were able time after time to separate the sheep from the goats. No CT

29 Barber, 84.
30 Clutterbuck, 104.
31 Sir Robert Thompson, quoted in Barber, 84.
32 O ’Ballance, 174; Clutterbuck, 104; Barber, 319.
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dared to come forward for a card; yet if a man was questioned and could not produce one,
he was immediately suspect.”33 As insurgents became more readily identifiable it not
only made their capture easier, it also reduced the likelihood o f false arrest or persecution
o f innocents, thereby helping to prevent injustices that may have served to separate
members o f the community from the government.
The registration cards had the biggest utility in the New Villages. The police
would run checks in the early mornings and screen everyone present. Anyone who
should not have been there was identified and questioned, anyone who should have been
there but was missing was noted as suspicious and marked for future monitoring.34 The
identity cards were also useful outside o f the villages, however, as police could use them
for random checks and in cordons. People who were far outside their registered locality,
or who did not have a card, could be identified as suspicious and questioned. Clutterbuck
argues that “it was from shreds o f evidence such as these that intelligence was built up
and agents recruited to betray the Communists.”35
The organization most responsible for the development o f intelligence was the
Special Branch. It resembled the British MI 5 in its duties, which included squashing
internal subversion, sabotage or revolution and counter-espionage. It was officially part
o f the police department but was in reality highly independent.36 According to
O ’Ballance, “The Special Branch was functioning and by the end o f 1951 had curtailed
the activities o f the Min Yuen. It’s biggest success was to bring the Min Yuen situation
under control in Penang Island, which was an outstanding Communist hotbed. The

33 Barber, 85.
34 Clutterbuck, 37.
35 Clutterbuck, 38.
36 Barber, 191.
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Special Branch was also well on the way to completing a record and dossier o f all
->n

members o f the MCP, the MRLA, and the Min Yuen.”

The Min Yuen (translated as

People’s Organization) was an underground organization o f people who supported the
MCP and the MRLA but were not official members o f either organization. It provided
money, food, intelligence and other supplies and may have had between 30,000 and
40,000 members at its height.38
The British also ensured that once on the defensive the guerrillas could not
recover. They were pushed further and further into the jungle, away from the population
which provided them supplies, intelligence and recruits. Once an area was declared
White, it stayed so and the communist organizations in those areas never recovered.39 As
the communist’s military capability was undermined, so was it’s political arm. It’s
terrorist attacks were designed, at least in part, to demonstrate the impotence o f the
government. The government’s efficiency in its battle against them, however, served to
demonstrate the obvious. The communist’s political appeal was also undermined by the
British decision to work towards total independence and to take meaningful steps in that
direction. This undermined the communist’s argument about colonialism, their primary
complaint against the government.
The British carried out all seven elements o f the direct action against the
insurgents element o f the counterinsurgency strategy proposed in chapter three. They
first secured the population from attack; they provided sufficient troop strength not only
for that defense but also to take the offensive; they put troops in population centers,

37 O ’Ballance, 115.
38 O ’Ballance, 92.
39 Clutterbuck, 112.
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primarily through the New Villages initiative, which was also instrumental in providing
intelligence that allowed them to identify and locate insurgents; they prevented insurgent
forces from regrouping once defeated; they undermined the Communist Party by
addressing it’s chief grievance (independence); and built up not only the host nation
security forces (through the Home Guard and other units) but also the host nation
political structure and institutions (discussed in further depth later in this chapter). For at
least these elements o f the COIN strategy which I have delineated, the British effort in
Malaysia tracked very closely. The next section deals with their efforts in indirect
actions against the insurgents.

INDIRECT ACTION AGAINST THE INSURGENT
In addition to direct action against the communist insurgency, the British took
effective indirect action as well. Indirect action is undertaken primarily in the political
realm and includes: undermining insurgent grievances through effective political action;
building host-nation legitimacy through governmental competence; developing a close
partnership between the host and supporting nation; and holding democratic elections as
soon as feasible.
From the very beginning, British leadership recognized that the struggle in
Malaysia was at heart a political rather than a military one. The first British High
Commissioner in Malaysia, Sir Henry Gurney, later to be assassinated by communist
guerrillas made the early decision that the control o f the war should not fall under the
armed forces. According to Barber, “This, he argued, was a war o f political ideologies.
He believed that what was needed was armed support for a political war, not political
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support for an army war.”40 He believed that military control would inevitably lead to
military excess and subsequent diminution o f the population’s support for the
government and increased support for the insurgents. He was not opposed to the use o f
military force, and advocated its proper use, but only as needed to allow for political
advancements. “More guns and troops were needed, o f course, but only, Gurney insisted,
as an adjunct to the civil power.”41
This set the stage for the subsequent unfolding o f the war and the continual focus
on its all-important political dimension. General Templer also kept this firmly in mind
and he placed the emergence o f a united Malaysian state that was accommodating to all
ethnic and social groups as his primary goal. As O’Ballance puts it, “He stressed the
needs for Malays, Chinese, Indians and Europeans to sink their differences and build up a
truly ‘Malayan way of life.’”42 Similarly, counterinsurgency expert John Nagl argues
that it was Templer’s ability to keep all aspects o f the conflict, including the political,
economic and social, in addition to the use o f the military and law enforcement force, that
was his greatest contribution to the struggle 43 This produced the conditions “to move
Malaya forward to a position in which it would be ready for independence, thus removing
the primary claim o f the MCP for public support.”44
Templer began work on this immediately. Within one month o f his arrival in
Malaysia, municipal elections were held in Kuala Lumpur for city council. Those elected
did not wield true power, but it was a step towards institutionalizing self-governance and

40 Barber, 74.
41 Barber, 74.
42 O ’Ballance, 119.
43 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from
Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 2002), 100.
44 Nagl, 100.
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o f producing greater cooperation between the British and the Malayans. The elections
also brought together racial alliances and brought to prominence future leaders o f an
independent Malaysia, including Tunku Abdul Rahman who would be Malaysia’s first
national leader.45
This came about in July 1955 with the country’s first general election. An
alliance, known as the Triple Alliance, was formed between three major political parties
that cut across ethnic groups and Tunku Abdul Rahman became Chief Minister o f the
Malayan Federation.46 The election was especially important because it drew eighty-five
percent o f the electorate to the polls and because the victory o f the Triple Alliance
represented the ability to compromise between the Chinese and Indian communities. It
demonstrated that Malaysia could exist as a national unity.47 The success o f the elections
completely undermined the Communist Party’s chief grievance against the British, that o f
colonialism, and subverted their political message and their primary raison d ’etre.
While working towards these elections, the British had struggled to uphold the
legitimacy o f the government and its ability to meet the needs o f the people. A distrusted
or impotent government would not have been able to hold successful elections or hand
the reins o f that legitimacy over to any government so created. It was imperative,
therefore, to generate support for the government before national elections could be seen
as credible. General Templer realized that good government must come prior to selfgovernment and that immediate elections would lead to dysfunction. “He [Templer]
realized that, for the people in the villages, self-government was less important than good

45 Barber, 180.
46 O ’Ballance, 149-150.
47 Barber, 268.
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government. He was determined to bring self-government to Malaya, but not until the
independent government could be strong enough to prevent racial violence (as had
occurred in India) and the people were no longer in a state o f insecurity and poverty.”48
To this end the government worked diligently to improve the everyday lives of
Malaysia’s people. This was done especially well in the New Villages. If people had
been transported into the New Villages and had encountered poor administration and few
services, they would likely have resented the government for being transplanted. But
many came to appreciate their new surroundings. Barber describes the positive
environment in these villages:
As the families settled in and the ring o f hammers and grinding o f saws showed
that the first houses were being knocked together, troops were building the school
and doctors were giving every villager a medical examination, treating - for the
first time in their lives-any who were ill. In another hut a clerk was handing out
money, for each family received a government subsidy for up to six months until
it could reap the first harvest o f its short-term crop.49
Such progress and new services lent credibility and legitimacy to the government and
undermined the communist’s claims against the government.
Clutterbuck argues that the economic development o f rural and remote areas is
one o f the keys to countering communist insurgencies. Such development must directly
impact the people and be noticeable to everyone. If the people see their own and their
neighbors’ quality of life and prosperity improving they will be more likely to view the
government as legitimate and the insurgent as a threat to their improving situation.
“Provided that the ordinary people’s confidence in this progress is maintained, they will
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not wish to upset the applecart, and Communist subversion will find nothing on which to
take root.”50
It was such progress that brought many Malaysians, both indigenous and Chinese,
over to the side o f the government and drew them away from the communists. The
emphasis placed on governance, and their success at demonstrating effective governance,
was, according to Barber, the most worrying aspect o f the British counterinsurgency
effort to communist insurgent leaders. They realized that an effective British government
would undermine their grievances and weaken their appeal to the people while
subsequently improving the government’s position.51 This was rightly seen as highly
effective indirect action against them.
In the end though, it was independence that was most destructive o f the
communist cause. When Malaysia became an independent country on August 31, 1957 it
removed the communist’s primary pillar o f complaint against the government. As Sir
Robert Thompson put it, “Well— there’s one thing that even Chin Peng can’t disguise.
He started a war to kick out the British Imperialists— and now there aren’t any. We’ve
not been kicked out— we’ve left, head high, and it’s the British who gave Independence
to Malaya, not Chin Peng.”52 The insurgents were no longer freedom fighters struggling
against an imperialist outsider but were now bandits battling the elected government o f
their own country. This altered the very nature o f the war in favor o f the government.53
Following independence the government continued to focus on the provision o f
government services as a primary effort o f the counterinsurgency strategy. Chief
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Minister Tunku, having been involved in the effort for many years before his election,
realized the importance of governmental legitimacy and the need to appear competent
and responsive. This wise statement o f Thompson’s is illustrative o f his understanding o f
the situation:
During the last three years o f the war, more roads were built, more jungle cleared,
bridges and water systems constructed, schools and hospitals started, than had
been done in the last three generations. We were not fighting the Communist
terrorists with arms alone. We went a long way to win the hearts and minds o f
our people. We gave people more than the Communists could ever hope to
54
give.
Under the new government’s leadership the Emergency was formally ended on July 31,
1960.

INTERACTION WITH THE POPULATION
The population is the key battlefield in counterinsurgency struggles. Whichever
side most successfully brings the population over to its side is most likely to prevail. To
prevail, counterinsurgents must: develop substantial and deep cultural awareness and
understanding; address political, economic, developmental and social grievances o f the
population; develop cooperation between the population and counterinsurgent forces in
order to improve intelligence; avoid brutal tactics that will alienate the population; and
deny insurgent forces access to and support from the population.
When the conflict in Malaysia began, a substantial portion o f the population was
neutral. Malaysians were not communists, but they did not necessarily feel strongly
about supporting the government. They simply wanted to live their lives in peace. This
was even more true when it came to the Chinese population, which often felt neglected

54 Tunku Abdul Rahman, quoted in Barber, 320.

95

by the government. The population, and again specifically the Chinese population,
certainly didn’t want to risk supporting the government if it was eventually going to lose.
The prospect o f retaliation by a successful communist insurgency was all too real.
O ’Ballance notes that, “The Government had considerable difficulty in persuading the
Chinese community in Malaya to take any interest or give any help in combating the
MRLA. In 1950, a great many were ‘fence sitters.’ They were not sure the Government
was going to win, and that the MRLA would be defeated.”55
Nagl argues that, by a few years into the war, the insurgents actually had the
advantage.
The guerrillas had reorganized themselves by early 1950 to the point that one
observer believed their civil support was ‘probably equal to that o f the
government in the matter o f supplies and superior in the matter o f intelligence.’
As a result, guerrilla incidents, which had dropped from over two hundred
monthly in the second half o f 1948 to fewer than a hundred by the middle of
1949, increased to over four hundred a month by m id-1950. The military was
hard pressed, unable to station sufficient forces to guarantee the safety o f cleared
areas.56
As noted in previous sections, however, the British learned quickly and worked
hard to protect the population from insurgent violence and to improve their standard o f
living. These efforts eventually paid off as the population began to side more and more
with the government as the conflict wound on.
The British were able to demonstrate cultural awareness and understanding for
two reasons. First, they had already been in the country for decades and so there were
many functionaries and bureaucrats who already had a deep understanding o f the country
and its people. Secondly, by developing the Home Guard and other indigenous forces to
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work most closely with the population they ensured even greater cultural affinity. The
more the government forces had an indigenous face, the less cultural friction and
misunderstanding was likely to arise.
The centerpiece o f the British effort to win the population was the Briggs Plan.
Nagl quotes a veteran o f the conflict as saying: “In the early days, we didn’t grasp how
important the support o f the local people was. It wasn’t until Briggs that we understood
that the CTs got all o f their support - food, supplies, intelligence-from the local people.
Only about 1950 was the political nature o f the war really grasped.”57 Briggs recognized
the centrality o f the population: “The people matter - they are vital - but you can’t expect
any support from people you can’t protect.”58 And he made protecting them and winning
their support the center o f his strategy.
In brief outline, the Briggs Plan constituted the following:
(a) to dominate the populated areas and to build up a feeling o f complete security
which would eventually result in a steady and increasing flow o f intelligence
(b) to break up the Communist organization within the populated areas.
(c) to isolate the insurgents from their food and information supplies.
(d) to destroy the insurgents by forcing them to attack counterinsurgent forces on
their own ground.59
Barber describes the plan as “A master-stroke o f power and simplicity.” It
ensured “that from now on security forces would protect the unpopulated areas, cut the
enemy lines o f communication between CTs and villagers, and force the CTs out to
battle. Briggs planned to give the populated areas the confidence which only protection
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could bring, to implement Gurney’s squatter plans, and by resettling half a million
people, isolate the CTs from their food supplies.”60 The plan also placed the weight o f
the government’s efforts on the shoulders o f the civilian government itself and the police
force. The military played a supporting role, but was not in the lead.61
Though Briggs devised the plan, it was his successor, General Templer, who was
most responsible for implementing it. He too recognized the key importance o f earning
the support o f the population and it was he who first popularized the phrase about
winning “the hearts and minds o f the people.” According to O’Ballance, this phrase
“summed up the keynote o f his whole policy,” and was highly effective.62 One o f the
primary elements o f Templer’s implementation o f the Briggs Plan was the establishment
o f the New Villages, briefly discussed earlier.
The New Villages project was massive in scope and involved moving over
400,000 squatters into consolidated and defensible locations. Though initially traumatic,
the benefits that the people accrued in their new homes generally outweighed the
negative feelings derived by their forced removal. The actual movement o f the people
was a crucial period in which extremely negative feelings could have been aroused
against the British and the Malay government. After all, the military was forcibly taking
people from their homes and resettling them in strange locations which they did not
know. The potential for the development o f long-lasting hatred was real. It was due to
the professionalism with which the resettlement was carried out that such long-term
hostility was avoided. As Barber put it, “The difficulties came with those who were just
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terrified; and it was here that the British troops behaved so magnificently. It would have
been easy for them to regard all squatters as possible CTs and bundle them by force into
the waiting lorries, but they never did. Patiently, and with an abundance o f good humour,
they sweltered in the tropical heat, helping the people to sort out their problems and their
belongings.”63
Clutterbuck concurs that the manner in which these forced relocations occurred
was crucial. Here’s how describes the process:
When the skeleton o f a New Village was ready, a selected squatter area would be
surrounded before dawn by a cordon o f troops. Other troops, police, nurses, and
welfare officers moved into the area. Each family was allowed to fill one truck
with its possessions, food, and a limited amount o f livestock. The families were
repaid at market prices for any animals or crops that could not be taken along.
In the long run, these early-morning roundups were among the most important
moments o f the war, for the way they were conducted colored the whole attitude
o f the people toward the government. The roundups could have been carried out
with brutality, as Communist propaganda had led the squatters to expect. In fact,
however, they were carried out with much kindness and sym pathy....For the
soldiers it was a hateful task, and there was nothing false about the compassion
with which they helped these families gather up the chickens, carry the babies,
and lift the old women into the trucks. This astonished the Chinese, and many
have since placed on record that it was one o f the biggest factors in winning their
eventual support.64
Once the New Villages began to operate, the people who moved there often
appreciated their new way o f life. Protection was ensured by both the military and later
by the local Home Guard, a new house and the necessities o f life were provided for, and
many peasants were given their own land to farm. This last was especially important in
the culture. “For hundreds o f thousands o f peasants all over the country who believed in
the old Chinese proverb, ‘A land title is the hoop that holds the barrel together,’ this was
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the fulfillment o f a dream: to own a plot o f land which a man could pass on to his sons
when he died.”65
Not only did the New Villages succeed in bringing the population close to the
government by providing them with security and material welfare, but it also successfully
divorced them from the insurgents. Combined with national registration cards, the New
Villages made it prohibitively difficult for insurgents to interact with the population in
order to obtain food, supplies, and intelligence.
The guerilla must live amongst people, who provide him with food, information
and money; when the Briggs Plan, to remove whole sections o f the population
into defended New Villages, was put into effect, he was at once deprived o f his
main essentials. Most o f his time was taken up trying to obtain food, and lack o f
information about the moves and intentions o f the Security Forces caused many
defeats and losses. Strict precautions were taken to prevent food being smuggled
out to the insurgent fighters in the jungle.66
These effects did more to undermine the insurgency than any individual battle or
series o f battles. Hack notes that, “Unable to dominate populated areas, lacking logistical
links to other countries, and with the jungle offering only subsistence support to small
groups, the MNLA had made itself reliant on its umbilical cord to the squatters.”67 The
New Villages cut that cord. By bringing the population closer to the government while
simultaneously isolating it from the insurgents, the British struck at the heart o f insurgent
effort. It was this that was most responsible for a successful conclusion o f the war.

A ft

Also o f vital importance were efforts to make the government more inclusive o f
all o f Malaysia’s people. Citizenship became much more readily available to Chinese,
more than a million o f whom took advantage o f it; the Malayan Civil Service was opened
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to non-Malays; and a program o f Malayan primary education (rather than the individual
programs o f various ethnic groups) was instituted across the country. These initiatives
gave people a stake in the success o f the government and helped foster an important
sense o f nationalism by Malays o f all racial categories.69
Importantly, these strides towards winning over the population were not reversed
by heavy-handedness in combat. Any gains made through providing security, material
welfare, and other goods could be immediately undermined by the indiscriminate
application o f violence resulting in the death o f innocents. The dangers o f this were
recognized by the British from the beginning. “In this kind o f war, one stray bomb that
killed one innocent child could make a thousand enemies.”70 Though “collateral
damage,” as it is called, is impossible to avoid completely in warfare, concerted efforts
can reduce it. According to Professor Anthony Short, as quoted by Barber:
There were, almost inevitably, innocent victims. Some o f these victims - like the
twenty-five dead in Batang Kali in northern Selangor - were not surprisingly
made martyrs by the MCP. But there was nothing like the indiscriminate killing
o f civilians in Vietnam. And although the figure can never be known, I would put
it at less than a hundred from all causes - including misplaced shots and bombs
dropped in error.71
This level of caution, and the resultant low numbers in inadvertent civilian casualties,
was crucial to the effort o f winning, and keeping, the population.
Furthermore, great efforts were made to ensure that policing and the overall
treatment o f the population remained within the bounds o f the law. Torture was not used
and brutality was generally avoided. According to Clutterbuck this was crucial in
maintaining popular legitimacy, “ ...in fighting an insurgency o f this kind, it is vital that
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every action by government officials, policemen, and soldiers be strictly within the law.
The law can be as tough as is needed, provided that it is properly enacted and that
officials are manifestly subject to it themselves.”72
The political progress made towards both undermining the communist political
apparatus and the move toward legitimate Malayan independence, was also vital.
Promises of, and concrete movement toward, independence drew the population toward
the government by legitimizing it while simultaneously removing the communist’s chief
grievance against the government.
These measures [towards independence], together with successes o f the Security
Forces in the field, gave the people o f Malaya o f all races confidence in British
intentions, and confidence in themselves and their future. This confidence
brought with it a slow but none the less marked tendency to get off the fence and
to actively resist the insurgents. The battle to gain the minds and confidence o f
the people had been a tough one and these were the first real signs that is was
being won by the Government.73
By the time Gen. Templer relinquished power on May 30, 1954 to his successor,
the war was on the way to being won. He had instituted the Briggs Plan, thereby
bringing security to large segments o f the population and severing the insurgents’
primary link to supplies, intelligence, and recruits. More than 13 million people were
living in White Areas74 (areas deemed secure from insurgent violence), local
governments were being elected and the groundwork for eventual independence and
democratic governance in the future was laid.75
In fact, independence was not far off and would be achieved in August 1957.
During the three years between Templer’s departure and Malaysian independence great
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strides were made against the insurgency, both militarily, and even more importantly,
politically. The Malaysian Communist Party’s political platform, centered on anti
colonialism, was delegitimized by independence. Increasingly good security and military
tactics, fueled by ever better intelligence provided by a cooperative populace, led to the
depletion o f insurgent forces. By 1957 the MRLA was down to a paltry 1,500 available
combatants.

7

The insurgency lasted for another three years but was in continual decline during
that time. The communist’s connection with the people continued to fade and they were
unable to recruit willing participants to replace those who were increasingly being killed,
captured, or who were voluntarily surrendering in order to take advantage o f bribes and
amnesties.77 Many formerly committed communists began to leave the party, and the
insurgency, as their position became more dire. Many left because they were unwilling
to die for a lost cause or because they came to recognize the party’s various failures.78
By the time the insurgency was officially declared over, in July o f 1960, only 500
insurgents remained and these were isolated, ill-equipped, and almost completely
ineffectual. Emergency restrictions were lifted in all areas except for certain locations
along the border with Thailand and life in a free and safe Malaysia moved forward.79
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CONCLUSION
This case study has served a two-fold purpose. The first was to demonstrate that
democracies can in fact win counterinsurgencies abroad. It is interesting to note that
Malaysia receives no more than a passing mention in either Arreguin-Toft or Merom, the
two scholars with the most trenchant arguments that democracies can’t win democracies.
To truly make their case, these authors would need to find a way to explain away
Britain’s success in Malaysia. That they did not attempt to do so indicates a weak point
in their argument.
But the Malaysia case goes further than simply offering a counterpoint to Merom
and Arreguin-Toft. It not only demonstrates that democracies can win
counterinsurgencies, it also points to the success o f a particular strategy, one much like
the strategy outlined here. The British followed a strategy having the three key elements
that I have outlined: direct action against the insurgents, indirect action against the
insurgents, and interaction with the population. The British succeeded not only in
devising a strategy along these lines but also in following it. They avoided the temptation
to undermine that strategy by using heavy-handed firepower, made the protection o f the
population central to their actions, and worked for political independence for the Malay
people.
Democracies can win counterinsurgencies, and following a strategy along the
lines o f that outlined here seems to be the surest way to do it.
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CHAPTER 5
VIETNAM

The Vietnam War is an important case study in the examination o f the ability o f
democracies to win counterinsurgencies. In this conflict, the greatest military power on
the planet was defeated by a small, undeveloped country. Many lay this loss at the feet o f
counterinsurgency strategy. Probably the most famous is Harry G. Summer, Jr., who
wrote the influential book, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis o f the Vietnam War. In it he
writes that
Judged by the results o f the war, the basic m istake.. .was that we saw their
guerrilla operations as a strategy in itself. Because we saw it as a strategy, we
attempted to understand it in terms o f the ‘people’s w ar’ theories o f Mao Tsetung, and devised elaborate theories o f counterinsurgency. We attempted to
counter it by using such models as the British model in Malaysia.1
Blaming counterinsurgency strategy has been a popular means by which analysts
have sought to remove blame from the Army itself. As this chapter will endeavor to
show, nothing could be further from the truth. In actual fact, the U.S. Army pursued a
largely conventional strategy for most o f the war. For the crucial initial years o f fighting,
a strategy o f attrition was pursued which relied almost exclusively on conventional search
and destroy missions. Not until 1968, and a change o f command, was an emphasis on
counterinsurgency strategy put into place. By then, however, support for the war in the
U.S. was dwindling and a draw-down o f forces was underway. Despite that draw-down
the new strategy quickly yielded dividends and demonstrated the efficacy of
counterinsurgency when properly applied. It is important not to analyze the Vietnam

1 Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis o f the Vietnam War (New
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War as one conflict that was either won or lost. Instead, it most analytically helpful to
look at it in two periods, the conventional period and the counterinsurgency period.
Doing so brings to light important lessons concerning the ability o f democracies to win
counterinsurgencies. But first, a brief history of the conflict is in order to provide a broad
picture o f what happened and to set the context.

HISTORY
The war in Vietnam lasted for nearly twenty years and was fought from roughly
1955 (depending upon when one places the beginning o f the insurgency in the south)
until 1975, though it’s roots can be traced back to the beginnings o f French colonialism in
the 1850s. After a struggle, the Treaty of Hue was ratified in 1884 which formally
established French rule o f Vietnam. This colonization continued until World War II
when it was interrupted by Germany’s defeat o f France and the subsequent institution o f
the Vichy regime, which sided with the Axis powers. Though the French continued to
administer Vietnam during this period it was really under Japanese control.
During this period o f primarily Japanese occupation the Vietnamese communist
movement first began to develop. It was founded by Ho Chi Minh and was most
successful in the northern part o f the country, though there were some adherents in the
south. In August 1945, after the Japanese surrender to the Allied powers, the Viet Minh,
Communist Party fighters, initiated an uprising and took control o f many Vietnamese
cities, particularly in the north. It seemed that Vietnam may become an independent
communist country but the French viewed the territory as its own and began retaking
territory from the Viet Minh. This sparked a nearly decade long struggle between the
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French and the Viet Minh which ended at the Battle o f Dien Bien Phu in 1954 when the
French were stunningly and decisively routed by Viet Minh forces.2
The French defeat resulted in the Geneva Accords o f 1954. In this agreement,
Vietnam was temporarily split between North and South at the 17th parallel and
nationwide elections were set to occur in 1956, with a view to reunifying the country. In
the meantime a communist regime under the direction Ho Chi Minh developed in the
north while the south was under the nominal leadership o f Emperor Bao Dai but was
really directed by his Prime Minister, Ngo Dinh Diem. A rigged election in 1955 made
Diem president of the State of Vietnam (South Vietnam) and a similarly rigged election
in the North solidified Ho Chi Minh’s power. This hardened the independent status o f
the two halves o f the country and Diem, realizing that he would likely lose a nationwide
election to Ho, refused to allow such an election to be held in 1956 as directed under the
Geneva Accords (which the south had not signed since it was an agreement between the
French and the Viet Minh).
Many political operatives from the north had remained in the south after the
signing o f the accords, and when Diem refused to hold elections they began to mobilize.
Though Diem used authoritarian tactics in an attempt to arrest these operatives, enough
evaded those efforts to recruit more people into the fold and in 1957 to initiate a
campaign o f terrorism and subversion against the government, initially without northern
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support. Their actions, along with missteps by the Diem government itself, began to
erode the popularity o f the South Vietnamese regime.3
Historian Spencer Tucker describes the unfolding o f the insurgency:
The southern insurgency grew much more quickly than the DRV leadership
anticipated. It was fed by the Diem government’s weakness, its inattention to the
needs o f the peasants, and its unwillingness to acknowledge problems. In
addition to promising reform, especially in returning land to the peasants (what
the Americans called ‘winning hearts and minds’), the NLF sought physically to
control the villages. In 1957 perhaps some 80 percent o f the southern population
lived in 17,000 hamlets spread over 8,000 villages. Controlling these would be
the key both to supporting existing guerrilla forces and later to expanding them.
Towards this end the NLF stepped up its program o f assassination o f Diemappointed local officials. During 1957-8 some 700 village-level officials were
killed; 1,200 died in 1958-9, 2,500 during 1959-60, and 4,000 died from May
1960 to May 1961. School teachers, social workers, and medical personnel were
also favored targets for kidnapping and assassination.4
This indigenous insurgency in the south was soon bolstered by support in the
north. The Communist Party in North Vietnam held its Third Party Congress in
September 1960 and officially proclaimed the goal o f overthrowing the South
Vietnamese government by means o f violence. “Socialist revolution” in the north and
“liberating the South” were the two preeminent goals laid out by the Party for the years
ahead.5
Worried about the implications o f South Vietnam falling to communist
aggression, the United States initiated a policy o f aiding the Diem regime. At first this
aid was primarily monetary. From 1954-1963 the United States provided approximately
$1.7 billion in aid, most o f it aimed towards the military.6 But this aid also began to take
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the form o f actual U.S. military personnel, as advisors were sent to help improve the
quality o f the Army o f the Republic o f Vietnam (ARVN). In 1960, 875 U.S. troops were
stationed in Vietnam. By the next year that number had reached 3,164 and by 1964 the
number was up to 23,310. In 1962, the U.S. had established the Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV) to direct U.S. military operations there. Up to 1964,
however, the direct involvement o f U.S. personnel in combat was relatively limited and
fewer than 300 soldiers had been killed there.7 This limited role began to change in early
1965 when, at the request o f MACV commander General William Westmoreland, the 9th
Marine Expeditionary Brigade was sent to Da Nang to protect assets there. By the end of
that year there were nearly 200,000 U.S. military personnel in country with an expanded
mission o f assisting ARVN in any way deemed necessary, including direct involvement
in combat.8
Westmoreland adhered to a classic conventional strategy o f seeking out and
destroying the enemy, paying little heed to the tasks o f pacification (counterinsurgency)
and the development o f the ARVN. By the time o f his replacement in 1968 by Gen.
Creighton Abrams, the war appeared to be in a situation o f stalemate and the American
people were turning against it. Abrams changed the strategy to one focused on
counterinsurgency principles. This led to what Lewis Sorely has called the “better war,”
in which much success was garnered in a short time.
Unfortunately these changes came too late. By 1969, the withdrawal o f American
troops was begun under the Nixon Administration’s policy o f “Vietnamization,” a hand
over o f the conflict to the Government o f Vietnam (GVN) and the ARVN. In January
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1973 the Paris Peace Accords were signed. This agreement temporarily halted the war
and was an official end to U.S. participation in it. The Accords allowed, however, for the
North Vietnamese to maintain their current positions in the South. This provided them a
springboard for an offensive in 1975 which crushed the Saigon government and handed
the North Vietnamese ultimate victory in the conflict. The tragedy o f Vietnam was that
by the time an appropriate strategy, that o f counterinsurgency, was instituted the
American public had lost all taste for the war and the U.S. had already begun a steady
withdrawal o f forces.

DIRECT ACTION AGAINST THE INSURGENT
This section will examine how closely the direct action against the insurgent
element o f the COIN strategy outlined in this dissertation was followed in the early years
o f Vietnam. The first part o f such direct action is securing the population from insurgent
attacks. Westmoreland believed that this was best accomplished through a conventional
offensive strategy. He believed that by seeking out and destroying the enemy, conceived
o f as both North Vietnamese main forces and Viet Cong guerrillas, there would be no
enemy left to threaten the villagers. In his memoirs, Westmoreland says:
As I saw the three phases o f my strategy, American combat troops were to be
used at first to protect developing logistical bases, although some might have to
be committed from time to time as ‘fire brigades’ whenever the enemy’s big units
posed a threat, which was how I contemplated first using the airmobile division in
the Highlands. In the second phase, we were to gain the initiative, penetrate and
whenever possible eliminate the enemy’s base camps and sanctuaries. So long as
the Communists were free to emerge from those hideouts to terrorize the people,
recruit or impress conscripts, glean food, levy taxes, and attack government troops
and installations, then to retire with impunity back into their sanctuaries, there
was little hope o f our defeating the insurgency. Invading the sanctuaries also
might bring the elusive enemy to battle, affording an opportunity to destroy his
main forces. In the third and final phase, we were to move into sustained ground
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combat and mop up the last o f the main forces and guerrillas, or at least push
them across the frontiers where we would try to contain them.
Two additional tasks were to be pursued throughout all three phases:
pacification and strengthening the ARVN. By the time the war reached the final
phase, I expected the bulk o f the people to be under government control and
protection and the ARVN to be so trained and equipped and in such numbers that
the South Vietnamese alone could deal with any lingering opposition. In a later
day that was to be called ‘Vietnamization.’9
It should be noted that pacification and strengthening the ARVN are presented
almost as an afterthought, certainly neither fit into the main effort o f Westmoreland’s
strategy. In fact, it is argued by many analysts and historians that those goals were
largely dismissed by Westmoreland throughout his tenure o f command in Vietnam.
Former CIA official and historian Lewis Sorely describes Westmoreland’s strategy in the
following terms:
His [Westmoreland’s] approach to achieving that [defeating the enemy] was to
wage a war o f attrition, using search and destroy tactics, in which the measure o f
merit was body count. The premise was that, if he could inflict sufficient
casualties on the enemy, they would cease their aggression against South
Vietnam. In his single-minded pursuit o f this objective, Westmoreland essentially
ignored two other crucial aspects o f the war, improvement o f South Vietnam’s
armed forces and pacification.10
Westmoreland’s focus on traditional methods o f warfare, at least for U.S. troops,
is further evidenced by a cable he issued during the conflict. He wrote:
There is no doubt whatsoever that the insurgency in South Vietnam must
eventually be defeated among the people in the hamlets and towns; however, in
order to defeat the insurgency among the people, they must be provided security
o f two kinds:
(1) Security o f the country as a whole from large well organized and equipped
forces including those which may come from outside their country.
(2) Security from the guerrilla, the assassin, the terrorist and the informer.

9 Gen. William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, N Y : Doubleday and
Company, 1976), 185.
10 Lewis Sorely, Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt, 2011, Kindle Electronic Edition), 91.
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MACV is convinced that U.S. troops can contribute heavily in the first category
o f security.. ..Therefore, the MACV concept is basically to employ U.S.
forces...against the hardcore DRV/VC forces in reaction and search and destroy
operations and thus permit the concentration o f Vietnamese troops in the heavily
populated areas along the coast, around Saigon and the Delta.11
Tucker argues that Westmoreland’s conventional mindset was programmed by his
experiences in World War II and Korea and that he was never able to break away from
that paradigm. He points out that because o f this, Westmoreland “expressly rejected
suggestions that US units be broken down into smaller groups to concentrate on
pacification.”

I“)

Andrew Krepinevich agrees with this assessment. He writes,

The sheer weight of American materiel and resources seemed sufficient to the
military leadership to wear down the North Vietnamese and their VC allies; thus,
strategy was not necessary. All that was needed was efficient application of
firepower. It had worked against the Japanese and the Germans in World War II
and against the Chinese in Korea. It would be tried again in Vietnam.13
Sorely maintains that this over-emphasis on the strategy o f large main force units
(often battalion or multi-battalion in size) searching through the jungle for similarly large
enemy main force units was “costly in terms o f time, effort, and materiel, but often
disappointing in terms o f results. The reality was that the enemy could avoid combat
when he chose; accept it when and where he found it advantageous to do so; and break
contact at will as a means o f controlling casualties.” 14 It also left the populated villages
unprotected, at least by U.S. forces. As Scott Sigmund Gartner points out, “Search and
destroy aimed to destroy the enemy, not control real estate. Hills and villages were

11 Gen. William Westmoreland, quoted in Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and
Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 154-155.
12 Tucker, 105.
13 Krepinevich, 165.
14 Lewis Sorely, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy o f
Am erica’s Last Years in Vietnam (Orlando: Harcourt, 1999), 4.
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frequently taken, abandoned, and retaken in order to kill enemy forces.” 15 Villages were
seen more as terrain in which fighting, with the goal o f killing the enemy, was conducted
rather than as populated areas that needed to be consistently protected.
In fact, the north frequently used large battles to draw U.S. forces away from
populated areas, thereby leaving them exposed. Stanley Kamow writes in his Pulitzer
Prize winning history o f the conflict that, “The battles at Khesanh and elsewhere in the
hinterlands before and during the Tet offensive were intended to draw the Americans
away from South Vietnam’s population centers, thereby leaving them naked to assault.” 16
These areas were left protected only by the ineffective ARVN. As Krepinevich put it:
“The ARVN was to be consigned to the unglamorous duty o f population security, a role
in which they had demonstrated considerable ineptitude in the past. Thus the Army left
counterinsurgency to the RVNAF, while U.S. commanders went out in search o f the big
battles.” 17 This left the most critical part o f the conflict, protecting the population, to the
corrupt and poorly trained and equipped ARVN.
Even worse, the U.S. Army’s own tactics were counterproductive in that they
relied upon heavy firepower and bombing, thereby often alienating the people.
The use o f armored formations went against many principles o f classical
counterinsurgency doctrine. Armored units rarely operated at night, when the
guerrillas were most active; they allowed for easy evasion o f U.S. forces by the
guerrillas; they encouraged the infantry to operate ‘buttoned up’ inside their
vehicles instead o f out on patrol; they were ‘maintenance-intensive’ pieces o f
equipment, requiring large numbers o f support troops, who did not actively
participate in operations; and finally, compared with the infantry, they were
grossly indiscriminate in the application o f firepower. In short, they were a blunt
instrument for combating insurgency— save in its most advanced stages— but

15 Scott Sigmund Gartner, Strategic Assessments in War (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997), 130.
16 Stanley Kamow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), 554-555.
17 Krepinevich, 168.
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quite appropriate to the Army’s notion o f how wars should be fought. A further
addition to the Army’s arsenal o f firepower was the air support provided by
tactical fighters and helicopters. The rationale for the lavish application o f such
firepower (and, in the case o f the helicopter, additional mobility) was not for
counterinsurgency operations but to support the Army’s strategy o f attrition. All
this firepower and mobility, claimed General Wheeler, made traditional concerns
relating to counterinsurgency inoperative.18
The philosophy o f using an overwhelming application o f force to quell the
insurgency was perhaps best encapsulated by a response that Gen. Westmoreland gave to
a question during a press conference about how to end the insurgency in Vietnam. His
one word answer was: “Firepower.”19 This reliance on a conventional application o f
force made body-count the primary metric o f success, thereby incentivizing the Army to
kill as many as possible but disincentivizing maintaining control over a particular area.
“Thus, while the Army killed many VC, it never denied the enemy his source o f
strength— access to the people. The result was a seemingly perpetual rejuvenation o f the
insurgent forces.”20
Over-reliance on firepower in populated areas is demonstrated by the fact that 70
percent o f all rounds fired by the U.S. in the war (with the exception o f the Tet
Offensive) were used in light or inactive combat situations.21 Similarly, the amount o f
aerial bombing was immense. Almost eight tons o f bombs were dropped by the
American side during the war, most o f which was in Laos and South Vietnam. This was
more than two times as much as was dropped by the Allies during all o f the Second
World War.22

18 Krepinevich, 170.
19 Westmoreland, quoted in Krepinevich, 192.
20 Krepivenich, 197.
21 Krepivenich, 201.
22 Tucker, 118.
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General Khuyen, o f the ARVN, argued that
Hatred was our enemy’s major instrument to turn the people against
us...Comm unist guerrillas usually drew retaliatory fire from our gunships and
artillery by sniping at our aircraft, convoys or outposts. More often than not, it
was the local people who were exposed to our fire because
by the time it came,
i
the guerrillas had fled or taken shelter underground.
■j

In the same vein, a pacification official observed that, “With increasing frequency
VC and NVA forces enter a hamlet, raise their flag and announce that they are staying.
In order to get them out, we often have to destroy the hamlet.”24 These observations were
confirmed by an analysis conducted by the Office o f the Secretary o f Defense (OSD)
which found that “our unobserved fire alienates the local peasants in most cases, thus
harming our efforts to break down their loyalty to and support for the Viet Cong.”25 The
extent to which this firepower, used in furtherance o f the seek and destroy strategy,
undermined building positive relationships with the people is further discussed in a later
section.
To counter the accusation that the U.S. conventional approach was a major cause
o f failure in Vietnam, the Strategic Hamlets program is often brought-up. This was a
population settlement and security program modeled on the resettlement program in
Malaysia. Strategic Hamlets turned out to be a disaster and this is often pointed to as
evidence that traditional counterinsurgency strategy was no more successful than was the
conventional approach and may have even been worse. This ignores several key facts
about the program, however.

23 Gen. Khuyen, quoted in Krepivenich, 199.
24 Pacification official, quoted in Krepivenich, 199.
25 Office o f the Secretary of Defense, quoted in Krepivenich, 201.
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Initiated by the Diem regime in 1962 (before the introduction o f U.S. combat
troops) as an outgrowth o f his failed 1959 agroville program and based on the New
Villages concept in Malaysia, the Strategic Hamlets program was incompetently run by
corrupt officials from the very beginning. Run by President Diem’s brother Nhu, the
program involved the forced relocation o f peasants into armed compounds and also
promised to provide access to superior health and educational services. The plan called
for the establishment o f 14,000 Strategic Hamlets comprised o f the relocated residents o f
16,000 unprotected rural hamlets. This was to have been completed by 1963.26
After a month the GVN (Government o f Vietnam) claimed that 1,300 Strategic
Hamlets had already been created. They put the total at 2,500 in August and 3,225 in
September 1962. Before two years had gone by, 8,000 o f these fortified hamlets had
been established. But these were little more than Potemkin villages.27 Many o f them
were unfortified and few offered the services advertised. Additionally, the sites were
often poorly located and ineffectively administered. The problems were exacerbated
even further by the actions o f the ARVN soldiers who were tasked with protecting these
hamlets but instead often stole food and committed other abuses against the populace.28
This was occurring to people who had been forced off o f their own lands and into the
Strategic Hamlets, ostensibly for their own good. As Tucker succinctly puts it, “Riddled
with corruption, the program turned out to be a vast and expensive failure and alienated
much o f the peasantry. Probably most o f the peasants simply wanted to be left alone and

26 Tucker, 96.
77
Krepinevich, 68.
28 Tucker, 96-97.
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certainly found the RVN as much an enemy as the VC. The government moved them off
their lands, taxed them unfairly and did not deliver on promises.”29
Tucker’s assessment is affirmed by an interview with Hai Chua, a communist
defector, conducted by U.S. advisor Stuart Herrington. Hai Chua made the following
statement regarding his own experiences with Strategic Hamlets:
First, the government forced many o f the people to move to central locations
called ‘Strategic Hamlets.’ We were told that this was for our protection from the
Vietcong, but at this time, the people o f Hiep Hoa [his hamlet] did not yet feel the
need for such protection. The program caused many hardships as whole
households were uprooted and moved to settlements near the main road. The
Communists capitalized on this unpopular policy by pointing out that the
government was trying to sever the people’s ties to their ancestral lands.30
Clutterbuck places some o f the blame on the inflated urgency o f getting large
numbers o f hamlets established, whether they were functional or not. This meant that the
newly populated hamlets were set up so hastily, and with merely the intention o f being a
statistic, that they could not provide need services, work opportunities, or evfen security,
the raison d'etre o f the entire program. Additionally, inhabitants were often not
registered, which left them open to infiltration.31
This intense push for numbers was often at the behest o f President Diem’s brother
Nhu. According to Kamow, Nhu and Diem saw the program essentially as a way to
enhance their influence rather than as a true strategy for winning the population to their
side.32 Yuen Foong Khong agrees. He argues that, “Diem focused on controlling the
peasants instead o f winning their hearts and minds because it seemed a surer way o f

29 Tuker, 96-97.
30 Hai Chua, quoted in Stuart A. Herrington, Silence Was a Weapon: The Vietnam War in
the Villages (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), 30.
31 Clutterbuck, 67.
32 Kamow, 273.
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maintaining his tenuous grip on power.”33 This led Robert Thompson, one o f the
counterinsurgency experts in Malaysia who had been responsible for the establishment o f
New Villages, to proclaim that, “No attention was paid to their purpose. Their creation
became the purpose in itself.”34 Another factor in the ineffectiveness o f the program
probably lays at the feet of N hu’s chief military officer in charge o f it, Col. Pham Ngoc
Thao. Kamow divulges that his sources told him that Thao was actually a communist
operative and that he deliberately undermined the program to render it ineffective and to
turn the people away from the GVN.35
Strategic Hamlets, though a failure, cannot be considered a failure o f a legitimate
attempt at true counterinsurgency strategy. It was devised and implemented by a corrupt
and incapable government and military. It was run by a politician seeking only to benefit
from the perception o f success by racking up numbers. And was undermined by an
enemy spy who likely worked diligently to undermine it’s success. The Strategic
Hamlets program may in fact have led to some success if it had been supported by
competent American troops, had progressed at a realistic pace, and actually delivered the
services and security that it was intended to.
Though Westmoreland’s strategy was overwhelmingly focused on seek and
destroy (for example, in June 1967 a full 86% o f operations carried out by U.S. battalions
did so with this mission in mind36) he did make some tepid attempts at counterinsurgency
proper. One such effort was Operation Hop Tac, initiated in 1964. It was experimental

33 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the
Vietnam Decisions o f 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 94.
34 Thompson, quoted in Kamow, 273.
35 Kamow, 274.
36 Krepinevich, 190.
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in nature and only instituted in six provinces in the vicinity o f Saigon. The idea o f the
operation was to clear areas o f VC (Viet Cong) activity, maintain security through
aggressive patrolling, provide important government services, and then handing the areas
over to local militias and police forces once they were capable o f providing security.37
Yet this program also faltered due to Westmoreland’s hands off approach. He
insisted that all combat forces be ARVN and that U.S. troops would offer only advice and
supplies. An ARVN unit was moved into the area from a distant province, which led to a
high rate of desertion. Furthermore,
Political instability in Saigon was another negative factor. Khanh became so
involved in political concerns that he was little interested in Hop Tac. Rather than
have them participate in the project, he held marine and airborne brigades in their
barracks close to the capital to prevent a possible coup. The RVN police failed to
do their job, and the government did not deliver the American supplies that were
to be the economic leverage.38
Due to its failures, the program was ended in 1965.
Though Westmoreland involved the Army in few pacification efforts, other U.S.
entities did makes such attempts, and they were often the most successful elements o f the
American mission during Westmoreland’s command. One such initiative was run by the
CIA and called the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). It was begun in 1961 and
its primary purpose was to organize and arm villagers. They were also given medical
supplies and agricultural assistance. These functions were carried out by contingents o f
U.S. Army Special Forces. By the end o f 1962 the program had secured an entire
province and approximately 38,000 villagers were taking part.39

37 Tucker, 106-107.
38 Tucker, 106-107.
39 Nagl, 128.
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Unfortunately, once the program came to the notice o f the Army, it’s purpose was
redirected. Nagl writes that, “Under MACV’s leadership, the CIDG soldiers were
integrated into the ARVN and used as mobile strike forces while U.S. Special Forces
were withdrawn from the program to be placed in offensive roles; they were replaced by
far less capable Vietnamese Special Forces.”40 Leading him to the assessment that, “The
most flexible o f all U.S. government organizations [the CIA] was unable to alter U.S.
Army counterinsurgency policy with a program that achieved demonstrable results in a
comparatively short time and with relatively few resources expended; the organizational
culture o f the army was too formidable a barrier to permit learning from the CIA’s
success.

9^41

Another organization that attempted to implement a counterinsurgency strategy
was the U.S. Marine Corps. Major General Lew Walt, who was commander o f the III
Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) in northern South Vietnam pushed a pacification
strategy for his troops that was at odds with Westmoreland’s search and destroy
conventional strategy. He directed the formation o f CAPs (Combined Action Platoons)
which integrated a 14-man Marine rifle squad, along with one Navy corpsman, into
Vietnamese Regional Forces platoons. The CAPs lived in Vietnamese villages to stay
close to the people and provide protection. They also performed civic action activities,
attacked the VC infrastructure, organized intelligence, and conducted propaganda42 All
elements o f the counterinsurgency strategy advocated in this dissertation. There were

40 Nagl, 129.
41 Nagl, 129.
42 Tucker, 126-127.
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also coordinating councils developed which brought together regional heads o f civilian
agencies, ARVN and U.S. military commanders, and a representative from GVN.43
The program was carried out from 1965 to 1971 and involved 114 Marine CAPs
throughout I Corps. According to many assessments, the CAP units performed
admirably. Thompson said, “O f all the United States forces the Marine Corps alone made
a serious attempt to achieve permanent and lasting results in their tactical area o f
responsibility by seeking to protect the rural population.”44 This was borne out by a
DOD study conducted in 1967. It found that when scored by the Hamlet Evaluation
System (HES), villages with a CAP element scored 2.95 out o f 5 while the average score
in I Corps villages was only 1.6. The length o f time that a CAP remained in a village
also correlated positively with increased security.45
Moyar argues that CAPs effectively “inhibited guerrilla and shadow government
activity in the hamlets” and “improved the fighting capabilities o f the territorial forces.”46
He also added that because they lived among the population they were more frequently
able to engage the enemy than were units following a search and destroy mission rubric.
Despite its successes, however, CAPs was destined to remain a small and
relatively limited element of the overall effort in South Vietnam. As Major General John
Grinalds put it, “There was too little CAP, too late.”47 This was largely due to
Westmoreland’s negative view o f the program and his failure to support it.
Westmoreland was largely dismissive o f the program, saying, “I believed the Marines

43 Nagl, 157.
44 Thompson, quoted in Krepinevich, 172.
45 Krepinevich, 174.
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47 Gen. John Grinalds, quoted in Nagl, 158.
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should have been trying to find the enemy’s main forces and bring them to battle, thereby
putting them on the run and reducing the threat they posed to the population.”48 He
therefore did not provide the requisite support to allow the program to be expanded.
Westmoreland was not the only Army leader to disparage the CAPs effort,
however. It was widespread in the Army. According to Krepinevich,
The Army’s reaction to the CAP program was ill-disguised disappointment, if not
outright disapproval, from the top down. Gen. Harry Kinnard was ‘absolutely
disgusted’ with the Marines. “I did everything I could to drag them out,’ he said,
‘and get them to fight.. .They just wouldn’t play. They just would not play. They
don’t know how to fight on land, particularly against guerrillas.’ Major General
Depuy observed sarcastically that ‘the Marines came in and just sat down and
didn’t do anything. They were involved in counterinsurgency o f the deliberate,
mild sort.’49
The program ultimately had little overall impact. Due to lack o f support from
both Westmoreland and the GVN, CAPs was limited in scope.
Another counterinsurgency institution developed in Vietnam was CORDS. This
stood for the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Study and was initiated at
the behest o f President Johnson in 1967. It was essentially a program to integrate civilian
and military pacification programs under a single institutional entity. It increased
funding and manpower to counterinsurgency but was primarily a means o f organization.50
The program was never very large in scope, however. In the year of it’s initial
development, 1967, it had 4,000 military and 800 civilian personnel. It reached it’s

48 Nagl, 157.
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height o f manpower in 1969 with 6,400 military and 1,000 civilians. After that point,
manpower was steadily reduced until the program became defunct in 1972.51
The primary function o f CORDS was to provide advice, training, planning and
funding for pacification programs run by GVN. Most o f the personnel involved in the
program were advisers to GVN organizations and institutions. This became more and
more the case as time went on and as Vietnamization gained momentum.52 Though small
in scope, most analysts judge the program to have been useful. Moyar contends that
“CORDS greatly improved the coordination of civilian and military programs and
allowed the United States to keep a better account o f GVN personnel involved in
pacification.”53 Similarly, Henry Nuzum points out that “the organization effectively
integrated, within its parameters, the security, political, and economic portions o f the
COIN campaign from the district to national levels and contributed to the defeat o f the
Viet Cong insurgency.”54
CORDS, CAP, and CIDG were all successful but subsidiary programs that
demonstrated results in the counterinsurgency effort. They are today often lauded as the
most successful initiatives o f the war during Westmoreland’s stewardship, yet they were
all programs that were outside of his primary purview and contrary to the thrust o f his
strategy. If such programs had a more central role, it is likely that their successes would
have been even greater and would have had an even larger impact. As it was, they had
effect primarily around the margins and did not make a substantial enough impact to
change the outcome o f the war.

51 Moyar, 49.
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One o f the keys to a successful counterinsurgency effort is the development of
intelligence in order to identify the enemy. This goal was impeded by Westmoreland’s
search and destroy strategy, in that the best intelligence is usually derived through close
contact with the population. Since the strategy focused on large conventional units
housed on military bases, the opportunity to gain intelligence from the population was
substantially dampened. Even worse, however, was that the Army seemed largely
uninterested in this type o f intelligence. It’s main intelligence goals revolved around
large concentrations o f enemy forces rather than insurgent groups in villages and hamlets.
Krepivenich writes that,
As for the Army’s main-force units, their intelligence effort focused on the
enemy’s big units. Lieutenant General Yarborough observed that the weight o f
the intelligence effort was aimed at discovering how many divisions they had, not
how many were placed at the village level or the hamlet level. Robert Komer
claimed that this was ‘to the total neglect o f the guerrillas and the so-called Viet
Cong infrastructure, the political-military apparatus that was really running the
w ar....The shortcomings o f Army Intelligence officers in waging the ‘other’ were
further compounded by the one-year-tour-of-duty policy established by the Army.
Brief tour lengths contributed to the attitude prevalent among many intelligence
officers that familiarity with the culture, language and society o f Vietnam was not
essential in the performance o f their duty. In failing to appreciate the necessity o f
destroying the insurgent’s political infrastructure as a precondition for victory, the
Army failed to render counterinsurgency intelligence operations the priority they
deserved. While the efforts o f CORDS foundered on the relatively low priority
given these operations by MACV and the national police, the Army’s intelligence
personnel suffered from the service’s preoccupation with its traditional approach
to war.’55
One organization that did focus on intelligence targeting insurgents, and most
especially communist leadership, was the CIA. They developed the Intelligence
Coordination and Exploitation program in 1967 which later became known as Phoenix in
1968. This program coordinated intelligence from all relevant organizations and set up

55 Krepivenich, 229.
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local intelligence centers at the district and provincial levels.56 This information was
most frequently provided to Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) and
National Police Field Forces who would attempt to kill or capture the targeted
individuals.57 Leaders were the primary targets, the idea being that decapitating the
leadership would undermine the entire guerrilla infrastructure. The majority o f this
program’s activities occurred after Westmoreland’s tenure.
Another key to taking direct action against the insurgent force during a
counterinsurgency conflict is the development o f the host nation military capability. This
was also largely ignored under Westmoreland’s tenure. He considered defeating
communist main forces to be the primary objective o f U.S. forces. He assigned
pacification to ARVN which received little training and limited supplies. According to
Gen. Maxwell Taylor, “We never really paid attention to the ARVN Army. We didn’t
give a damn about them.”58
This judgment was widely shared. Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth
Bunker said, “It seemed to me we started late in training the Vietnamese, and that we had
a lot to make up. In the beginning, I think we had misjudged the war and thought that it
would be a short-term proposition that we could finish ourselves.”59 This neglect applied
not only to training but to equipment. According to Brigadier General James Lawton
Collins, Jr., “By 1966 U.S. forces had been given first priority for men, money, and
material, and the basic mission o f strengthening the Vietnamese armed forces became a
second priority. This change immediately lowered the quality o f advisory personnel and
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the availability o f the more modem equipment for the Vietnamese Army.”60 The neglect
o f ARVN would have long term consequences for South Vietnam as it would leave them
ultimately unprepared to deal with North Vietnamese conventional forces once the U.S.
had left the country to it’s own defenses.
Westmoreland’s strategy o f seek and destroy, focused on the enemy main forces,
had several negative repercussion when it came to direct engagement with the insurgents.
According to Sorley, these included “ neglect o f the advisory task and o f the need to
improve South Vietnam’s armed forces, and equally neglect o f the crucial pacification
program, thereby leaving largely undisturbed the enemy’s shadow government, its
infrastructure within the villages and hamlets o f rural South Vietnam.”61 This strategy
would ultimately prove unsuccessful and progress would not be made towards these goals
until Gen. Creighton Abrams was to redirect strategy in April 1968.
Abrams immediately recognized the need for a radical shift in strategy. He
directed his staff to devise a new war plan, often referred to as the ‘one w ar’ plan due to
the fact that pacification would no longer be considered a separate effort. It changed the
primary measure o f effectiveness from body count to population security and a focus on
developing civil authority.62 63 This was most clearly seen in how forces were used. As
Sorely puts it,
Instead o f thrashing about in the deep jungle, seeking to bring the enemy to battle
at times and in places o f his own choosing— the typical maneuver o f the earlier
era—allied forces now set up positions sited to protect populated areas from
invading forces. This put friendly forces in more advantageous situations and
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forced the enemy to come through them to gain access to the population, the real
objective o f both sides in the war.64
This was further evidenced by the implementation o f the Accelerated Pacification
Campaign (APC) on November 1, 1968, a day which Sorely indicates “marked a new
departure in the war.” This initiative involved securing as many contested hamlets as
possible, beginning with a goal o f 1,000, by moving troops into the countryside. The
program showed immediate results and the goal was raised to 1,330 and by the beginning
o f the following year (January 1969) forces had been moved into 1,320 hamlets.65 A
system known as the Hamlet Evaluation System was eventually developed to measure the
security gains in protected hamlets.
Sorely describes how the system functioned:
The system placed hamlets in one o f six categories: A, B, C, D, E or VC. The A,
B, and C categories indicated degrees o f being relatively secure, while D and E
meant contested. Those designated VC were considered to be under enemy
control. The ratings were calculated by using the advisors’ answers to a
comprehensive set o f questions on both security and development. Among the
specifics were such things as whether the hamlet had an assigned Popular Forces
platoon, an elected government, a People’s Self-Defense Force unit, and an
ongoing self-help project.66
This system demonstrated the immediate results obtained by the APC. Moyar
points to several key statistics to demonstrate this (although he questions their accuracy,
he argues that they do reveal an important trend and a significant improvement in
security). First is the number o f people living in areas deemed secure. This number
increased by 8.2 million people from 1967 to 1972. This meant that the total population
o f the country living in secured areas almost doubled, from 42% to 80%. Furthermore,
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from December 1969 to December 1971 the percentage o f people living in areas in which
the VCI (Viet Cong Infrastructure) could not move freely had increased from 56% to
80%.67 Success also began to be measured by counterinsurgency specific metrics such as
reduction in tax revenue collected by the VC shadow government, less successful
recruiting for new insurgent volunteers in the villages, and fewer supplies and food
acquired by the insurgency from villagers.68
David Fitzgerald, who is a critic o f the “better war” thesis, argues that there was
little new conceptually about the APC, rather its biggest point o f departure from previous
efforts was that U.S. troops were much more heavily involved in its execution. This was
itself, however, a major change. Pacification was no longer being dumped solely at the
feet o f ARVN. It was also highly significant that population security was designated as
the top priority o f the APC. Due to its success, the APC became the model for future
operations by both the GVN and Abrams’ 1969 Combined Campaign Plan.69
Abrams fueled these successes partly by a reorientation o f intelligence. “The
intelligence is the most important part o f this whole damn thing. And if that’s good, we
can handle anything,” he once said.70 He described intelligence as being the “lifeblood”
o f the effort.71 In addition to his recognition that intelligence was key, he also recognized
that a broader variety o f intelligence, beyond just the enemy’s order o f battle and the
position o f their large forces, was needed. He ordered that the Weekly Intelligence
Estimate Update begin to include information on “pacification, expansion o f territorial
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forces, manpower issues, economic reform, elections, and refugee assistance.”72 Sorely
is quick to point out, however, that this did not come at the expense o f conventional
military intelligence. “Abrams was not neglecting the military campaign, but using the
broadened perspective to facilitate use o f forces to better advantage, to wage a smarter
and more availing war.” He also notes, that “soon attendance by Ambassador Bunker
became frequent, whereas earlier the embassy had seldom been represented at these
critical weekly planning sessions.”73
Abrams also focused heavy attention on the development o f Vietnamese forces in
various incarnations. Gen. Richard Stilwell identified this as a major departure from the
Westmoreland era. “I think,” he said, “one o f the significant differences between the
Westmoreland tenure and that o f Abrams is that, under the former, overriding priority
was given to the buildup and sustainment o f US forces. And the training, equipment,
mothering, helping the ARVN forces took a relative back seat - until Abrams got there.”74
A greater focus on Improvement and Modernization (I&M) for the ARVN was in
accordance with Nixon’s push for ‘Vietnamization’ o f the war, which was the idea that
South Vietnam needed to take progressively greater responsibility for the war as the U.S.
• je

began to withdraw.
By 1972 considerable progress had been made in this regard. The military was up
to 11 infantry divisions comprised o f 120 battalions. There were also 58 artillery
battalions, 19 various armored divisions, and other supporting battalions. There was a
reserve comprised o f 21 Ranger battalions as well an Airborne Division and a Marine
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Division. The Navy had 1,680 vessels and the Air Force had grown to more than 1,000
aircraft. The military was also supplemented by a National Police force o f 116,000
men.76
In addition to the increased size o f the Vietnamese armed forces was a greater
munificence in terms o f equipment. According to Frances Fitzgerald, “the United States
began to arm the Vietnamese with a generosity unknown in the days o f General
Westmoreland. For the first time it issued the infantry with the powerful M-16 automatic
rifles, the grenade launchers, and machine guns that the Americans used.”

77

This was not

only a great boon to the potential effectiveness o f the South Vietnamese military, but also
served as a symbolic recognition o f equality between American and South Vietnamese
forces.
Not only was the size and functionality o f South Vietnamese main forces greatly
increased by there was also an added focus on the development o f Regional Forces and
Popular Forces. These were local people recruited to defend their home districts and
provinces and were key to the pacification effort. “Abrams had made their expansion and
improvement his special concern, achieving particular success by sending out small
70

military advisory teams to work with the RF companies and PF platoons.”

These forces

would eventually come to comprise half o f all South Vietnamese armed forces. In some
areas, such as the populous Delta, they reached up to 80% o f available manpower. “In
every area o f the country they were an important part o f the security environment.
Patrolling, conducting night ambushes, on bridge security, the RF and PF inflicted a
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substantial amount o f damage on enemy forces— and in turn suffered serious losses—
while denying them easy access to the population.”79
The newly improved military forces o f South Vietnam, in conjunction with the
new focus on pacification, began to show important results. The success o f the South
Vietnamese conventional forces was demonstrated during the 1972 Easter Offensive, the
first major invasion o f North Vietnamese conventional forces into South Vietnam since
the 1968 Tet Offensive. Although the North Vietnamese garnered initial victories and
captured territory, the South Vietnamese counterattacked and retook that territory. The
eventual casualty figures were heavily unbalanced in favor o f South Vietnam. The South
Vietnamese lost more than 8,000 dead and 24,000 wounded but the North Vietnamese
suffered 100,000 casualties out o f 200,000 soldiers, approximately 40,000 o f whom were
killed. The invading army also lost half o f its tanks and heavy artillery.80 This was
accomplished by the ARVN with much more limited support than was available during
the Tet Offensive, essentially receiving only advice, logistical support, and air power.
The devastation suffered by the North Vietnamese during this battle is made clear
by Kamow in his recounting o f a March 1973 meeting o f communist leaders in Hanoi.
They concurred that their present problems in the south were serious. The South
Vietnamese force, now more than a million men armed with American aircraft,
artillery and tanks, was retaking key sectors, while the Communists had not
recovered from the casualties they had suffered during their massive spring
offensive o f 1972. ‘Our troops were exhausted and their units in disarray,’ wrote
[Gen. Tran Van] Tra. ‘We had not been able to make up our losses. We were
short o f manpower as well as food and ammunition, and coping with the enemy
was difficult.’ Vietcong cadres in some places were confused, numbers o f them
actually behaving passively toward the Saigon government in the belief that they
had to observe the cease-fire. At this rate, disaster loomed for the Communists.
Their spies inside the Saigon regime informed them that Thieu had developed a
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plan for the next two years to keep grabbing territory until he felt secure enough
to authorize an election-the results
o f which would o f course, confirm him as
Qt
South Vietnam’s sole authority.
Even more successful than the effort against North Vietnamese conventional
forces was the progress made in pacification. William Colby, director of the CIA, noted
that,
By 1972 the pacification program had essentially eliminated the guerrilla problem
in most o f the country.. ..This whole aspect o f the war, the unorganized part o f the
war, was not given a great deal o f attention during the early part o f the war. Only
after 1967 was it given a major part o f the attention o f the military command as
well as o f the rest o f u s.. .we put a great deal o f effort and energy into it.
Essentially.. .1 think we won that part o f the war, because in 1972 there weren’t
any guerrillas in the attacks by the North Vietnamese, and in 1975 there weren’t
any guerrillas in the attack by the North Vietnamese. The guerrillas were all on
the South Vietnamese side.82
Unfortunately, just as these successes were being achieved the U.S. was
withdrawing its support from South Vietnam. Manpower was being steadily reduced and
even support in terms o f supplies and air power would eventually be withdrawn. The
South Vietnamese had proven their ability to repel a northern invasion during the Easter
Offensive as long as they were supported by air power and with new supplies. When the
NVA invaded again in 1975, with the support o f the Chinese and the Soviet Union, the
South Vietnamese, now left to fend for themselves, were tragically unable to do so again.

INDIRECT ACTION AGAINST THE INSURGENT
Unsuccessful as was Westmoreland’s direct action against the insurgents, indirect
action— by both the U.S. and GVN— was even worse. Indirect action includes building
up the host nation and the government’s legitimacy while simultaneously undermining
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the insurgent’s grievances through effective political, economic and social action. “True
to its Concept [search and destroy], the Army focused on the technological and logistical
dimensions o f strategy while ignoring the political and social dimensions that formed the
foundation o f counterinsurgency warfare. The result was a high-cost, low-payoff
strategy.”83 The Army under Westmoreland’s leadership looked at the struggle in
Vietnam as military in nature and paid little attention to its political aspects. “Politics
would take a back seat while the Army inflicted sufficient damage on the insurgents to
force them to the peace table.”84
Not all o f the failure in this regard can be placed on the U.S. Army, however.
Much o f it had to do with the incompetence and faulty decision-making o f the South
Vietnamese government. These problems started with President Ngo Dinh Diem who
lead Vietnam from 1955 until his overthrow and murder during a 1963 coup d'etat.
Kamow describes Diem as suspicious o f anyone outside o f his family, which prevented
him from delegating authority efficiently and led to an administration rife with nepotism.
Much like his American allies he saw the insurgency in narrow military terms and failed
to understand the political nature o f the conflict and the appeal o f the communist
ideology to many rural peasants, limiting his strong supporters to fellow Catholics and a
few other small constituencies.85
He made matters worse by failing to initiate reforms, such as land redistribution,
that would have been popular with the people. Instead he responded with oppression. As
Tucker put it, “For Saigon reform took a back seat to fighting the insurgency, with the
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result that it continued to grow.”86 One example o f the repressive means used by the
Diem regime was Law 10-59, passed in May 1959, which allowed for the trial and
execution o f suspected terrorists by roving tribunals.87 There were many more such
onerous laws passed, some o f which will be discussed in the following section.
It was due to Diem’s incompetence as a leader that the U.S. tacitly backed a
plotted coup to overthrow him. This turned out to be a mistake as it led to years of
political instability and abrupt changes in leadership. Diem had been deposed by Duong
Van Minh, who was himself forcibly removed from power by Nguyen Khanh in less than
a year. During the ten months following Diem’s murder there were nine changes in
no

power!

Moyar describes the chaos that ensued:
Diem’s successors showed that they could not fight the insurgents as well as he
had. As premiers came and went from the end o f 1963 through the first half o f
1965, they replaced most o f their predecessors’ province chiefs and many other
key officers with their own cronies. The discontinuity o f leadership gravely
weakened all o f the GVN’s war efforts.89

The situation would not stabilize until June 1965 when General Nguyen Van Thieu
finally seized power. Upon the adoption o f a constitution he was elected president and
remained so until the end o f the war.
The incompetence and instability o f the South Vietnamese government left a
power vacuum that the communists were quick to exploit. Moyar notes that,
As the GVN lost its ability to govern, the VC’s ability to make use o f the village
resources grew. One o f the VCI’s first tasks in gaining control over a population
was the recruitment o f villagers into mass political organizations, such as the
Liberation Farmer Association, Liberation Youth Association, or People’s
Liberation Committee, or into the guerrillas. The Liberation Farmer Association
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the most important association, for the Party distributed land through it once
the GVN lost its power in the village.90

Wets

The insurgents took advantage o f the GVN’s diminished legitimacy by forming
their own shadow government, often referred to as the VC infrastructure. Moyar goes so
far as to say that, “O f all the factors at work in the village war, the actions o f the shadow
government’s cadres played by far the largest role in propelling the Viet Cong to
victory.”91 These cadres acted as the political and military leadership o f the VC and
guided recruitment, logistics (such as moving food and combat arms to and from needed
locations), combat and other efforts at the behest o f the North Vietnamese government.
Moyar says that the shadow government grew from 1960 - 1965 then shrank during the
1965 - 1967 time period. Despite those reductions, however, the political cadre probably
numbered between 80,000 and 150,000 people in 1967 according to a CIA estimate.92
The Southern Communist Party, which was the formal organization o f the shadow
government, was organized into national, regional, provincial, district and village
levels.93 It took its orders from Hanoi and allowed North Vietnam to maintain control
over both the guerilla fighters and the political efforts to erode GVN legitimacy.94 In
addition to the administrative, political, and logistical duties mentioned above, the cadre
also acquired income for the insurgency through taxation o f the rural populace. This
income, either in the form o f cash or seized agricultural products, often fed and supplied
the guerrillas and was instrumental in the survival o f the insurgency.95
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The leadership o f South Vietnam and the incompetence o f the GVN severely
eroded the legitimacy o f the South Vietnamese government. This made it easier for the
insurgent forces to gain support in the villages which allowed them to gamer recruits,
acquire income, move troops and supplies, and enhance their own legitimacy in terms o f
the ability to govern through their established shadow government. If an insurgency
revolves around winning the people to one’s side, the inability o f South Vietnam and its
U.S. ally to take indirect action against the insurgent was a major flaw in their strategy.
Without addressing the political and social issues o f importance to the people o f South
Vietnam, they left a void that was filled by the VC and which made it easier for them to
challenge the government both politically and militarily. This was worsened by the
allies’ inability to interact appropriately with the population.
Like the overall strategic approach to the war, this also began to change under the
leadership o f Gen. Abrams and President Thieu. Abrams’ recognition o f the importance
o f indirect action, through the development o f legitimate government, is apparent from
this comment,
Now I know the fighting’s important. I know they’ve got to, if the 324 Bravo
comes charging down [Route] 547 into Hue, you’ve got to get out there and really
lick them. But all o f these things in the pacification, where the machinery of
government and the philosophy that President Thieu is - building the village and
the hamlet, and really building a base there and so on. I really think that, o f all
the things, that’s the most important. That’s where the battle ultimately is won.96
Abrams recognized not only the importance o f a functioning South Vietnamese
government, but also the need to destroy the burgeoning VCI shadow government. His
change in strategy worked to undermine it in two ways. The first was that the refocus on
general pacification put American troops closer to the villages and focused their efforts
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more squarely on insurgent forces rather than large main forces. As the cadre
intermingled with other insurgent forces they were killed and captured in larger numbers
as a consequence, even without direct targeting. But they were also more directly
targeted, which is the second reason that they were more successfully undermined under
Abrams than Westmoreland. He ordered “an intensive drive against the VC
infrastructure and political apparatus aimed at eliminating it just as rapidly as possible;
not suppress, but eliminate.”97
Moyar argues that these efforts had a considerable impact on the Viet Cong
shadow government:
In many cases, the danger o f Allied operations did not force the shadow
government to stop functioning altogether but did inhibit its activities. The illegal
cadres, almost all o f whom did not live in the hamlets by the late 1960s, often
curtailed their visits to decrease the likelihood o f encountering Allied forces.
Because o f the cadres’ reduced access to the population and their use o f fewer
assistants, they could not obtain personnel, taxes, or intelligence from the hamlets
as effectively as they had previously nor could they give as much assistance to
Communist soldiers.98
He concludes that “As a result o f the shadow government’s decline, the nature of
the war in South Vietnam underwent a dramatic transformation.”99 The dismantling o f
the VCI was going hand in hand with improved government under the leadership o f
President Thieu. Ambassador Bunker described him as having “considerable intellectual
capacity” and praised him for his adherence to constitutional governance and greater
concern for making the government work in the interests o f the people. Bunker said o f
Thieu that, “He has been acting more and more like a politician, getting out into the

97 Abrams, quoted in Sorely, A Better War, 148-149.
98 Moyar, 256.
" M o y a r, 271.

137

country, following up on the pacification, talking to people, seeing what they want.” 100
Thieu’s efforts will be further discussed in the following section.

INTERACTION WITH THE POPULATION
Interacting with the population was a key area in which the U.S. effort failed
during Westmoreland’s leadership. Nagl laments that in Vietnam, “The concept that
success in counterinsurgency consisted o f separating the insurgents from popular support
never took root.” 101 The Army never recognized a need for any deep understanding o f
Vietnamese culture, history, language or people and did not train its advisers in these
areas. The brevity o f their tours o f duty also prevented many advisers from acquiring this
knowledge during their deployments in sufficient time to employ it in their decision
making. According to Krepinevich, “This cultural hubris on the Army’s part conflicted
with a basic tenet o f counterinsurgency that holds that in order to be successful, you must
be as familiar as possible with the people and the area that you are trying to win over and
control.” 102 He notes that only a few dozen soldiers a year were trained to speak
Vietnamese at a proficient level and that this impeded their success as advisers.103
This lack o f understanding was not limited to the soldiers in the field, but also
reached up to the highest levels. In one o f his memoirs, Robert McNamara, who was the
secretary o f defense under President Johnson, noted that “Our misjudgments o f friend
and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance o f the history, culture, and politics o f the
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people in the area, and the personalities and habits o f their leaders.” 104 He also notes that,
“We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task o f winning the hearts and
minds o f people from a totally different culture.” 105
Though it should have been expected that the Americans would experience
difficulty connecting with the people, that the South Vietnamese government should have
been able to make such a connection is something that might have been taken for granted.
The ineptitude o f the government under Diem and his immediate successors, however,
prevented this. Though discussed briefly in the previous section, this problem is worth
revisiting here in greater detail.
One o f the greatest divides in Vietnamese society was that between wealthy
families with large holdings o f land and the common peasants who worked that land or
had very small plots of their own. Diem sought the support o f the wealthy elite at the
expense o f the commoner. He refused to implement meaningful land reform that would
have more fairly distributed farm land and given the peasantry a more secure stake in
South Vietnamese society. Kamow points out that Diem “permitted landlords to retain
large holdings, so that little acreage was available for distribution...Even worse, Diem
antagonized peasants by requiring them to pay for land that they had been given free by
the Vietminh during the war against the French, and the Communists capitalized on his
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crude policy.” 106 Additionally, he abolished local village-level elections, which was also
unpopular.107
According to Tucker the inequity o f land-ownership was so severe that in 1961,
15% o f the population owned 75% o f all available land. Diem did initiate some land
transfer to the peasantry, but to an insufficient degree to create satisfactory change.
Tucker further points out that not even 2% o f aid monies provided by the United States
was utilized for agrarian reform.108 The failure to rectify the land issue, by Diem and the
United States, not only alienated people from the GVN, but also provided the insurgency
with an issue to capitalize on. In many areas the communist shadow governments would
institute their own land reform policies which benefitted the local peasants and won them
to their side.
It was in this area that President Thieu was later to make such great strides. He
recognized the importance of the land issue and took concrete steps to resolve it more
favorably for the peasantry. In 1969 alone the government redistributed more land than
in all o f the seven years prior. President Thieu then introduced a program called ‘Land to
Tiller’ in 1970. This program affected a third o f all cultivated land and made land
owners out o f approximately 500,000 families who had been renting their land at the cost
o f half o f their crops.109 This made a major contribution towards returning legitimacy to
the government and drawing the common people back to its side.
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Another major constituency which the Diem government had alienated was the
Buddhist community, which comprised between 70 and 90 percent o f the population at
the time. Being Catholic himself, Diem had little sympathy for Buddhists and enacted
policies that pushed them away from the government. He also favored Catholics and
gave them key positions o f power and influence. One policy which particularly roused
the ire o f the Buddhist community was a prohibition on flying the flag o f the World
Fellowship o f Buddhists. In response, thousands o f Buddhists took to the streets in
demonstration on May 8, 1963, the Buddha’s birthday. The military’s response to this
demonstration resulted in the death o f eight demonstrators, some o f whom were children.
This in turn resulted in even larger demonstrations and the first case o f self-immolation
by a Buddhist monk on June 11,1963. By the end o f the year, six other monks had
similarly committed suicide in protest o f Diem’s repressive actions against Buddhists.
The wife o f Diem’s brother, known as Madame Nhu, only worsened the situation by
referring to these events as “barbecues.” 110
That unfortunate comment was not the only way in which her influence alienated
the population. Since Diem him self was unmarried, Madame Nhu acted as first lady and
had considerable influence over certain areas o f legislation. This power led her to
institute a “bizarre puritanical campaign that outlawed divorce, dancing, beauty contests,
gambling, fortune telling, prostitution, adultery and even certain music and hair-dos.
Harsh punishments for violations of these new rules antagonized many.” 111 This further
eroded support for the government, especially in urban areas where these strictures were
most likely to be applied and enforced.
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The combination o f insufficient land reforms, the repression o f Buddhism in favor
o f Catholicism, and the unpopular laws pushed by Madame Nhu did severe damage to the
government’s ability to maintain support from the population during Diem’s reign. The
tactics utilized by U.S. forces also contributed considerably to that erosion. In a
counterinsurgency strategy that involves winning the population, the use o f brutal
military tactics must be severely constrained or, ideally, eliminated. Such was most
definitely not the case during the Westmoreland years o f the war. The use o f heavy
weaponry to further the strategy o f Westmoreland’s seek and destroy mission would
serve to undermine the relationship between the U.S. and South Vietnamese government
with the people.
U.S. reliance upon massive firepower and bombing, as well as weapons such as
cluster bombs and napalm was often counterproductive. Krepivenich makes the point
strongly,
Massive firepower was the primary means utilized by the Army to achieve the
desired end o f the attrition strategy— a body count. During the years of
intervention the Army’s preoccupation with reaching the crossover point made the
body count the enemy o f traditional counterinsurgency doctrine, which dictates
that protection o f the people must come before destruction o f the enemy. By
giving top priority to the body count, the Army gave its officers the incentive to
bend the ROE in favor o f killing ‘potential’ insurgents, although in many
instances they might have been innocent civilians. The availability o f firepower
and technology (in the form o f sensors, radar, and so on) made it easier to ‘send a
bullet’ instead o f a soldier, who could have made the distinction between friend
and foe.1'2
As an example o f the excessive use o f firepower, Krepivenich points to an
operation called PERSHING, executed in February 1967. During this operation a total o f
1,757 enemy were tallied as killed. In order to reach that objective however, over
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136,000 rounds of artillery were expended in addition to 5,000 rounds from naval
support. More than 150 bombing sorties were flown and 500,000 pounds o f napalm were
dropped. “All this in an area that the Army had characterized as ‘densely populated.” ’113
The use o f napalm was especially egregious. The Army seems to have been well aware
o f that fact. When asked a question about the possible ramifications o f using napalm in
terms o f its political impacts, Gen. Paul Harkins (Westmoreland’s predecessor in
Vietnam) replied that “It really puts the fear o f God into the Viet Cong. And that is what
counts.” 114
Another feared weapon was the cluster bomb. These bombs would expel
hundreds o f pellets that would devastate anything within range. According to Kamow,
“the cluster bombs were frequently dropped by American aircraft on populated regions in
both North and South Vietnam, killing or maiming thousands o f civilians.” He quotes
Gen. Harold K. Johnson, army chief o f staff, as saying about the indiscriminate nature o f
their use, “We have not enough information... We act with ruthlessness, like a
steamroller.” 115
The cluster bomb was only one aspect o f a massive air campaign. Though the
bombing o f North Vietnam often receives the most attention in the scholarly literature, it
has been estimated that 62% of the tonnage o f all bombing from 1965 to 1971 was in
South Vietnam.116 2.2 million tons o f bombs were dropped by American aircraft on
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South Vietnam and 643,000 tons on North Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 alone.117
Kocher, et. al., further argue that “The available evidence strongly confirms that bombing
in Vietnam was indiscriminate; it could not target individual VC supporters while sparing
government supporters or the uncommitted, even when intelligence was good.”118 Their
research demonstrates that this bombing was often worse than doing nothing as it likely
drove the population away from the government and towards the insurgency. Having
conducted a well-controlled statistical investigation they find that “The overall pattern is
consistent with bombing having decreased the RVN’s ability to control hamlets” and
“bombed hamlets that were previously under government control were more likely to
move toward insurgent control than were unbombed hamlets w hile.. .bombed hamlets
that were previously under insurgent control were more likely than unbombed hamlets to
remain under insurgent control six months later.”119
Another irritant to the population was the use o f defoliants. Conducted in an
attempt to eliminate food sources for insurgents and to degrade their ability to hide in
thick jungles, defoliants were used extensively. Krepivenich reports that, “Defoliant
operations by the U.S. Air Force under the code name RANCH HAND increased
dramatically, from 5,861 acres destroyed in 1962 to 1,570,114 acres destroyed in 1967.
Destroyed acreage dipped by about 15 percent in 1968-69, to about 1,360,000 and then
dropped sharply in 1970 to approximately 300,000 acres.” 120 He also points out that this
tactic greatly damaged relations with the people.
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The use o f defoliants soured relations between the Americans and the Vietnamese
even in supposedly secure areas. When the II Field Force began deploying to
South Vietnam in the summer o f 1965, for example, defoliants were used to clear
the Long Binh area, which would serve as its headquarters. Unfortunately, the
defoliants sprayed on the brushlands resulting in heavy damage to the rich crops.
It happened overnight. Fruit fell from trees, and the rubber trees on nearby
plantations turned brown and lost their leaves. Once the people discovered the
cause o f this calamity, they became worried that the spraying was dangerous to
animal and human life. In successive years, the birth o f a defective baby was
invariably blamed on the Americans and their defoliants.121
Westmoreland’s strategy o f search and destroy, primarily through the use of
heavy firepower and massive weaponry, was ill-conceived for a counterinsurgency
conflict in which attracting the people’s support was o f paramount importance. Gen. Vo
Nguyen Giap, one o f the most important leaders in the North Vietnamese military noted
the weakness o f Westmoreland’s strategy:
Westmoreland was wrong to count on his superior firepower to grind us down.
Our Soviet and Chinese comrades also failed to grasp our approach when they
asked how many divisions we had in relation to the Americans, how we would
cope with their technology, their artillery, their air attacks. We were waging a
people’s war, a la vietnamienne-a total war in which every man, every woman,
every unit, big or small, is sustained by a mobilized population. So America’s
sophisticated weapons, electronic devices and the rest were to no avail. Despite
its military power, America misgauged the limits o f its power. In war there are
two factors-human beings and weapons. Ultimately, though, human beings are
the decisive factors. Human beings! Human beings!122
Gen. Abrams agreed with Giap’s assessment. “It’s the people in the end. That’s
the critical thing o f the whole business,” he once said.123 One o f Abrams’ first efforts,
therefore, was to reduce the use o f excessive force. He restricted the use o f heavy
weapons in cities, allowing it only with his own direct approval. He also reduced the
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resort to unobserved artillery fire.124 In a speech to the National Defense College o f
Vietnam, Abrams declared:
I can assure you that no matter how frustrating, no matter what our past
experience, restraint will and must govern virtually all o f our activities.... we
cannot apply the full firepower of our military force throughout the countryside at
will, for to do so would further endanger the lives and property and the
governmental relationship with the very people we are all fighting to protect: your
own citizens o f V ietnam .25
Moyar points to several statistics to demonstrate that this was not only a sentiment
but something that resulted in real change.
From January 1969 to January 1971, the percentage o f air sorties against targets
within one kilometer o f inhabited hamlets fell from 15.2 percent to 4.1 percent,
and within two kilometers from 25.4 percent to 10.8 percent. At the same time,
the total number o f all Allied sorties in South Vietnam declined dramatically,
from 188,308 in 1969 to 46,909 in 1971. The percentage o f villagers who said
that no artillery or air strikes had landed in their hamlets or the vicinity during the
past month rose from 69.8 percent in December 1969 to 89.0 percent in December
1971.126
This is not to indicate, however, that Abrams was opposed to the use o f force, and
sometimes with a heavy hand. David Fitzgerald points to Abrams’ acclamation of
Operation Speedy Express which was carried out in 1969 by the 9th Infantry Division.
The operation relied on the use o f heavy firepower and by one estimation resulted in the
deaths o f 5,000 civilians. The 9th ID claimed the number o f enemy dead to have been
10,899.127 So it shouldn’t be mistakenly believed that Abrams totally eliminated the use
o f heavy firepower. But he did restrict its usage, and despite exceptions such as
Operation Speedy Express, it was significantly reduced.

124 Sorely, A Better War, 219.
125 Abrams, quoted in Sorely, A Better War, 28-29
126 Moyar, 295.
127 David Fitzgerald, 27.
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In conjunction with each other, Gen. Abrams and President Thieu made strides
towards winning the population over to the side o f the government. Thieu by taking their
concerns seriously, especially land distribution, and making reforms to address them and
Gen. Abrams by reducing the use of heavy fire-power, excessive force generally, and
defoliants. These steps undoubtedly contributed to the defeat o f the insurgent element
within South Vietnam that was achieved in the early 1970s, thereby forcing the North
Vietnamese to ultimately rely on a conventional assault against the south to win the war.

CONCLUSION
In 1975 the North Vietnamese launched a final offensive against South Vietnam
using conventional forces. On April 30th o f that year they captured Saigon and the war
was over. The North Vietnamese had won and the country was reunited under
communist domination. This followed a years long withdrawal o f U.S. troops and the
signing o f a Peace Accord between the U.S., North Vietnam and South Vietnam on
January 27, 1973. Not only had the U.S. removed it’s combat forces, including air
power, but it also abandoned South Vietnam financially. Though $1 billion had initially
been authorized for aid to South Vietnam in 1975, by the time it got through the
appropriations process and the costs o f administration were deducted the total amount
actually provided was a mere $654 million.128 At the same time, North Vietnam
continued to receive substantial support from the Chinese and the Soviet Union.
As a result o f the drastic reduction in financial support, the South Vietnamese
armed forces were greatly reduced and their ability to fight extremely hampered. The Air

128 Sorely, A Better War, 367.
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Force made 200 aircraft inactive and reduced support, reconnaissance and airlift support
by half. 600 naval vessels were inactived, which cut river patrols by 72%. Even
essentials such as ammunition and spare parts became increasing sparse.129 Ambassador
Ellsworth Bunker described this betrayal in stark terms:
I gave Thieu personally three letters from President Nixon committing us, in case
o f a violation o f the Paris agreements by the other side, to come to their
assistance. Well, the other side violated the agreements almost from the day they
signed them .. .but we never came to their assistance, because Congress refused to
appropriate the money. The result was, and as each day went by, the South
Vietnamese had fewer guns, fewer planes, fewer tanks, diminishing ammunition
with which to fight, while the North was being fully supplied by the Soviets and
the Chinese. The result was inevitable.130
Those who point to counterinsurgency strategy as the reason for the inevitable
result are mistaken in doing so. The U.S. did not, in fact, follow a counterinsurgency
strategy until late in the war when Gen. Abrams took over. Even then it was only
partially a counterinsurgency effort. By the time a counterinsurgency strategy was
initiated, the U.S. public had already soured on the war and a withdrawal had begun.
Even so, the insurgency was still essentially defeated and major military and political
objectives were achieved during the Abrams years. Krepivenich argues that
The lack o f progress in defeating the insurgents during the period of 1965-68 can
be attributed, in part, to an Army strategy reflecting traditional methods o f
operation in a conflict that was dramatically different from its wars over the
previous half-century. Deeply embedded in the service’s psyche, conventional
operations held sway over the Army even as its civilian superiors lost faith in their
effectiveness for counterinsurgency operations.131
And further that,
If the Army had followed a counterinsurgency strategy, both the human and
financial costs o f the war would have been significantly lower. This, in turn,

129 Sorely, A Better War, 367-368.
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would have assisted to some extent in maintaining popular support in the United
Slates for the U.S. participation in the war. It would have placed the Army in a
position to sustain its efforts in a conflict environment certain to produce a
protracted w ar.132
It was the failure to institute a counterinsurgency strategy early enough that led to defeat,
not its adoption from the beginning.
The efforts made towards an counterinsurgency strategy instituted during
Westmoreland’s tenure, such as CAP and CORDS, turned out to be very effective but
inadequately supported. When Abrams instituted counterinsurgency more seriously, the
results were enormous. In fact, Sorely argues that “There came a time when the war was
won.” 133 He points out that by the time U.S. forces withdrew pacification had been
largely successful and the insurgency defeated. Furthermore, the failure o f the North
Vietnamese invasion in 1972, known as the Easter Offensive, demonstrated that South
Vietnamese conventional forces were capable o f repelling such attacks if given air
support and financial backing— two things which were not made available in 1975.
The Vietnam War did not have to be lost. An effective counterinsurgency
strategy instituted at the beginning, before the American public revoked its support for
the war, would likely have succeeded. This is demonstrated by the fact that periphery
counterinsurgency efforts during Westmoreland’s tenure were successful, as was the
counterinsurgency strategy instituted by Abrams. Robert Komer was surely correct when
he said, “The greatest problem with pacification was that it wasn’t tried seriously until
too late, or if not too late certainly very late in the day.” 134
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CHAPTER 6
IRAQ

Like the war in Vietnam, the Iraq War is often interpreted as an ominous indicator
in terms o f a democracy’s ability to defeat an insurgency, especially in a foreign land. If
viewed through the wrong lens, it may appear to strengthen the (incorrect) lesson o f
Vietnam that such efforts are futile. Once again, the most powerful state in the world was
prevented from reaching its war aims by a militarily weaker insurgent force in a
developing country. At first glance, the ambivalent outcome o f the war in Iraq is further
proof that democracies can’t win counterinsurgencies and shouldn’t try. As with
Vietnam, however, this is the wrong lesson to draw.
Unfortunately, the mistakes o f Vietnam were re-made in Iraq. A conventional
strategy was stubbornly clung to in the face o f an irregular conflict. It took years for the
proper adjustments to take place, years that placed Iraq, the U.S. and coalition partners on
the path o f defeat. Once those adjustments were made, the course o f the war changed.
The implementation o f a proper counterinsurgency strategy prevented absolute defeat.
Though it is hard to claim that success was achieved, it is readily apparent that major
improvements in the situation were made. The pre and post counterinsurgency eras in
Iraq were vastly different in terms o f outcomes, once again demonstrating the absolute
imperative o f getting the strategy right. In order for a democracy to win a
counterinsurgency fight, it must implement a population-centric counterinsurgency
strategy.
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HISTORY
The Iraq War began on March 20, 2003 when the United States and its coalition
partners invaded the country in order to overthrow Saddam Hussein and dismantle the
regime’s supposed arsenal o f weapons o f mass destruction. It did not end until December
2011 when the U.S. withdrew its last remaining combat troops. In the meantime nearly
5,000 members o f the coalition forces were killed and at least 100,000 Iraqi civilians
similarly lost their lives. The majority o f these casualties came after the initial invasion
quickly and successfully overthrew Saddam Hussein’s government and destroyed his
conventional military capability.
The successful invasion force was small. It consisted o f only three U.S. Army
divisions, a U.S. Marine division and one British division. Including the British
contingent, the total number o f troops involved in the invasion totaled around 145,000.'
By April 9 coalition forces had seized Baghdad and Hussein was on the run, his
government fully collapsed. On May 1,2003 President Bush announced from the aircraft
carrier USS Abraham Lincoln that major combat operations had come to a conclusive
end. In the beginning, this proclamation, along with the prediction that the coalition
would be greeted as liberators, seemed to be bom out. There was some resistance to the
occupation by former Ba’athists and foreign extremists, but violence remained low
during the summer o f 2003.2
That resistance continued to grow, however, and key events, such as the
revelation o f severe prisoner abuse at the U.S.-run Abu Ghraib prison in early 2004, as

1 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: The
Penguin Press, 2006), 117.
2 Bruce R. Pimie and Edward O ’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006) (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 9.
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well as the bombing by Sunni radicals o f the al-Askari Mosque (one o f the most holy
sites in the world to Shia Muslims) further inflamed the violence. By 2006 the violence
was intense. Insurgents attacked coalition forces with indirect fires, small arms, and,
most successfully, with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). At the same time,
sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shi’ites had reached a level bordering on civil war
and involved ethnic cleansing in certain cities.
The primary motivations o f the insurgency against the coalition were to eliminate
their presence in the country and to dismantle the democratically-oriented political
system that the coalition was putting in place.3 The sectarian conflict was fueled by
mutual suspicion. The Sunnis feared their newly subservient position, believing that the
empowered Shi’ites may visit revenge upon them for atrocities committed while Hussein
was in power. The Shi’ites feared Sunni attempts to maintain their dominance and also
wished to exact revenge against their former tormenters.
Because initial assessments were highly optimistic, little planning went into
preparing for post-invasion security. The primary mission was to establish a viable Iraqi
government and military so that authority could be transferred to them and the coalition
could withdraw quickly. An insurgency was not expected and dealing with one was not
part o f the initial campaign plan. Securing the Iraqi population was not a primary
mission o f coalition forces in the early years o f the war. As Gordon and Trainor put it,
the view o f the administration was that, “An oppressive, authoritarian regime would be

3 Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2006), 121.
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removed, the liberated masses would breathe a sigh o f relief, and new officials would
grab hold o f the levers o f power and administer the new state.”4
By the end o f 2006, however, President Bush had come to realize that the war was
on the verge of being lost and that a change o f strategy was needed if events were to be
turned around. He replaced Secretary o f Defense Rumsfeld with Robert Gates and began
looking for new military leadership to take the reins in Iraq. He settled upon Gen. David
Petraeus whose most recent command had been at the Army War College in
Leavenworth, Kansas, where he oversaw the production o f a new field manual outlining
Army doctrine for counter-insurgency warfare. The new strategy to be implemented by
Petraeus was labeled “The New Way Forward” and would focus on population security
and adopt counterinsurgency priorities and tactics.5 It also involved a surge o f additional
troops in an attempt to quell the violence, especially in the capital city o f Baghdad.
Though this new strategy and influx o f troops initially resulted in higher
casualties., within a few months those casualties had been dramatically reduced and
violence was down to 2004 levels. The strategy was largely successful in providing
protection to the population.6 Sunni tribesmen had ended their opposition and in fact
joined the coalition in large numbers in opposition to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and as a
result sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shi’ites was reduced. Political problems,
especially o f a sectarian nature, still existed, but were being dealt with significantly less

4 Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story o f the
Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Pantheon Books,
2012), 10.
5 Victor Davis Hanson, The Savior Generals: How Five Great Commanders Saved Wars
That Were Lost - From Ancient Greece to Iraq (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013),
216-217.
6 Lydia Walker, “Forging a Key, Turning a Lock: Counterinsurgency Theory in Iraq
2006-2008, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 10, (2009): 915.
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violently. The worst part o f the insurgency was over and the Iraqi government held
together, providing an opportunity for political and economic development.
Unfortunately the U.S. public, as well as the populations o f the other coalition
members, were by this time largely opposed to the war. As in Vietnam, by the time an
appropriate counterinsurgency strategy had been settled upon, and the right leader to
implement it placed in command, support at home was already too severely eroded to
make the effort sustainable, despite demonstrable improvements in the situation. The
surge was only a temporary introduction o f increased troop levels and those troops were
soon being withdrawn. Coalition partners began to abandon the effort and U.S. force
levels continued to dwindle. By 2011 all forces would be out o f the country and Iraq
would be a sovereign country left to its own defense. Although the government under
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has survived, there has been a resurgence o f violence
against the population. Car bombs and other attacks have become more and more
frequent and the future o f the country remains uncertain.

DIRECT ACTION AGAINST THE INSURGENT
Caught off guard by the growing inferno o f the insurgency, the coalition forces in
Iraq suffered from having too few troops from the very beginning. In planning the
invasion, the defense department, primarily under the influence o f Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, decided on a “light footprint”
approach. This approach was challenged by many senior military leaders, who believed
that more troops, especially in the aftermath o f the initial invasion, would be necessary.
In testimony before Congress, Gen. Eric Shinseki, then the Army Chief o f Staff, said:
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I would say that what’s been mobilized to this point, something on the order o f
several hundred thousand soldiers, are probably, you know, a figure that would be
required... .it takes significant ground force presence to maintain a safe and secure
environment to ensure that people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal
responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this.7
The Administration’s response to this estimate was immediate. Two days after
Shinseki gave his testimony, Wolfowitz was himself before the House Budget
Committee. He directly contradicted Gen. Shinseki’s prediction.
There has been a good deal o f comment— some o f it quite outlandish— about
what our postwar requirements might be in Iraq. Some o f the higher end
predictions that we have been hearing recently, such as the notion that it will take
several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq, are
wildly off the m ark... .it is hard to conceive that it would take more forces to
provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself
and to secure the surrender o f Saddam’s security forces and his army-hard to
imagine.8
Wolfowitz and others in the administration believed that troop requirements
could be much lower. According to Tom Ricks, Wolfowitz was telling senior Army
leadership that he expected the troop level to be down to only 34,000 within a few
months o f a successful invasion.9 This emphasis on a small troop posture would have
extremely negative effects. Before the surge in 2007, the peak number o f troops was
184,500, o f which 160,000 were from the U .S.10 This number was insufficient to provide
security to the population. Analyst Anthony Cordesman argues that, “ ...the United States
wasted critical days, weeks, and months when it failed to engage in a security effort
before opposition movements could regroup and reengage. U.S. actions caused a power
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vacuum because the United States was not prepared for nation building and the escalation
o f resistance after enemy conventional forces were defeated.” 11
This deficiency was compounded when CPA administrator L. Paul Bremer made
the fateful decision to disband the Iraqi Army. This not only reduced the number of
personnel available to provide security, but it positively endangered security by cutting
off trained, armed men from their only source of employment which led to
disgruntlement and to many o f these former soldiers joining the Sunni insurgency.
The first sign o f the insufficient troop levels was the onset o f massive looting that
went on just after the successful invasion. About this looting Ricks writes,
As U.S. forces triumphed, Iraqis rose up and expressed their hatred for Saddam
Hussein’s regime in an extraordinary wave of vandalism. Mobs attacked
government buildings across the country, carting off not just valuables but
everything that could be pried off walls and floors. During this period it wasn’t
uncommon to see a pickup truck carrying doors, window frames, and piping from
government offices. 2
When questioned about this looting at a press conference, Secretary Rumsfeld
described it as a manifestation o f newfound freedom and did not seem concerned to take
additional steps to quell it. This would prove to be one o f the worst mistakes o f the war.
Not only did it render many functions o f the government inoperable, impede the
generation o f electricity, and lead to an equation o f democracy with chaos, but it also
painted the American forces as impotent and vulnerable. According to RAND analysts
Pimie and O ’Connell, “For many law-abiding Iraqis who were in awe o f U.S. capabilities

11 Anthony H. Cordesman, The War After the War: Strategic Lessons o f Iraq and
Afghanistan (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2004), 41.
1 Ricks, Fiasco, 135.
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during the invasion, this remains a watershed event in terms o f disappointment, loss o f
trust, and the spiral downward.” 13
In addition to insufficient force levels, part o f the problem was failure to plan. Lt.
Gen. Kellogg was a senior member of the Joint Chiefs o f S ta ffs planning staff. Ricks
quotes him as saying: “I was there for all the planning, all the execution, I saw it all.
There was no real plan. The thought was, you didn’t need it. The assumption was that
everything would be fine after the war, that they’d be happy they got rid o f Saddam.’14
Even when those initial assumptions were proven to be incorrect by the rising
violence, few steps were taken to remediate the looming problem. Larry Diamond, a key
governance adviser in the CPA, wrote that,
.. .the failure to address the security deficit persisted. Even when we faced a
growing insurgency without enough troops to combat it and maintain order; even
when Iraqi confidence in the CPA plummeted with each car bombing and attack;
even when foreign fighters, arms and money were pouring across the country’s
unsecured borders, Secretary Rumsfeld and other senior administration figures
blithely insisted that we had a sufficient military presence. The inadequacy o f
force and o f resources meant that we could not secure the roads, we could not
protect the courageous Iraqis who were coming forward to work for us, and
ultimately we could not protect our own people.15
One o f the chief planners o f the invasion force, Col. Kevin Benson argued that if
a sufficient number o f troops had been available at the beginning, the insurgency may
have been altogether avoided. “You know .. .there was a moment where some o f my
Arab friends told me that if we’d have kept the lid on, we probably wouldn’t have these
problems. OK, conjecture. How do we keep the lid on? Well, we continue the force

13 Pimie and O ’Connell, 69.
14 Gen. Kellogg, quoted in Ricks, Fiasco, 109-110.
15 Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled
Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2005), 288.
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flow. We don’t stop. We leave everyone in place.” 16 Unfortunately, decision makers
remained convinced that the occupation could be accomplished with the small contingent
o f forces already deployed.
The uncontrolled looting soon morphed into violent attacks, not only against Iraqi
and coalition forces but also against the Iraqi people by July 2004. This problem was
largely ignored by coalition forces, who focused more on their own force protection, and
by the remaining Iraqi Army and police forces, which were poorly trained and equipped.
“The lack o f focus and commitment toward developing an antidote to this powerful
mechanism for undermining Iraqi tolerance for U.S. troops proved to be one o f the major
strategy o versights on the part o f coalition forces in the entire Iraq war.” 17
The lack o f focus on population security was not limited to U.S. forces, British
forces (who were primarily based in the south) were also more focused on protecting
their own troops. According to Frank Ledwidge, “The British forces existed not to
protect the Iraqi population o f the city [Basra]: it existed largely, indeed almost
exclusively, to protect itself.” 18 This lack o f focus on population security quickly led to
Basra becoming a “law-free zone” that including kidnappings, car-jackings, robbery, and,
worst of all, reprisal killings and sectarian ethnic-cleansing.19
The most frequent targets o f attack o f Sunni extremists were large Shi’ite
gatherings. Shi’ites were attacked, often by vehicle-born IEDs (VBIEDs), whenever they
grouped together. They were targeted at “pilgrimages, weddings, funerals, open-air

16 Col. Kevin Benson, quoted in Ricks, Fiasco, 122.
17 Pimie and O ’Connell, 33.
18 Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 28.
19 Ledwidge, 29.
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markets, restaurants, and even mosques.”20 These attacks led the Shia to form their own
militias to provide security and to counterattack their Sunni persecutors. The two most
prominent o f these were the Badr Organization, and more importantly, Moqtada al-Sadr’s
•

Mahdi Army.

91
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•

The reprisals executed by the Shi’ite militias resulted in further

retaliation by Sunni insurgents and terrorists, thereby resulting in a vicious cycle o f
sectarian violence, often o f a particularly brutal nature. “Death squads abduct people,
torture them with electric drills, murder them, and leave their mutilated bodies in public
places.”22 In July 2006, the Baghdad morgue accepted 1,815 bodies, 90% o f which had
died violent deaths.23
Even despite this growing violence, Gen. George Casey (then the top military
commander in Iraq) and Gen. John Abizaid (head o f USCENTCOM) continued to argue
against increased troop levels. Believing that an increased presence would only provoke
further attacks, they insisted that U.S. forces should continue to withdraw while Iraqi
forces were trained and took on more o f the burden. According to Victor David Hanson,
their position was that,
At each scheduled reduction in American forces, the Iraqis would be required to
step up to replace them. The pace o f transformation would not always be
contingent on actual events on the ground, but rather become a catalyst for them.
After all, violence was always endemic to Iraq, and American soldiers would be
seen as the problem rather than the solution24
Yet Iraqi forces were nowhere near capable o f replacing their American
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counterparts. This was especially troublesome given that one o f the primary missions o f
the coalition was Iraqization, the training o f a new Iraqi military and police force.
Ahmed Hashim explains that,
A considerable amount o f focus was beginning to be put on ‘Iraqization’ o f the
security situation by training and equipping Iraqis to take on the task o f fighting
insurgency and terrorism. The United States unfortunately fell into the trap of
measuring success in this endeavor by means o f a single key and obvious
indicator: the number o f personnel it can claim to have been trained.. ..In mid2004 the United States was ambivalent about the state o f the Iraqi security forces.
The disintegration of many units during the worst o f the insurgency crisis in April
2004 had shocked many. Looking back,
many US officers and officials realized
■y c
that the forces were clearly inadequate. "
The Iraqi military was poorly motivated and did not patrol as frequently or
proactively as American forces.26 For example, at the end o f January 2005, Iraqi security
forces conducted only an average o f around 1,200 patrols per week. In contrast, coalition
forces conducted 12,000 patrols in the same period o f time.27 The American focus on
numbers meant that by the end of 2006 the Iraqi Army had approximately 138,000
soldiers. In terms o f quality, however, the Iraqi Army left much to be desired. Pimie and
O ’Connell notes that,
It was equipped almost entirely as light-infantry battalions supported by motortransportation regiments. It included only one mechanized brigade, part o f which
was equipped with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles donated by Eastern
European countries. As a result, there is a wide disparity between the lightly
equipped Iraqi Army forces and the heavily equipped U.S. forces trying to
accomplish similar missions. In addition, the Iraqi Army mirrors the sectarian
and ethnic divisions that plague the country. Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shi’ite
Arabs usually serve in battalions that consist largely or exclusively o f their own
groups. There is no judicial system within the Iraqi Army to assure discipline,
and soldiers can refuse orders with impunity.28

25 Hashim. 310.
26 Hashim, 311.
27 Hashim, 313.
28 Pimie and O ’Connell, 52.
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The Iraqi police were even further behind, as developing the Army was considered more
important.

29

In many cases, Iraqi security forces were worse than incompetent— they were part
of the problem. Both the Army and the National Police force were heavily Shi’ite and by
2006 had been infiltrated by various Shi’ite militias who were intent on ethnically
cleansing Shi’ite areas o f all Sunni presence. Ricks notes that,
These forces didn’t have to carry out the cleansing themselves. All they had to do
was go into a Sunni neighborhood and demand in the name o f pacification that all
heavy weapons be relinquished. After that was accomplished, they could tip off
the Shiite militias, who might arrive that night or the next morning, ready to take
on the newly defenseless population.30
Efforts at ethnic cleansing, both by Shi’ites and Sunnis, had resulted in an estimated 2
million rufugees having fled the country by 2006. Another 2 million were thought to
have been displaced within the country.31
In addition to lack of security due to insufficient troops and the poor quality of
Iraqi security institutions, poor intelligence also prevented a more effective response to
the insurgency. This lack of intelligence resulted from four key reasons. The first was
that Americans were based in giant super-FOBs (Forward Operating Bases) remote from
the population. Interactions were reduced to occasional patrols in which it could be
dangerous for the people to approach the soldiers.
The second reason was that failure to secure the population left them vulnerable
to reprisals if they were discovered to have provided information to the coalition.
According to Lt. Col. Michael Silverman, “It was fairly easy for leaders o f the group

29 Pimie and O ’Connell, 50.
30 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military
Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009), 46.
31 Ricks, The Gamble, 47.
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[AQI] to track what city-dwellers did. They only needed a spy or two on a block to know
if someone pointed out an IED to Americans or spent too much time talking when
American patrols visited. The punishment was a swift and public death.”32
Third, the dissolution of the Iraqi military and police force simultaneously
eliminated the most effective capability o f acquiring intelligence since coalition forces
often lacked the connection with the population and the language skills to acquire
intelligence.33 Finally, U.S. intelligence was often distracted by multiple tasks. It tended
to focus on threats to coalition forces rather than to the public. It also focused on issues
extraneous to the insurgency. Ambassador Bremer, for example, complained that
intelligence was too focused on discovering weapons o f mass destruction.34
By 2006 the failures in intelligence, providing security to the population, and in
building an effective Iraqi military and police force, as well as the problems of
governance discussed in the next section, had led to an intolerable situation o f violence
and chaos in the country. Sectarian differences had led to near civil war, violence against
both the population and coalition forces had escalated, and development was at a stand
still. During the summer of 2006, violence in Baghdad increased by 43% and by
December o f that year, approximately 3,000 Iraqi civilians were being killed each month
in sectarian violence.35 Gen. David Petraeus described the situation as he found it when
he returned to Iraq in early 2007:

32 Lt. Col. Michael Silverman, Awakening Victory: How Iraqi Tribes and American
Troops Reclaimed al Anbar Province and Defeated al Qaeda in Iraq (Philadelphia:
Casemate, 2011), 28.
33 Pimie and O ’Connell, 71.
34 Gordon and Trainor, 31-32.
35 Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking
o f the Iraq War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 32.
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I found the conditions there to be even worse than I had expected....The
violence— which had escalated dramatically in 2006 in the wake o f the bombing
o f the Shi’a al-Askari shrine in the Sunni city of Samarra— was totally out of
control. With well over fifty attacks and three car bombs per day on average in
Baghdad alone, the plan to hand off security tasks to Iraqi forces clearly was not
working. Meanwhile, the sectarian battles on the streets were mirrored by
infighting in the Iraqi government and Council o f Representatives, and those
disputes produced a dysfunctional Iraqi political environment as well. And with
many o f the oil pipelines damaged or destroyed, electrical towers toppled, roads
in disrepair, local markets shuttered, and government workers and citizens fearing
for their lives, generation o f government revenue was down and the provision o f
basic services was wholly inadequate. Life in many areas o f the capital and the
country was about little more than survival.36
It was Petraeus’ mission to turn this situation around through the implementation
o f a new counterinsurgency strategy utilizing increased forces available through the
surge. The new strategy called for changing the primary mission to protecting the
population and ensuring security. It was hoped that this would provide space for political
development and for improvements in military and police forces. As Ricks put it, “In
sum, the short war approach that the United States had followed for years had been
abandoned. The U.S. military had arrived in Baghdad in April 2003 with the expectation
o f largely leaving by that September. For three years after that, commanders had planned
variations on that swift exit. Now the long war was about to begin.”37
The surge would include the introduction of five new brigades into the battle
space, with an additional helicopter brigade and support troops. The total number of
added forces was around 30,000 soldiers. President Bush said these additional forces
were there “to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local
population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable o f providing

36 Gen. David Petraeus, Foreword in Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus
and the Remaking o f the Iraq War, by Peter R. Mansoor (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2013), ix.
37 Ricks, The Gamble, 124.
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the security that Baghdad needs.”38 This additional force strength was maintained for 18
months and began to be withdrawn in summer 2008.
One o f the biggest changes o f the surge was not just the additional troops, but
how they were used. Instead of being based in huge FOBs, these troops were moved into
smaller camps within populated areas. This allowed them to better protect the
population.39 This o f course also exposed American troops to greater levels o f violence
and the number o f casualties grew in the first few months o f the surge. Through April o f
June 2007 more than 100 Americans were killed each month. This was the first time in
the war that casualties reached that level for three consecutive months.40
Fortunately, however, this spike in violence was only temporary. By July, the
number o f casualties fell below 100, never to reach that level again. There were only 55
American deaths in August and the number was down to 14 in D ecem ber41 Even more
important, the number o f civilian Iraqis killed began to drop, eventually falling to levels
seen only prior to the onset o f severe sectarian strife in 2006.42 Violence was reduced
during the summer o f 2007 by nearly all measures. Ricks reports that,
Between June and December [2007], the number o f bomb, rifle, mortar, and
grenade attacks in Iraq would decrease by some 60 percent, from an all-time high
o f 1,600 a week in June to below 600 a week by year’s end. Some 44 car bombs
were detonated in Baghdad in February, killing 253 and wounding another 654,
while there would be only 5 in December, killing 12 and wounding 40 43

38 Ricks, The Gamble,
39 Ricks, The Gamble,
40 Hanson, 218.
41 Ricks, The Gamble,
42 Hanson, 218.
43 Ricks, The Gamble,

122.
132-133.
240.
249.

164

Reduced violence continued into 2008. In July o f that year only 13 Americans
were killed.44 Other goals were being met as well. Intelligence gathering, for example,
improved as U.S. troops were in more constant contact with the people and as they
became more confident in the ability o f U.S. forces to protect th em 45 Furthermore,
“Baghdad turned mostly quiet-just thirteen months after the deployment o f more
American troops. Media accounts conceded that most political and economic
benchmarks promised by Petraeus-under dispute throughout 2007-were being met and
passed by late 2008.”46
With an appropriate number o f soldiers and the proper counterinsurgency
strategy, the coalition was able to turn around a dire situation which was teetering on the
edge o f defeat. Though Iraq was still far from safe, violence was greatly reduced and the
population was more secure. Unfortunately, however, the surge lasted only a short time
and withdrawal o f forces began immediately after. Just as in Vietnam, when the
appropriate strategy was applied success followed but by the time it was applied the
public was already weary o f the war and was demanding a pull-back. It’s impossible to
know a counter-factual, but the success o f the surge indicates that if the appropriate force
level and strategy had been applied at the beginning o f the conflict, an insurgency may
never have arisen at all and if it did, may well have been quickly defeated.

44 Hanson, 219.
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INDIRECT ACTION AGAINST THE INSURGENT
Direct action against the insurgency is not the only area in which the coalition
made serious errors during the Iraq War. Indirect action— in the form o f reconstruction,
economic development, and political legitimacy—was also deeply flawed. A primary
reasons for this, at least at the beginning, was failure to plan. As noted previously, the
Bush administration was confident that the invading force would be greeted as liberators
by a population grateful for the removal o f Saddam Hussein. They further believed that
the Iraqi government and economy would be able to reform on its own with little help
from the coalition. Oil revenues were assumed to be sufficient to pay for reconstruction,
and Iraqi exiles, such as Ahmed Chalabi, would be able to direct the government until
nationwide elections were held.
Immediately following the successful invasion, the Bush administration put
retired General Jay Gamer in charge o f the Office for Rehabilitation and Humanitarian
Aid (ORHA), thereby making him the top civilian governing authority in the country.
Unfortunately, Gamer took a rather hands-off approach and was ineffective in
establishing order. Hashim judges the ORHA harshly, saying that it
...can be blamed for failing to restore basic services to the Iraqi people or
distribute humanitarian aid effectively. The country had less electricity than
before the war and during the decade o f sanctions. This was not an optimal
situation to have in spring as the heat o f the Iraqi summer loomed. As the regime
collapsed hospitals were extensively looted o f medicines and supplies, and were
also in worse shape than before the war. The effective rationing system collapsed
after the war but humanitarian assistance could not reach the people in a sustained
manner because planners in the Pentagon did not work with NGOs. Moreover,
NGOs that were keen to go into postwar Iraq were loath to send their workers
because o f the absence o f law and order. Unsurprisingly, the political, economic
and social situation in Iraq under the auspices o f Gamer and ORHA in spring
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2003 could be said to approximate-with a little hyperbole-Thomas Hobbes’s state
o f nature.47
It is perhaps unfair, however, to blame Gamer exclusively, as he was reflecting
the overall attitude o f the administration. Little planning had gone into the postwar
reconstruction phase and it was considered o f little consequence. As an example o f the
nonchalant attitude taken by the administration towards issues o f governance, Larry
Diamond recounts this meeting between Secretary o f Defense Rumsfeld and Ambassador
Barbara Bodine just prior to the invasion in mid-March 2003:
...she explained the urgent need to figure out a way to make sure Iraqi civil
servants got paid in the aftermath o f the war, so that government services could
continue and opposition could be preempted. The operating assumption had been
that the Iraqi civil servants would be in their offices after the war, ready to work,
and that the occupation would have a fully functioning Iraqi government within a
matter o f days. Rumsfeld insisted that it didn’t matter whether Iraqi civil servants
got paid. ‘They can wait two weeks or two months,’ he said. What mattered, he
said, was that the American taxpayer wouldn’t stand for the United States paying
Iraqi civil servants. When someone suggested that there would be riots in the
streets if the civil servants didn’t get paid, Rumsfeld replied that this could be
used as leverage to get the Europeans in to pick up the burden48
As a result o f this carelessness towards the Iraqi bureaucracy, governing
institutions collapsed immediately after the invasion. Pimie and O ’Connell note that “In
defeat, the Ba’athist regime collapsed quickly and completely. Suddenly no longer a
centrally controlled, one-party dictatorship, Iraq became ungovemed space, lacking basic
services and security for its citizens.”49 The coalition had removed the governing
structure o f Iraq and failed to replace it with another structure strong enough to provide
key and essential services.

47 Hashim, 293.
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Gamer and ORHA were soon replaced by Ambassador L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer
who became head o f the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). He did little better, and
in fact made certain decisions that likely worsened the situation. The most damaging o f
these decision was de-Ba’athification o f the Iraqi bureaucracy, which emptied the
government o f competent technocrats, and the dissolution o f the Iraqi Army and National
Police. Approximately 120,000 government employees o f all types— including non
political positions such as teachers and doctors— were suddenly without jobs and
unavailable to assist in the country’s reconstruction.50
These decisions left the country with dysfunctional governing institutions and no
security forces outside o f coalition troops. The CPA proved incompetent in the task o f
performing those governing responsibilities once carried out by the dismissed Iraqi
bureaucracy. Lack o f planning, incompetence, and incorrect assumptions led to the
unraveling o f Iraqi society and a total lack o f legitimacy for the CPA. Ricks argues that,
When assumptions are wrong, everything built on them is undermined. Because
the Pentagon assumed that U.S. troops would be greeted as liberators and that an
Iraqi government would be stood up quickly, it didn’t plan seriously for less rosy
scenarios. Because it so underestimated the task at hand, it didn’t send a welltrained, coherent team o f professionals, but rather an odd collection o f youthful
Republican campaign workers and other novices. Nor did it send enough people.
In part because o f the poor quality and sheer lack of CPA personnel, the U.S.
occupation authorities would prove unable to adjust their stance quickly when
assumptions proved wrong. Because o f that incompetence, the CPA would be
unable to provide basic services such as electricity, clean water, and security to
the Iraqi population, and so in the fall o f 2003 it would begin to lose the
lukewarm support it had enjoyed.51
Hashim agrees and argues that these deficiencies fueled the growing insurgency.
He writes:
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The CPA would have succeeded in degrading the impact o f ill will and o f the
insurgency had it restored law and order, had it not implemented certain policies
that either humiliated Iraqis or added to the level o f unemployment, and had it
begun an effective reconstruction o f the country. The lack o f basic services and
the patent inability o f the occupiers to rebuild infrastructure fueled much o f the
emerging discontent.52
The failure to begin reconstruction and development efforts immediately and
competently had at least three immediate consequences. One was that there was a large
pool o f disaffected young men, including dismissed soldiers, without sufficient
opportunity for employment. These men resented the CPA and the occupation generally
and provided the insurgency with a substantial population o f potential recruits.53 The
second consequence was that the CPA lost whatever legitimacy it may have had. It was
bad enough that the CPA was a foreign occupying entity, but when combined with
incompetence and seeming indifference to the plight o f ordinary Iraqis it held little appeal
as a governing authority. This in turn led to the third consequence, a power vacuum in
governance created a power struggle by militia forces to fill it.
Pimie and O’Connell assessed that, “The government is so ineffective that the
conflict more nearly resembles a many-sided struggle for power amid the ruins o f the
Ba’athist state.”54 This was a sectarian struggle primarily between the Shi’ites and Sunni
but also included the Kurds, who sought a large degree o f autonomy. These groups
formed their own armed militias in order to protect their own constituents and to attack
their sectarian enemies. They also worked on social projects, however, filling the gap left
by the non-functioning government. One o f the most prominent o f the Shi’ite militias,
The Mahdi Army, which was led by cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, was heavily involved in the

52 Hashim, 295.
53 Pimie and O ’Connell, 28.
54 Pimie and O ’Connell, xiv.

169

provision o f social services and has been compared with Hezbullah with its combination
o f military and social services.55
In recognition o f the CPA’s limited legitimacy, Bremer initiated an effort to hand
power, or at least a certain degree of influence, over to an Iraqi led governing entity. In
July o f 2003 the Iraqi Governing Council was formed. It was comprised o f 25 members,
all o f whom were chosen by the coalition. This would lead to further problems of
legitimacy as many, including the very influential Shi’a religious leader Ali al-Sistani,
claimed that the council could not be reflective o f the will o f the Iraqi people since it was
unelected and chosen by the occupying forces. The first president o f the council was
Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who was a leader in the Shi’ite Da’wa Party. It also included other
prominent Shi’ite leaders and Kurds such as Jalal Talabani. It contained no Sunni Arabs,
however.56
The decision not to include any Sunnis further alienated them from the
government and exacerbated their feelings o f disenfranchisement. It also threatened the
Sunnis by making it seem as if the coalition were siding exclusively with the Shi’a, who
they feared would seek reprisals for past wrongs against them. The council failed to
provide the Sunnis with an appropriate political outlet to express discontent, leaving them
only with violence as an alternative. Further, it enabled Sunni extremist propagandists
the ability to claim that attacks against the government were attacks against an
illegitimate foreign occupier and its Shi’a collaborators rather than a legitimate Iraqi
government that was designed to meet the needs o f all Iraqis.57
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Free and fair elections, however, take time to prepare for and execute. The first
national elections would be held in January 2005. Unfortunately, the Sunnis chose to
boycott the election and won only 17 seats, leaving them practically voiceless. The Shi’a
dominated United Iraqi Alliance party won 140 seats and the Kurdistan Alliance took 75.
The Iraqi List (primarily composed o f secular Shi’ites) won 40 seats. Ibrahim al-Jaafari
was made prime minister.58
One o f the primary tasks o f this newly elected body was to draft a new
constitution for Iraq. It did so and that draft was accepted by the Iraqi people in a
referendum in October 2005. The adoption o f the new constitution required a new
election and one was held in December 2005. The Sunnis participated this time, thereby
lending greater legitimacy to the outcome. The results still fell largely along sectarian
lines, however. The United Iraqi Alliance won 128 seats, the Kurdistan Alliance 53, and
Iraqi Concord Front (a Sunni party) won 44 seats. The Iraqi List was reduced to 25 seats.
Ibrahim al-Jaafari was initially offered the retention o f the prime minister position, but
objections from the Kurds and Sunnis led to his eventual rejection. Instead Nouri alMaliki, o f the Da’wa Party took the position in February 2006. He remains in that
•

•

t

•

t

position to this day.
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These elections were a major step in the direction o f enhanced government
legitimacy. The problems o f sectarianism, corruption and incompetence still remained,
however. When Gen. Petraeus took command o f American forces in Iraq he recognized
the importance o f improving civil governance along with security.

58 Pimie and O ’Connell, 14.
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As security improved, the tasks in the civilian arena took on greater importance.
It was critical, for example, that we work with our coalition and Iraqi civilian
partners to help repair damaged infrastructure, restore basic services, rebuild local
markets, reopen schools and health facilities, and support the reestablishment o f
the corrections and judicial systems and other governmental institutions. While
not determinative by themselves, such improvements gave Iraqi citizens tangible
reasons to support the new Iraq and reject the extremists, insurgents, and militia
members who had caused such hardship for them. To facilitate and coordinate
such efforts, each brigade and division headquarters was provided an embedded
provincial reconstruction team o f approximately a dozen civilian and military
experts.60
Efforts were made along these lines; Petraeus cited improvements in election
laws, reform o f de-Ba’athification, and amnesty legislation.61 But this was the area in
which the least progress was probably made. By the time elections were held, legal
reforms began to be instituted, and the government started to more competently provide
basic services, sectarian violence and endemic political corruption and waste had already
poisoned Iraqi politics and political institutions. Once a government is seen by a large
percentage o f its citizens as illegitimate, regaining loyalty from that population becomes
extremely difficult, especially when there are forces actively working to prevent such
loyalty from developing. Patraeus himself admitted that “ .. .it was in this area that the
most additional progress was-and still is-needed.’

That hasn’t changed since, and at the

time o f this writing sectarian antagonism, especially between Shi’ites and Sunnis remains
the greatest challenge to Iraqi nationhood and stability.
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INTERACTION WITH THE POPULATION
The U.S. also made substantial mistakes at the beginning o f the Iraq War in terms
o f its interaction with the Iraqi people. In addition to its failure to protect them, discussed
in the section on direct action, the U.S. failed to understand them, and in some cases was
an active threat to them by means o f collateral damage and poorly calibrated use o f force.
According to Hashim, “Interactions between US forces and Iraqis were characterized
from the early days by profound psychological and cultural gaps. The vicious cycle is
exacerbated when Iraqis and Americans begin to view each other as merciless and brutal
savages, and then to act upon these perceptions, inflicting atrocities that further widen the
gap.’"
Journalists Chris Hedges and Laila al-Arian concur with Hashim’s assessment.
They point to a lack o f cultural, historical and linguistic understanding as being severe
handicaps to fruitful interaction with the people. This ignorance can easily morph into
stereotypes and racism. This becomes especially pronounced as violence increases and
soldiers witness their friends being killed by these people whom they have little
understanding of. When this happens, “The occupation troops, frustrated and enraged by
the growing power and deadliness o f the insurgency, usually jettison quaint notions about
winning over a populace that, most soon decide, is hostile to the occupation.”64
Thi s lack o f understanding was made worse by the strategy o f basing soldiers on
large protected bases rather than among the population. This was done under the
leadership o f Gen. Ricardo Sanchez but increased even more under the direction o f Gen.
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George Casey. Ricks argues that, “Casey.. .undermined his own efforts, because his
basic approach remained at odds with counterinsurgency theory. He was pulling his
troops farther away from the population, closing dozens o f bases in 2005 as he
consolidated his force on big, isolated bases that the military termed ‘Super FOBs.”65
This cut American troops off from the population and prevented the types o f close
connections that may have fostered understanding and positive relationships.
Interestingly, in 2004 Casey had ordered his planners to prepare a comprehensive
review o f lessons-leamed from previous counterinsurgencies. He writes in his memoir
that “COIN was something that we, in the U.S. military, had not been involved with for
some time. My perception, from observing and talking to subordinates, was that we
understood the doctrine well enough, but that we all had a lot to learn about how to apply
that doctrine, particularly in Iraq.”66 The review came back with several key conclusions,
the top two being that an emphasis on intelligence was key and that there should be a
focus on meeting the needs o f the population, particularly in terms o f security. Yet the
two primary takeaways from the report for Gen. Casey had to do with the length o f
average counterinsurgencies (9 years) and the fact that a capable indigenous partner was
im portant67
Due to the lack o f connection and empathy with the people that came from basing
troops apart from them, hostility was sometimes visible in the tactics used by coalition
forces and in their treatment o f Iraqis. In terms o f tactics, for example, the methodology
used by coalition forces to search homes was often counterproductive. Pimie and
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O ’Connell noted that, “When insurgency first became apparent, the United States
responded with kick-down-the-door-sweep operations that often netted few insurgents
but made Sunni Arabs increasingly disaffected and created a mass o f fodder overnight for
a new wave o f insurgent propaganda videos.”68 Sgt. John Bruhns, who was involved in
such searches and spoke with Hedges and al-Arian, gives a detailed explanation o f how
these raids unfolded:
You go up the stairs. You grab the man o f the house. You rip him out o f bed in
front o f his wife. You put him up against the wall. You have junior-level troops,
PFCs (privates first class), specialists will run into the other rooms and grab the
family, and you’ll group them all together. Then you go into a room and you tear
the room to shreds and you make sure there’s no weapons or anything that they
can use to attack us. You get the interpreter and you get the man o f the home, and
you have him at gunpoint, and you’ll ask the interpreter to ask him: ‘Do you have
any weapons? Do you have any anti-U.S. propaganda, anything at all-anythinganything in here that would lead us to believe that you are somehow involved in
insurgent activity or anti-coalition activity?’ Normally they’ll say no, because
that’s normally the truth. So what you’ll do is, you’ll take his sofa cushions and
you’ll dump them. If he has a couch, you’ll turn the couch upside down. You’ll
go into the fridge, and you’ll throw everything on the floor, and you’ll take his
drawers and you’ll dump them .. .You’ll open up his closet and you’ll throw all the
clothes on the floor and basically leave his house looking like a hurricane just hit
it. And if you find something, then you’ll detain him. If not, you’ll say, ‘Sorry to
disturb you. Have a nice evening.’ So you’ve just humiliated this man in front o f
his entire family and terrorized the entire family and you’ve destroyed his home.
And then you go right next door and you do the same thing in a hundred homes.69
It’s not surprising that such tactics did not endear coalition forces to the people.
Even those people initially in support o f the occupation could be quickly swayed to the
other side upon experiencing such trauma. Another soldier, Sgt. Westphal, said about
this, “Most o f the people were terrified. You could see it in their eyes. We knew that this
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[night raids] was not the way to win hearts and minds. You don’t come in the middle of
the night and harass people and then expect them to give you flowers the next day.”70
The most egregious example of mistreatment o f Iraqis by U.S. forces was likely
the treatment o f prisoners in Abu Ghraib. In early 2004 it was uncovered that prison
guards in that prison had been physically, psychologically and sexually mistreating many
prisoners in their custody. Explicit photographs o f these guards humiliating their
captives outraged not only Iraqis, but people around the world, especially other Arabs.
This incident was extremely damaging and was a major recruiting tool for extremists.
Pimie and O ’Connell explain why the incident was so harmful to the American effort:
For Arab audiences, the photographs taken at Abu Ghraib, endlessly copied and
disseminated through the media and the Internet, confirm their worst
apprehensions about Americans. The photographs depict acts o f sexual sadism
inflicted by American women on Arab men, acts that are especially humiliating in
a culture that emphasizes masculinity and personal honor. Weak leadership,
inadequate resources, confusing guidance, and tangled command relationships all
contributed to the chaotic conditions at Abu Ghraib, where these abuses
occurred.71
These perceptions were on top o f the negative perceptions created by the inability
o f coalition forces to protect the Iraqi people from violence, the prevalence o f accidental
killings (at checkpoints, for example), collateral damage (numerous examples o f this sort
are described by Hedges and al-Arian) and the failure to provide services. Insufficient
access to basic necessities such as power and clean water persisted and further alienated
the population from the government and the coalition. During the summer o f 2006,
electricity was available during only half o f the day. Likewise, water-treatment facilities
in Baghdad were only capable o f meeting little more than half o f the city’s needs.
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Sewage and garbage collection were also major problems in Baghdad and mostly non
existent outside o f the capital, and especially in rural areas.72
As in the other areas o f the war, interaction with the population began to improve
under the leadership of Gen. Petraeus. He was very aware o f the importance o f the
population in counterinsurgency efforts. “The biggest o f the ‘big ideas’ that guided the
strategy during the surge,” he said, “was explicit recognition that the most important
terrain in the campaign in Iraq was the human terrain— the people.”73 One way in which
he did this was by encouraging the expansion o f a new program (begun in 2007, first in
Afghanistan and then Iraq) called the Human Terrain System (HTS) throughout
American bases in Iraq. According to the organization’s website, it’s mission is as
follows: “The Human Terrain System develops, trains, and integrates a social science
based research and analysis capability to support operationally relevant decision-making,
to develop a knowledge base, and to enable sociocultural understanding across the
operational environment.”74
In other words, the program fielded civilian social scientists to study and analyze
the culture o f the populations living within the battle space in order to provide relevant
information to decision-making commanders. Petraeus has said that, “Counterinsurgency
operations depend on a keen understanding o f the political, historical, cultural, economic,
and military situation in each area.. .Truly understanding the human terrain was vital to
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our ability to improve its security.”75 HTS was the Army’s primary attempt to meet that
recognized need.
Although HTS teams met with variable success, most commanders who were
asked said that they were useful. Lamb, et. al., analyzed several assessments o f HTS
functionality and found that, “When all commander assessments from multiple studies
are considered, it is clear that those who thought their HTTs [Human Terrain Teams]
were useful constituted the large majority.”76 These commanders specifically cited HTTs
as providing greater situational awareness, knowledge o f basic customs, and
methodologies for obtaining accurate information pertaining to the human terrain. They
were also positively cited for providing cultural awareness and human terrain training to
the troops.77
Much more important than efforts such as HTS, however, was the Sunni
Awakening. This was a widespread defection o f the Sunni Arabs from their allegiance to
al-Qaeda and the insurgency and their re-alignment with coalition forces and the Iraqi
government. This movement began in Ramadi, a part o f Al Anbar province which was
one o f the most violent in the country. Lt. Col. Silverman, who was operating in the area
at the time, credits the Sunni’s defection from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to the brutal
intimidation campaign that the organization was using against the population.78
Silverman points to the initial willingness o f one sheik, Abu Ali Jassim, to stand up to

75 Petraeus, xviii-xix.
76 Christopher J. Lamb, James Douglas Orton, Michael C. Davies and Theodore T.
Pikulsky, Human Terrain Teams: An Organizational Innovation fo r Sociocultural
Knowledge in Irregular Warfare (Washington, DC: IWP Press, 2013), 2.
77 Lamb, et. al., 179.
78 Silverman, 72.

178

AQI, and his subsequent kidnapping and murder by AQI, as the catalyst for the entire
movement.
The Abu Ali Jassim sheik and the members o f his tribe, although they were rabid
nationalists, hated AQI. They aligned with a handful o f other tribes to form the
Anbar Salvation Counsel (ASC) and to encourage their young men to fight AQI.
The ASC was a very small group o f sub-tribe sheiks from four tribes in Jazeera,
north o f Ram adi...who were taking direct action against AQI. They began
recruiting tribal militias to violently remove al Qaeda from their areas, and that is
what caused al Qaeda to overplay its hand. On August 21, 2006, AQI made what
turned out to be a fatal error. Members kidnapped and killed the sheik o f the Abu
Ali Jassim tribe in North Ramadi, and they committed the unforgiveable offense
o f hiding the body so that the sheik could not be properly buried.79
This atrocity led to a general Sunni uprising against AQI. Fortunately, U.S.
leaders were wise enough to recognize that this was happening and worked to capitalize
on it. Gen. Petraeus notes that, “ .. .the spread o f the Awakening beyond Ramadi was not
serendipity; rather, it was the result o f a conscious decision and a deliberate
effort....Given my recognition o f the importance o f reconciliation, I was determined that
we would support the nascent Awakening and then, over time, gain our Iraqi partners’
on

support, as well.’

One way in which he did this was to put these Sunni (and to a lesser

extent, Shi’ite) fighters, known as Sons o f Iraq, on the payroll o f the occupation.
Petraeus notes that 18 months into the surge there were 100,000 such fighters being paid
to protect their neighborhoods from Sunni insurgents and Shi’a militias.81 This was a
major force multiplier that greatly supplemented the new troops introduced by the surge.
This initiative met with major success. Hanson notes that in Anbar Province
seven thousand weapons caches were confiscated and thousands o f al-Qaeda fighters
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killed towards the end o f 2007.82 Ricks reports that, “Some experts, such as retired Gen.
Abizaid and Stephen Biddle, a sometime adviser to Petraeus, argue that the change in the
loyalties o f Sunni fighters was the single most important cause o f the improvement in
security iri 2007.”

Ol

Silverman also credits the movement with making democratic

elections possible. He notes that many o f the sheiks involved in the Awakening worked
together with Shi’ites to develop political parties representing all major sectarian groups.
“If not for the Awakening movement,” he says, “I don’t think that could have
happened.”84
As in the two other areas o f counterinsurgency, direct and indirect action against
the insurgents, coalition forces initially made major mistakes in terms o f interacting with
the population. They were largely ignorant o f cultural, political, religious, economic and
historical factors related to the population and how they viewed the coalition and its
efforts. They relied too heavily on invasive tactics, such as violent and humiliating raids
in the middle o f the night, and the attitude o f disrespect towards Iraqis that festered
among the troops allowed the Abu Ghraib incident to occur.
Efforts undertaken later in the war, primarily under the leadership o f Gen.
Petraeus, brought about substantial improvement. Petraeus made the population the
center o f gravity o f the conflict. He de-emphasized counterproductive night raids,
tightened rules o f engagement, and focused on obtaining greater cultural awareness
through efforts such as the Human Terrain System. He also grasped the opportunity
presented by the Sunni Awakening and worked hard to foster relationships with
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influential sheiks to make the most o f that phenomenon. Aside from the surge and the
overall change o f strategy initiated by Petraeus, the Awakening was one o f the most
important factors that resulted in reductions in violence in 2007 and after. Biddle,
Friedman and Shapiro that “both the surge and the Awakening mattered” and that it was
the synergy between them that led to the drastic reduction in violence.

Of

Unfortunately

these efforts came several years into the war, when many animosities had already been
developed and nurtured. If the surge had been adopted initially, there is no telling how
much more quickly the insurgency could have been brought to heel.

CONCLUSION
The Iraq War began with a highly successful invasion, morphed into a vicious
insurgency, and ended with an American withdrawal from a country with improved
security but persistent sectarian political strife that has continued to result in violence. In
their RAND report, Pimie and O ’Connell give a good summation o f how things got so
out o f control following the initial success o f the invasion. They write:
The Bush Administration did not anticipate widespread, virulent resistance to
U.S. occupation and to a new Iraqi government led by Shi’ite Arabs and Kurds.
As a result, it was initially unprepared to conduct COIN and promoted slow-paced
creation of the government, ceding time to the insurgents. Ethnic and sectarian
parties dominated the new government and failed to produce a foundation for
national unity....M oreover, the government was so weak that even Shi’ite Arabs
turned to militias for the protection that coalition forces failed to provide. In the
absence o f effective government, extremists in both sects committed outrages that
made the division still harder to bridge.
The coalition’s failure to protect the population, provide essential services to the

85 Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why
Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012):
11.

86 Pimie and O ’Connell, 61.
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population, and identify a proper military strategy had disastrous consequences. “The
combined facts that the U.S. military has followed a flawed COIN approach and the Iraqi
government has been ineffective in exerting its writ o f control over the country
constituted the early engines of failure.”87
Despite its initial unpreparedness, a swift change o f strategy from conventional
warfare to counterinsurgency operations would likely have met with far greater success.
Unfortunately, the flawed conventional strategy was adhered to for nearly four years.
Time enough to allow the insurgency to metastasize and for the American public’s
support for the conflict to sour. As in Vietnam, the American effort in 2007 and after
was too late to affect a complete turnaround o f events.
It is astounding, however, how much the trends o f the conflict were reversed. In
2006 the country seemed on the verge o f total collapse into a brutal civil war. Ricks
sums up the progress:
As the surge ended in mid-2008, with the last o f the five additional combat
brigades heading home, Baghdad felt distinctly better. Kebab stands and coffee
shops had reopened across the city, and many ordinary Iraqis felt safe enough to
venture out o f their homes at night, in part because stores were remaining open to
evening shoppers. Some women discarded the head scarves that Islamic
extremists had insisted they wear, with violators being attacked. Even as Iraq’s
factions remained murderously divided, violence was at its lowest level o f the
entire war, with only a dozen American soldiers dying in July 2008.88
Petraeus himself wrote that,
The comprehensive civil-military endeavor pursued during the surge made it
possible over time to transfer tasks from U.S. and other coalition forces to Iraqi
soldiers and police, and ultimately, for the United States to withdraw its final
combat elements at the end o f 2011 without a precipitate descent back into the
violence and civil conflict that made the surge necessary in the first place.89

87 Pimie and O ’Connell, 2.
88 Ricks, The Gamble, 294.
89 n
Petraeus, xxi.
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That certainly represents the achievement o f a very limited goal— the prevention
o f a descent into absolute chaos— but given the situation in 2006, it was indeed an
achievement. That achievement can be attributed to stationing enough troops in the
country to secure the population and instituting a proper COIN strategy that took the
population into account and which was able to capitalize on such events as the Sunni
Awakening.
We can only surmise what would have happened if those troops and that strategy
had been in place from the beginning rather than only after disaster had taken place. It is
reasonable to conclude, however, that violence would never have reached the horrific
levels that it did in 2006, that the insurgency and the uprising o f Shi’a militias would not
have developed to such a large scale, that sectarian violence would not have escalated so
astronomically, and that the Iraqi political system would have had a greater chance o f
developing a set o f competent and effective institutions. What is certain, however, is that
the lack o f success in Iraq during the first part o f the war— that before the surge and the
settlement on a COIN strategy by Gen. Petraeus— cannot be blamed on
counterinsurgency strategy.
The coalition’s failure to meet its military objectives was not a result o f COIN.
We know this because COIN was not seriously and consistently tried in the early years.
Rather, that failure should be placed at the feet o f a more conventional strategy that
involved force protection and emphasis on seeking and destroying terrorist groups and
individuals. Iraq stands not as a case study against the effectiveness o f COIN but on the
contrary as a repudiation o f the implementation o f a conventional strategy in an
insurgency fight. More than that, it stands as a partial vindication o f COIN against its
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critics as it was only after a proper COIN strategy was implemented that the situation
turned around and success became a possibility. The proper conclusion to draw from the
case o f Iraq is that a conventional strategy is likely to fail when faced with an insurgency
and that a COIN strategy has a much greater likelihood o f success.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS

In January 2012 President Obama announced a sizeable reduction in the troop
levels maintained by both the Army and Marine Corps. Instead, more emphasis would be
placed on Special Forces units and on technological military solutions, such as drones.1
The Army in particular is slated to shed 80,000 troops over a five year period, bringing
a

the total number o f brigade combat teams from 45 down to 33. This is in accordance
with the administration’s decision to downgrade the country’s readiness to conduct large
scale counterinsurgency operations. The administration’s 2012 defense strategy states:
In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will
emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address
instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to
stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited
counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside
coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and
continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that
have been developed over the past ten years o f counterinsurgency and stability
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized
to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.3
This decision is likely the outcome o f a determination that such operations are too
costly and. unlikely to succeed to be worth carrying out. Yet this could quite possibly

1 Craig Whitlock and Greg Jaffe, “Obama Announces New, Leaner Military Approach,”
Washington Post, January 5,2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-0105/national/35439746_l_defense-budget-military-force-pentagon (accessed December 3,
2013).
2 Erin Banco, “Army to Cut its Forces by 80,000 in Five Years,” New York Times, June
25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.eom/2013/06/26/us/army-to-cut-its-forces-by-80000-in-5years.html?_r=0 (accessed December 3, 2013).
United States Department o f Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for
21st Century Defense,” http://www.defense.gov/news/defense strategic_guidance.pdf
(accessed December 3, 2013).
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turn out to be a very short-sighted decision. One o f the primary lessons o f Iraq (and also
o f Afghanistan) is that without sufficient levels o f troops to protect the population,
counterinsurgency operations are likely to fail. And it is not always up to the United
States to choose whether or not it wants to become involved in such operations. During
the 2000 election cycle George W. Bush repeatedly enunciated a disdain for nationbuilding e fforts throughout his campaign and during debates. Yet his efforts to do just
that in Afghanistan and Iraq turned out to be among the most consequential events o f his
entire two-term presidency. While it may be argued that Iraq was a chosen war that
could easily have been avoided, it is not so clear that Afghanistan was a war o f choice. In
any event, it is rare that the U.S. wants to become involved in counterinsurgency
operations, but the possibility o f becoming so involved cannot be ignored. In fact, it
seems far more likely that the U.S. will face such challenges in the near future than that it
will face large-scale conventional warfare with another great power.
The Obama administration’s decision is consistent with the views o f such scholarpractitioners as Col. Gian Gentile who writes that “the idea that counterinsurgency works
is wrong— and history supports this assertion.”4 It has been the purpose o f this
dissertation to demonstrate that history does not in fact support the assertion that
counterinsurgency doesn’t work. Rather it shows that in Malaysia it did work and that in
Vietnam and Iraq it wasn’t tried until too late in day. The theoretical literature which
argues that democracies are uniquely incapable o f successfully conducting
counterinsurgency has also been shown to be unpersuasive. This concluding chapter will

4 Col. Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace o f Counterinsurgency
(New York: The New Press, 2013, Kindle Electronic Edition), 2.
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recapitulate the evidence mustered throughout this dissertation, demonstrating that
democracies can in fact win counterinsurgencies if they utilize the appropriate strategy.
There are two main arguments in the theoretical literature against the ability o f
democracies to effectively counter insurgencies. The first is that democracies have
limited will power, the second is that they cannot be brutal enough. Both o f these have
much to do with the fact that the international media brings these conflicts directly into
people’s homes. In the first case, this media inundation makes casualties highly salient
and can erode public support for conflicts that are seen as having too high a cost in this
regard. In the second case, media coverage restricts a democracy’s ability to impose a
sufficiently brutal strategy necessary to bring the insurgents to heel. Such a strategy
results in a moral outcry when exposed by the media thereby undermining the regime’s
ability to execute it consistently.
The first o f these problems is likely the most worrisome for democratic regimes.
But it is not fatal. Democratic regimes have demonstrated the ability to stay with a fight
for years. The British ultimately prevailed in Malaysia after a decade, the U.S. had
substantial levels o f combat troops in Vietnam for eight years, and U.S. troops fought in
Iraq for a similar length o f time. Aversion to casualties mounts over time, but most
analyses (as discussed in chapter two) show no one-to-one relationship between
casualties and public support. Other factors, such as the probability o f success and the
importance o f the mission, are mediating variables. Casualties are just one factor in a
cost-benefit analysis conducted by the public. RAND analyst Eric V. Larson argues that:
Majorities o f the public have historically considered the potential and actual
casualties in U.S. wars and military operations to be an important factor in their
support, and there is nothing new in this. But the current attention to the public’s
unwillingness to tolerate casualties misses the larger context in which the issue
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has become salient: The simplest explanation consistent with the data is that
support for U.S. military operations and the willingness to tolerate casualties are
based upon a sensible weighing o f benefits and costs that is influenced heavily by
consensus (or its absence) among political leaders.5
So, although casualty aversion is a serious issue for democratic regimes
fighting insurgencies, it is but one factor among many. Its impact is blunted when the
cause is considered good, when there is a strong likelihood o f success, and when political
leadership is in consensus. Still, Mueller’s analysis o f public opinion in Vietnam (and
Korea) concluded that “support for the wars followed to a remarkable degree the same
trend pattern and was a function o f the logarithm of the number o f American casualties.”6
Popular opposition, especially in the aftermath o f the Tet Offensive, was certainly one
reason that the U.S. began to waiver in its commitment to South Vietnam and withdraw
troops from that country. In spite o f declining public support for the war, however,
combat troops were not fully disengaged until 1972. The war was a lengthy one, and
probably long enough for victory— if the proper strategy had been carried out from the
beginning.
This gets us to the second difficulty said to impede success for democracies
attempting to withstand insurgencies, which is that they cannot impose a strategy o f
brutality. Posed most forcefully by Gil Merom, the premise o f this argument is that
democracies are held too accountable by their publics to engage in the sort o f nasty,
brutal combat that it is necessary to defeat insurgencies. Indiscriminate and brutal
attacks, torture for the acquisition o f intelligence, and other such tactics cannot long be

5 Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role o f Casualties in
Domestic Support fo r U.S. Military Operations (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), xv.
6 John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1973), 266.
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carried out by a democratic regime constantly under scrutiny by the media and its
informed citizenry. Merom does indeed provide evidence that a strategy o f brutality can
be effective when carried out by an autarkic regime that is unworried by public backlash.
At the same time, democratic regimes that attempt to follow such a strategy, as did the
French in Algeria, are likely to fail due to public outcry.
This does not demonstrate, however, that democracies can’t win
counterinsurgencies. It only demonstrates that they can’t do so through the use o f
brutality. Nor should they. Moral outrage against brutal tactics are justified. Instead
democracies must follow another strategy— a population centered one. That is the type
o f strategy outlined by luminaries such as David Galula and recently made into doctrine
by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps under the guidance o f Gen. Petraeus. A strategy that
follows along those same guidelines was used as a rubric to analyze the conflicts
explored as case studies in this dissertation. An outline o f that strategy is as follows:
1. Direct Action against the Insurgent.
A. Secure the population from insurgent attacks.
B. Ensure sufficient troop strength to protect targeted populations and
destroy or expel insurgent forces.
C. Emplace troops in population centers.
D. Produce intelligence to identify insurgents and differentiate them
from the larger population.
E. Prevent insurgent groups from reforming following initial defeat.
F. Undermine or destroy insurgent political organizations.
G. Develop host nation military capability.
2. Indirect Action against the Insurgent
A. Build host-nation legitimacy by demonstrating political, economic,
social and developmental competence.
B. Undermine insurgent grievances through effective political action.
C. Hold elections and develop functional and independent political
institutions as soon as practical.
D. Develop close partnership between host and assisting nations.
3. Interaction with Population
A. Develop substantial and deep cultural awareness and understanding.
B. Address political, economic, developmental and social grievances o f
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the population.
C. Develop cooperation between the population and counterinsurgent
forces in order to improve intelligence.
D. Avoid brutal tactics that will alienate the population.
E. Deny insurgent forces access to and support from the population.
In the first case study examined in this dissertation, that o f the British in Malaysia,
it was demonstrated that this strategy was followed quite closely. The British instituted
and followed the Briggs Plan which focused first on providing security for the
population, secondly on breaking up the communist organizations and institutions among
the population, then on isolating the insurgents from the information and supplies that
they needed from the population, and finally on destroying the insurgents as they were
forced to directly confront government forces. The concept and proper implementation
o f the New Villages initiative helped achieve all o f these goals.
Though success in Malaysia took many years and was never easy, it was
achieved. The British destroyed the communist insurgency and left Malaysia a sovereign
and independent country that selected its leadership through a democratic process.
Malaysia was a victory for the British by any o f the measures outlined by Mandel. The
case o f Malaysia not only demonstrates that democracies can win counterinsurgencies, it
also shows how they should go about doing it.
Critics o f counterinsurgency are not impressed by this example. It is an anomaly,
they claim, in a time before extensive media coverage o f conflicts was available. Instead,
they would point to the failures o f the United States— the most powerful nation in the
world— in two o f its counterinsurgency efforts, Vietnam and Iraq. Since these are often
considered to be strong cases against the efficacy o f counterinsurgency strategy it is
important that they be confronted head-on, which I have done in case studies o f each o f
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them. Those studies revealed is that neither casts serious doubt on the value o f the type
o f counterinsurgency strategy described here and advocated by many o f the best
counterinsurgency experts over the past fifty years. Rather, they demonstrate the futility
o f relying upon conventional methods in an attempt to defeat unconventional threats.
They also demonstrate just how effective counterinsurgency strategy can be once
properly and consistently applied.
In the case o f Vietnam, the United States started the conflict with a highly
conventional strategy under the leadership o f Gen. William Westmoreland. The strategy
revolved around seeking out the enemy and destroying them— through conventional
military means and large units. This strategy proved largely ineffective. Although it kept
North Vietnamese conventional forces from overtaking the South, it did little to defeat
the insurgency or to build up ARVN forces. As the U.S. effort in Vietnam floundered,
and as the American public began to doubt the eventual outcome, support for the war
dwindled and resources began to be withdrawn.
In 1968 Westmoreland was replaced by Gen. Creighton Abrams who was more
flexible in his thinking and recognized the need for a counterinsurgency strategy, which
he quickly began to implement. Despite the fact that he suffered constant reduction in
forces and other resources, Abrams’ new strategy saw almost immediate results. By the
time U.S. forces were fully withdrawn, the insurgency was prostrate and ineffective and
the ARVN had demonstrated the ability to repel North Vietnamese conventional
aggression if it was supported financially and backed up by U.S. airpower. It took two
years after U.S. withdrawal for North Vietnam to muster the forces necessary to finally
overthrow the government o f South Vietnam and unify the country under communist
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control. This was not achieved by the insurgency, for it had been defeated by Abrams’
strategy. The final invasion o f 1975 would likely not have succeeded at all if the U.S.
had continued to provide air power and financial support to ARVN.
Rather than proving that counterinsurgency strategy is ineffective, the case of
Vietnam demonstrates that it is vital. The U.S. mission in Vietnam failed because it
waited too long to institute a proper counterinsurgency strategy and stubbornly clung to
the conventional strategy adopted by Gen. Westmoreland. By the time Abrams corrected
the strategic direction o f the war, U.S. public opinion had already grown sour and
resources were being withdrawn. If the U.S. had started with a counterinsurgency
strategy, however, it is likely— or at least plausible— that the success achieved by Gen.
Abrams late in the war would have occurred earlier, thereby providing the time necessary
to fully safeguard South Vietnam’s independence. It is the tragedy o f Vietnam that the
correct strategy was adopted too late in the war to ultimately make a difference in the
final outcome despite the successes that began to arise in short-order after its initiation.
The story in Iraq was largely the same, and therefore even more tragic since the
example o f Vietnam already existed and could have been learned from. Under the
leadership o f Gen. Ricardo Sanchez and then Gen. George Casey, a largely conventional
strategy was applied to the situation in Iraq. Nearly all initial planning went into the
invasion itself, with little heed being paid to its aftermath. This short-sightedness, and
failure to take into account a broader understanding o f what winning a war means, led to
chaos in post-invasion Iraq. Looters were allowed to plunder with impunity, public
services were breaking down, and sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shi’ites
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metastasized into a low-level civil war by 2006. A successful invasion was being turned
into an embarrassing defeat at the hands o f insurgents and terrorists.
It took several years for the Bush administration to recognize that there was in
fact an insurgency, that the current strategy was not working, and that a true
counterinsurgency strategy needed to be implemented. By that time the country was on
the verge o f collapse into utter chaos. It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that Gen.
David Petraeus was able to so successfully turn the situation around in only 18 months.
Though the country was far from being violence-free, the levels o f violence had dropped
to 2004 levels, which was a major accomplishment. This situation is attributable to both
Gen. Petraeus’ introduction of a new population-centric counterinsurgency strategy and
to his pursuit of alliances with key tribal leaders, as occurred in the Sunni Awakening.
The situation became settled enough that the Iraqi government was able to claim
its own complete sovereignty and request the withdrawal o f all U.S. troops by December
2011. Unfortunately, however, violence has continued since that time and the insurgency
has never been completely defeated. Nevertheless, the present condition o f the country
would likely be much worse if the new counterinsurgency strategy had not been
implemented in 2007. We can only wonder how much better things would be if it had
been initiated in 2003.
Can democracies win counterinsurgencies? The answer is yes. An analysis o f
both the theoretical literature and the study o f the important historical cases o f Malaysia,
Vietnam and Iraq make that clear. What is also clear, however, is that a proper
population-centric strategy must be employed and well-resourced from the beginning. To
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spend several years trying a conventional strategy before switching to a more appropriate
counterinsurgency strategy will likely fail, as it did in Vietnam and Iraq.
Other important lessons are that enough troops must be present to secure the
population from insurgent violence and to prevent widespread lawlessness. Cultural,
historical and social knowledge o f the country being operated in are essential. Over
reliance on firepower and heavy weaponry are often counterproductive. Intelligence,
particularly human intelligence, is o f paramount importance. This intelligence should not
be directed solely towards order o f battle and other conventional knowledge objectives
but towards understanding the insurgent shadow government, supply structures, and
leadership cadre. It is also imperative to have a strong partnership with a competent host
government that is willing to redress the legitimate grievances o f the population and
institute needed reforms.
Not only can democracies win counterinsurgencies, it is at least arguable that they
have certain advantages in doing so, given the type o f strategy outlined here. There are at
least four aspects o f democracy that possibly give them an advantage in carrying out
population-centric counterinsurgency: 1) democracies are usually wealthy, 2) they are
often multicultural and tolerant o f pluralism and diversity, 3) they possess a legitimate
form of government and the ability to assist others in developing legitimate governing
structures and institutions, and 4) democracies tolerate internal dissent and debate and are
therefore capable o f recognize suboptimal decisions and changing course.
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Democratic states are more likely to be wealthy than are autocraticies.7 This is
important in regards to population-centric counterinsurgency in that it is likely to be
expensive. Fielding the appropriate number o f troops, assisting the host nation in
providing services to the people, building up the host nation military capability, and
general nation-building efforts are all expensive. We saw in Chapter Three, based on
research by Lyall and Wilson, that wealth can be counterproductive in counter
insurgencies in that it allows for the overuse o f mechanization in order to prevent
casualties. This is not a necessary outcome, however. Democracies are capable o f
learning and the realization that mechanization is counterproductive has the potential to
lead to a more optimal use o f resources. Democracies have the financial wealth and
resources to be successful counterinsurgents, but they need to utilize those resources
wisely and in accordance with counterinsurgency theory.
Conducting counterinsurgencies in foreign lands requires cultural respect and
adaptability. Without the ability to function in a foreign culture, the counterinsurgent
force is unlikely to obtain the support o f the people. Democratic societies are usually
multicultural, pluralistic and tolerant. One o f the core values o f democracy is respect for
differences and alternative modes o f life. Such values have the potential to provide a
significant advantage to democratic counterinsurgents. They will likely have an easier
time adjusting to the host culture and should prove adaptable and open to cultural
difference, especially with appropriate cultural training and the use o f programs such as

Adam Przeworkski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi,
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 19501990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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the Human Terrain System. A non-democratic society, on the other hand, may not have
the same set o f values leading to an appreciation o f difference and pluralism. This may
put such societies at a disadvantage when it comes to operating in a foreign culture.
The development and support o f host nation legitimacy is a vital key to
counterinsurgency success. It is often the area over which the assisting nation has least
influence and may be one o f the most intractable o f problems facing them. As difficult as
it may be, however, democratic regimes likely have an advantage in this area. Though
there are varying forms o f legitimacy, democratic governance is rapidly becoming the
most widely accepted o f those forms. It’s also unlikely that a foreign counterinsurgency
effort would not have democratization o f the host nation as one o f its goals (if that nation
is not already democratic). Democracy is, therefore, the most likely path to the
development and sustainment o f host nation legitimacy. And who better to assist in the
development o f democracy than a democratic regime? In fact, it is quite counterintuitive
to imagine a non-democratic regime assisting another nation in becoming democratic.
Democratic regimes are most likely to be able to assist a host nation in developing
a democratic constitution or political framework (as the United States did in Afghanistan
and Iraq) ais well as functional and legitimate political institutions. The best example of
this is the U.S. occupation o f Japan in which a completely autarkic government, based on
the rule o f the emperor, was converted into one o f the richest and most functional
democracies on the planet in a matter o f years. Although this type o f transition represents
the best case scenario, it is only a democratic regime that has any hope o f bringing such
transition eibout.
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Finally, democracies tolerate internal dissent. Though seen by many as a unique
handicap o f democracies when fighting counterinsurgencies— because they are beholden
to popular opinion and support— it can also be a great strength. In democracies failing
strategies can be challenged. Though the United States started off with a flawed strategy
in both Vietnam and Iraq, those deficiencies were eventually recognized and the course
was corrected. That this could have happened in an autocratic regime is unclear. Such
regimes are often insulated from criticism, even by those within the government itself.
Protected from dissent, such regimes may continue with a flawed approach and be
impervious to change. The rigidity that can come with autarkic decision-making may be
a distinct disadvantage in population-centric counterinsurgency warfare.
The above speculations about the possible advantages that democracies may
possess in conducting population-centric counterinsurgency are just that— speculations.
Further research into these suggestions, if it were to empirically support them, would
provide powerful additional evidence that democracies can win counterinsurgencies, and
counter to the conventional wisdom, may even be better at it. Even if demonstrated to be
false, however, the evidence examined in this dissertation has demonstrated that
democracies are at least capable o f victory. Determining that they have the potential o f
actually being superior at counterinsurgents would be icing on the cake.
In either case, insurgent warfare is not likely to go away. Because powerful
democratic states such as the U.S. do not like engaging in counterinsurgency does not
mean that they won’t be faced with an insurgency and forced to do so. In fact, such low
intensity conflicts are much more likely to endanger the national security o f democratic
states than is full-scale conventional warfare conducted by large mechanized land units
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and naval vessels. This is especially the case in a world filled with failed states from
Somalia to Afghanistan and the persistence o f jihadist terrorist organizations around the
world. Failing to prepare for such an eventuality will only make success less likely. The
conclusion drawn by many from the U.S.’s experiences in Vietnam and Iraq (as well as
Afghanistan) that counterinsurgency efforts are futile is not only incorrect, but dangerous.
Countering a determined insurgency will always be hard. But democratic states can
defeat them. Learning the correct lessons from history and instituting the right strategy
based on those lessons is the way to do it.
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